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Preface 
 
The study of public administration and public management is a field of scholar-
ship that requires a firm embeddeness in the society it serves. After all, public 
administration scholarship is practical by nature. It provides practical tools and 
concepts for public managers and public leaders. These tools and concepts are 
derived from the study of administrative practices in that society.  
Universities, such as Mzumbe University (Tanzania) play an important role in 
developing tools and concepts and translating them for application in the day-to-
day situations of the specific administration of their country and their continent. 
The series African Pubic Administration and Management, founded by the Uni-
versity of Groningen and the African Studies Centre in Leiden, is an important 
instrument in fulfilling this promise for the African continent in general and Tan-
zania in particular. The aim of this series is to record the research of Tanzanian 
scholars in African public administration and public management and to distrib-
ute its results amongst all that are interested in what public administration and 
public management looks like in this African country.  
To ensure the academic quality, the publications in this series are subject to a 
peer review by scholars affiliated with the University of Groningen. The publica-
tion of this series is made possible by funding from the Netherlands Organisation 
for International Cooperation in Higher Education, Nuffic. 
 
Groningen / Morogoro, May 2011 
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1 
Theories and stories in  
African public administration: 
Introduction 
Josephat Itika, Ko de Ridder & Albertjan Tollenaar 
Introduction 
Public administration in developing countries is administration in transformation. 
In many countries in Africa, managing the public sector implies a continuing 
quest for good governance: For organisations, institutions and policies that best 
fit the needs of modernizing societies. In order to speed up the process, scholars 
and practitioners of public administration in Africa borrow ideas, concepts, insti-
tutional designs from all over the world, but mostly from the highly developed 
countries in Western Europe and America. There is a reason for borrowing in-
sights from the West: These societies appear relatively successful in the way they 
organize themselves. Through trial and error, they have succeeded in discovering 
sound administrative practices and good governance prescriptions, so it seems. 
Therefore they may offer good examples to follow for countries that have not 
gotten that far yet. 
Still, the transfer of administrative concepts and ideas from one institutional 
environment to another is full of pitfalls and barriers. One important obstacle is, 
that many of these concepts are very much interwoven in the social fabric of the 
country from which they originated. Administrative theories may be more about 
the particulars of management challenges in a specific cultural environment than 
about general insights in the workings of political and administrative organisa-
tion.  
All this can turn out to be particularly testing for teaching public administra-
tion and training future public officials. Much of this teaching is done with the 
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help of text books that are imported from the West. If teachers and students are 
not aware of cultural embeddedness of the content of those textbooks they may 
end up with a perspective on public administration that does not fit the adminis-
trative realities in their own country. To put it bluntly: A student of public ad-
ministration in Africa might very well gain a better understanding of the local 
government system in Great Britain or the USA than in Tanzania or Nigeria. Yet, 
the teaching and studying of public administration in Africa should be about Af-
rican public administration. The challenge then is to extract the core insights 
from public administration scholarship around the world and make them applica-
ble to gain a better understanding of indigenous governance issues.  
This book attempts to do just that.1 The foundation of the book is dual ap-
proach. On the one hand it discusses a number of core concepts of the public ad-
ministration discourse. These concepts, derived from the international public ad-
ministration scholarship are presented in their most general sense, stripped from 
excess meaning as much as possible. On the other hand the book is an anthology 
of stories about public administration in Tanzania. Some of these case descrip-
tions are the result of scholarly research, others are the by product of consultancy 
activities. Each of them is connected to one specific concept. In that way the 
story is an illumination of the concept, thus bridging the gap between an abstract 
theory and the complex reality it is meant to illuminate. In the remainder of this 
first chapter we will discuss the issue of transferring concepts from one adminis-
trative culture to another in some more detail. 
Dealing with dissimilarities 
Concept formation 
Concept formation means that otherwise diverging phenomena are brought to-
gether in one set under one name because they have one or more characteristics 
in common. By doing so, they are distinguished from other phenomena that lack 
those characteristics. Let’s take a relatively simple example: The concept of 
agency. We may define ‘agency’ as: An organisation that is (1) part of a govern-
mental executive branch and that is (2) performing a specific governmental task 
with (3) some autonomy. All organisations that have these three attributes in 
common fall under the heading of ‘agency’.  
Whether they are small or large, part of a local government or a central civil 
service, performing just one function or a variety of tasks – these and many more 
distinctions that can be made are not important for an organisation to qualify as a 
agency. Thus concept formation also means: Disregarding most of the real life 
                                                 
1.  The authors have taken their lead from Richard Stillman’s seminal text book Public Administration, 
concepts and cases. 
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complexity and focusing on only a few aspects of that reality. Concept formation 
is reduction of complexity. That is true for words in everyday life as much as it is 
for scientific concepts. Scientific concept formation is much more explicit, sys-
tematic and intentional than the use of words in everyday language.  
Still, the content of a scientific concept often is the result of a historic process, 
just as much as common words are. The origin of concept formation in social 
sciences often is a term from general language. Such terms do not have a fixed 
meaning but are burdened with all kinds of connotations, surplus meaning. Sur-
plus meaning implies rather than explicates and reaches far beyond what is di-
rectly perceivable or measurable. Once such a term is put to use in scientific dis-
course, much of the surplus meaning is honed off, sometimes so much so that 
only an operational definition is left of it. The word fever may serve as an exam-
ple. Originally the word was used as a name for a large and undifferentiated col-
lection of illnesses. Under the influence of professional medical usage the mean-
ing of the word ‘fever’ has been reduced to ‘a score of body temperature on a 
thermometer’. 
In de social sciences, and in the political and administrative sciences in par-
ticular, it is often difficult to purge terms of surplus meaning. Even more so than 
in other sciences, concepts are anchored in the culture of the society they are 
meant to describe. Often the user is not even aware that the concept is referring to 
more than the user has the intention to denote. Max Weber for instance has 
worked carefully and deliberately to file and polish the concept of ‘bureaucracy’, 
in order to eliminate all excess meaning. Yet his assertion, that ‘pure bureaucracy 
is the most rational way of executing authority’ is primarily a reflection of the 
dominant ideology of his contemporaries (Beetham 1974). American sociologists 
such as Parsons, Homans and Blau have not been able to avoid that implicit in 
there concepts and models are central American values such as individualism. As 
long as the discourse is confined to the culture from which the term emanated, 
surplus meanings may well stay hidden. If we use these concepts to discuss or 
analyze similar phenomena in another cultural setting however, the fact that con-
cepts do not have the same array of connotations in every culture will inevitably 
be exposed. This has been apparent especially in development administration.  
 
Problems with borrowing concepts 
In public administration we are confronted with two kinds of problems when ap-
plying concepts across cultural borders. First, there is the bridging of the gap be-
tween two culturally different administrative institutions, say the Tanzanian and 
the Dutch administration. Beyond that, however, we have obstacle to overcome. 
That is the barrier between two systems of scholarly language dealing with ad-
ministrative phenomena: The legal language and the social-scientific language. 
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Concepts referring to the institutional arrangements of an administration often 
originate in a legal context and have a lot of legal surplus meaning. Legal con-
cepts are normative; they have a lot to do with legal consequence (who is compe-
tent for what? who can authorize?). Thus the word city has a very distinct legal 
meaning in the municipal legislation of many American states, and is connected 
to specific jurisdiction and a specific kind of authority. This is probably not the 
same meaning as when a scholar of public administration uses the word ‘city’ in 
the context of urban studies.  
 
Applying concepts derived from one administrative environment to describe or 
analyze practices in another administrative environment can easily cause confu-
sion and misunderstanding. When comparing institutional arrangements of dif-
ferent countries it is not difficult to find look alike institutions, that is to say, or-
ganisations or procedures that bear equivalent names and nominally perform 
equivalent functions. But on close scrutiny it may become clear that such an in-
stitution is embedded in a larger institutional environment. Much of the meaning 
contributed to such an institution originates in that larger context. It is there 
where the cultural, (which often is equal to national) interpretation of institu-
tional concepts emerges, and it is there where trans-cultural confusion may set in.  
A classic case of such confusion can be found in the very influential Wilson 
article of 1887, ‘The study of administration’. In this paper Wilson argued in fa-
vour of a separation of politics and administration – a position that has been cen-
tral to American public administration for at least another century. To support his 
view he referred to European examples and German scholars – erroneously so, 
because his European examples related to an entirely different problem. Wilson’s 
interest was the reformation of the Jacksonian patronage bureaucracy. In his day, 
American public agencies were virtually owned by the elected executive. Agen-
cies were considered as spoils for the victor of the elections, to be used to reward 
supporters with jobs. There were hardly any administrative professionals. Wilson 
emphasized the need for a professional bureaucracy that was detached from the 
political sphere.  
The German authors Wilson referred to, were concerned with something quite 
the opposite. In Germany the public bureaucracy was a huge independent body, 
the single most powerful public institution in the country. It had slowly gained its 
independent position by rolling back the absolute control the monarch initially 
had over the bureaucracy. However, democratization was looming at the horizon, 
and many authors were afraid that the bureaucracy would loose its independence 
to political oversight. Thus these authors Wilson referred to were actually de-
fending an anti-democratic stand. Soon after the publication of his article Wilson 
himself became aware of the fact that he had inaccurately translated and mistak-
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enly interpreted his German sources, as we know since his collected works were 
published (Link 1970; Martin 1988). 
Strategies for comparing administrations  
In the literature one can find two strategies for comparing dissimilar administra-
tive institutions. The first strategy starts out with a limited number of concepts 
for institutional arrangements that can be considered universal. The leading ques-
tion in this strategy is to which extend such a universal institution fulfils equiva-
lent functions in different administrative cultures. Ferrel Heady, who promoted 
this approach, argued that bureaucracy was the ideal candidate to serve as the 
universal institution that could be the ‘focus for comparison’ (Heady 1991).  
The second strategy argues in just the opposite direction. It starts with specify-
ing a number of functions all politico-administrative systems have to fulfil. Then 
it tries to answer the question, which institutional arrangements in culturally dif-
ferent administrative systems do fulfil these universal functions. In both strate-
gies, concept formation has to deviate from the language that is internal to the 
administrative cultures under study. One worthwhile exercise when studying this 
book is to answer the question which of these strategies – or perhaps an entirely 
different one – is being used in the presentation of each of the concepts. 
Overview of public administration and public management 
The concepts discussed in this book provide an overview of public administration 
and public management. The book breaks down in four parts. The first part pre-
sents the essence of public policy. The justification for governmental interference 
in society lies in collective action. Some problems are too large to solve indi-
vidually. Individual citizens then form groups, share resources and solve com-
mon problems together. As a result governance comes about: councils are 
formed, elections organised, etc. Chapter 2 discusses this concept of collective 
action.  
Institutionalised governmental action has its drawbacks. The transfer of pow-
ers to a body that represents a group or a whole society harbours the danger of 
abuse of those powers. Counterbalancing such tendencies calls for ‘principles of 
good governance’. This concept is presented in chapter 3.  
Decisions of governments have specific characteristics. The main characteris-
tic is that these decisions are supposed to serve the public interest. The identifica-
tion of public interest calls for a procedure which results in a public policy that 
effectively contributes to solving policy problems. The essence of public policy 
is discussed in chapter 4.  
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Chapter 5 focuses on the implementation of public policy. Carrying out public 
policies calls for the cooperation of many actors. Chapter 5 elaborates on the spe-
cific problems of implementation.  
Involvement of the consumers of public policy is discussed in chapter 6. This 
chapter discusses the value of participation of communities. Public policy often 
results in legislation. Sometimes, however, legislation is not really an instrument 
for solving a policy problem. The concept of symbolic legislation, that covers 
this phenomon, is introduced in chapter 7.  
 
The next part is ‘Institution arrangements in public administration’. A govern-
mental organization should not be conceived of as one monolithic body. Indeed it 
made up of many organisations and organizational units. In order to perform their 
tasks, these units interacts with a host of organizations and individuals outside 
the public administration proper. Sometimes the government involves stake-
holders in the provision of public goods. This perspective of stakeholders is dis-
cussed in chapter 8. Chapter 9 introduces the professional as the crucial actor in 
providing public goods. Chapter 10 focuses on the institutional relations between 
central and local governmental bodies.  
 
The third part of the book focuses on management issues. As any organisation 
the agencies that make up a public administration have to deal with management 
problems. One question is, what criteria should be used when hiring or firing 
employees? This problem of staffing has a specific connotation in the public 
sphere, where patronage is not far away. Chapter 11 describes this concept.  
Chapter 12 discusses the relationship between the manager and his subordi-
nates. Quite often leadership is used as the magic term to identify the reason why 
an organisation is not fulfilling its promises. This chapter discusses leadership 
styles and its use in a public organisation.  
In present times public organisations usually are no longer traditional bureauc-
racies with a clear hierarchy both within and in their relations with their envi-
ronment. The use of ICT changes the way public organisations function. Chapter 
13 introduces the concept of e-government and e-governance.  
 
The last part is dedicated to new public management. This term refers to the phi-
losophy that more market orientation in the public sector will lead to more cost-
efficiency for governments when providing public goods, such as health care or 
electricity. Public-private partnerships (chapter 14) and privatisation (chapter 15) 
are two examples of new public management that are discussed in this final part 
of the book.  
 Theories and stories in African public administration  
 
 
7
Stories 
From concepts to cases 
Concepts are a reduction of the complexity of reality. Good concepts facilitate 
the creation of some order in the chaos of reality. Good concepts help us to focus 
on what is important for understanding that reality and not be distracted by trivi-
ality. Good concepts facilitate us to see how different phenomena relate to each 
other. Good concepts are necessary building blocks in any description or analysis 
of administrative reality. 
Yet concepts are abstractions. They perform a certain representation of reality, 
but they are not reality itself. So a third gap to be bridged when using concepts is 
the distance between the abstract notion contained in a concept and the concrete 
and ever so diversified reality of everyday administrative life. Cases - stories 
about the way things happen in administration - are an effective tool to do just 
that.  
Cases do not tell you the whole story, though. Just like concepts they are a re-
duction of reality. However, a case is focussed in a different way. The story in a 
case description is limited in its time span. It is concerned with just one incident, 
one decision or one organisation. Cases are rich in detail, however. They come as 
close to representing a cut-out of administrative reality as possible.  
 
Good cases 
What makes a case a good case? First of all it has to be based on good research. 
There are several methodologies for good case study research available. For this 
volume, the approach of Yin (2007) was the standard. Furthermore, the story 
needs to be told systematically. Rich detail is fine, but all detail needs to be func-
tional for getting the meaning of the story across. 
 
Good cases can perform at least three functions:  
• Cases enrich theory laden course material with real world public administra-
tion insights. Especially for traditional students that have not been actively 
out in the field by themselves, cases are an indispensable window on the 
world they are studying.  
• Cases offer illustrative material for understanding concepts, theories, process 
models etc. Concepts are lenses that make it possible to view reality in a cer-
tain way, comparable to the function of a microscope or a telescope. Cases of-
fer the student of public administration the opportunity to practice the use of 
conceptual lenses.  
• Cases present a great opportunity for interactive teaching. Cases present top-
ics for analytic exercises. Answering questions about how incidents in the 
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case could occur or about factors that may or may not be important for ex-
plaining what happened, will sharpen the analytical skills of the student of 
public administration. Furthermore, case material can be questioned in phi-
losophical and ethical terms, engender class room debate about what consti-
tutes good governance in this case and in general.  
 
The cases in this volume are written by public administration scholars from Tan-
zania. They are all teaching courses in public administration and public manage-
ment. Most of them have lots of experience with the realities of development 
administration and governance, as a consultant, a researcher or a civil servant. 
Their stories build on this experience. They bring African public administration 
home. 
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2 
Collective action 
Denis Kamugisha 
Introduction 
Since Tanzanian independence in 1961 the government of Tanzania has been 
striving to inculcate a spirit of collective action, the spirit of working together to 
fight poverty. The first president of Tanzania, the late Julius Kambarage Nyerere, 
had a dream that if people would work together and stay in communities, rather 
than individualistically, they would advance more. The Ujamaa (Villagization) 
policy was introduced in the 1960s to 1970s, to bring together people from scat-
tered areas to more defined or uniform areas where they could be provided with 
social services such as water, health, agriculture, transportation, education and 
the like. Despite this being done with the best of intention, it was in fact a top 
down policy, with the government dictating everything. So despite the fact that 
the government developed the Villagization policy to charter out a new way of 
bringing social services closer to the people, the collective action perspective re-
mained absent. As a result, the superimposed projects from the government never 
became the true property of the people. This lack of ownership caused the people 
to not feel responsible for taking care of the projects. As a result, most projects 
under the Villagization policy collapsed.  
This goes to show that just bringing people together may not necessarily result 
in collective action. What is important is how a journey of cooperation starts and 
ends, be it a political, social or economic one. The concept of ‘collective action’ 
is a core concept in social sciences for analysing and clarifying processes of 
community formation. A widely used basic definition of ‘collective action’ is: 
‘the pursuit of a goal or set of goals by more than one person’ (Schlager 1994).  
The water project at HILL village shows under what circumstances collective 
action might occur and what the possible consequences and limitations are. 
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The concept of collective action 
Collective action 
Collective action – we repeat – can be thought of as: ‘the pursuit of a goal or set 
of goals by more than one person’ (Schlager 1994). Schlager adds another, more 
elaborate description: ‘an action taken by a group of individuals either directly or 
on its behalf through an organisation to achieve common interest’. The group can 
be voluntarily self-formed, or instigated by external institutions, be it formally or 
informally.  
Every individual actor may face problems, for example shortages of water; in-
adequate health services or education. These problems are not easy to cope with 
for an individual, as they demand high investments. If the individual finds him-
self or herself to be a member of a group, a community, with actors who share 
the same problems, then there is a basis for collective action to pursue common 
goals. When the members of that group take their fate into their own hands and 
decide to solve the problem together; for example by building a school, hospital 
or water facility; collective action comes into being. 
Collective action does not come easy, or naturally, as common experience 
shows. Scholars have identified a number of prerequisites that have to be ful-
filled, in order for collective action to be at all possible: group identity, a shared 
idea of the common problem and a trigger. The next section will discuss these 
requirements in some detail. 
 
The prerequisites of collective action 
The concept of collective action applies when the members of a community have 
to identify themselves as members of that community; in other words: There has 
to be something of a ‘group identity’. Group identity can be based on many 
things. Sometimes the members share the same religion. Quite often this is the 
identity of groups that build schools or houses. Sometimes they belong to the 
same tribe or family. This social group is typical Tanzanian/African. In this soci-
ety the extended family relations form groups that provide services like social 
assistance. Next to these groups the perhaps the most important group are vil-
lages, hamlets or neighbourhoods; i.e. people living together, facing the same (in-
frastructural) problems. So to sum up, group identity can be based on: Religion, 
family, tribe or the geographical area where they live. Yet the interesting thing 
about collective action is that a new group identity may arise when people dis-
cover a common cause and start working together (Olson 1965). 
Secondly, there has to be a shared idea of the main problem that these mem-
bers have. If one would ask each and every member about their priorities, the an-
swer has to be almost equal. If some do not face the same problem, for example 
because they have their own well, then it is difficult to create a group initiative.  
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Thirdly, there has to be a spark: A trigger that starts the action. Quite often there 
is a specific concrete cause or event that brings the group together debating on 
how to solve the problem. This ‘spark’ might also be a strong individual leader 
within the group who is able to convince the individual members to participate in 
the initiative. 
The result of collective action is quite often the foundation of a sort of institu-
tion that simplifies the social interaction within the group. Institutions can be 
meetings, but commissions or committees with elected members representing the 
community members are also known institutions. Of course, one could also re-
gard decision-making rules such as the majority rule (every member has a vote; 
the decision that is supported by the majority of the votes will be implemented).  
Depending on the size of the group these institutions will be more formalised. 
The larger the group, the higher the necessity to form ‘subgroups’ like commit-
tees that prepare the decision-making or sometimes have the delegated power to 
decide on behalf of the group, or use decision-making rules such as the majority 
rule as mentioned before. Without these sub-groups of representatives or without 
a decision-making rule, decision-making is difficult.  
 
Collective action challenges 
The result of collective action is the production of public goods. A public good 
has a number of characteristics (Olson 1965). It belongs to no single individual. 
It is non-excludable (one person cannot reasonably prevent another from making 
use of a collective good) and non-rival, (one person’s consumption of the good 
does not affect another’s and vice-versa). Olson shows how there will be always 
a problem on maintaining these goods. This problem is called free rider behav-
iour. Since people cannot be excluded from using the collective good, there is no 
incentive to pay for it or contribute to its maintenance in (any) kind. If there are 
no contributions from the members of the community, the project will collapse. 
When a community is small, members may induce each other sufficiently to con-
tribute to the maintenance of the collective good. This is called ‘social control’. 
In larger communities, social control requires more effort and is less effective. 
Therefore a larger community will require a strong governmental body that can 
regulate and enforce contributions to the maintenance of the collective good as 
well as the way in which members may enjoy its benefits.  
Different scholarly disciplines each emphasise ‘collective action’ in a different 
manner. Political and administrative sciences are especially interested in the in-
stitutionalisation of collective action. Thus, in political science ‘collective action’ 
refers to the social relations within a community or country that make the pursuit 
of goals possible by more than one person. Eventually it is about the social struc-
tures that form the basic institutions of a governing body. One could argue that 
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collective action is the foundation of government, be it local or central. In a pub-
lic administration perspective, ‘collective action’ would also refer to government 
as collective action on a larger scale (nationwide). However, the institutionalising 
of the initial collective action by founding a government might very well threaten 
the essence of being a community: The gap between the institutions with deci-
sion-making power and the individual members may become too wide. Therefore 
new instruments are needed to enhance and support initiatives of groups. Then, 
collective action becomes more or less a policy instrument, prescribed in modern 
planning procedures like the Opportunities and Obstacles to Development proce-
dure in Tanzania.  
 
Institutionalising collective action in Tanzania 
Since independence, the Tanzanian government has attempted a number of poli-
cies to promote collective action at the grass roots level. The first articulated pol-
icy of this kind was the Arusha Declaration, based on a philosophy of socio-
economic liberation based on socialism and self-reliance as a long-term national 
development goal. An important part of the strategy for implementing the Arusha 
Declaration was the devolution of powers to the people. This policy was in force 
from 1967 till 1992. During this period, Regional Decentralisation, Village Gov-
ernments, District Development Committees and Regional Development Com-
mittees were established, in order to enable more participation of the people in 
decision-making. This can be considered an attempt at institutionalising collec-
tive action at the local level. 
The next period (1992-2002) was characterized by reforms in the public sec-
tor. The government undertook the reforms in the hope of increasing efficiency 
and the capacity of the public sector to deliver quality services. The reforms in-
cluded local government reform; financial sector reform; planning and budgeting 
reform and the restructuring of the regional administration. The reforms were 
meant to limit the role of central government and to create an enabling environ-
ment for local government authorities to perform and for people at the grass roots 
level to participate in local government decision-making.  
In reality, government planning continued to be dominated by government 
planners and economists, bureaucrats and donors, on the basis of the (illusory) 
feeling of control and efficiency: ‘We know what they (communities) do not 
know’. Therefore, effective participation in planning and decision-making re-
mained remote. Thus, the idea of increasing people’s participation, integrating 
developmental planning and addressing bottom-up planning was unsuccessful. 
As a remedy for these ills, the procedure for Opportunities and Obstacles to De-
velopment (O&OD) was introduced. 
 Collective action  
 
 
15
This strategy was in line with the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanza-
nia of 1977. Under articles No. 145 and No. 146 local governments are empow-
ered to transfer authority to the people. Article 146 states: 
‘Local Government Authorities shall have the right and power to participate, and to involve 
the people in the planning and implementation of development programmes within their re-
spective areas and generally throughout the country.’ 
These provisions in the Constitution aim at restoring the spirit of self-reliance, 
local resource mobilisation, transparency and accountability, whereby communi-
ties participate in planning, decision-making, implementation and ownership of 
their development activities through collective action spirit (Lamek 2009).  
The case of the water development project of HILL village 
Introduction 
In this understanding, Ifakara Health Research and Development Centre 
(IHRDC) under Tanzania Essential Health Interventions Project (TEHIP) in 2000 
started to research the mechanism through which the people’s voice would be in-
tegrated into the district planning process. The collective action perspective was a 
tool through which the interest of the people could be taped and engrossed to 
higher authorities. As a Non-Governmental Organisation, IHRDC had a role of 
assisting the government to increase people’s awareness and discuss their con-
cerns in district plans. Integrating the private sector and civil society was one of 
the ways of escalating governance reform. The reforms aimed at changing the 
role of the central government from directly involving itself in production and 
service delivery, to that of policy formulation, coordination, and advisory, 
strengthening capacities of local governments, the private sector, Non-Govern-
mental Organisations and to create an enabling environment for the local gov-
ernmental authorities to perform.  
The mechanism of engaging people, developed by Ifakara Health Research 
and Development Centre (IHRDC), was called ‘Community Voice’. The com-
munity voice as a planning strategy or methodology was applied in the Morogoro 
Region and the Coast Region, the Mvomero District (Morogoro Rural District by 
then) and Rufiji-Hutete District respectively. The community voice explains the 
collective action as elucidated in the Hill village case.  
The community voice or collective action strategy was used by HILL people 
to create a platform for discussion and by doing so, internalised a sense of collec-
tive action. The development water project is a good example of collective own-
ership of public good. Also the formation of a strong committee to cater for all 
aspects related to developmental issues at the village vindicates collective deci-
sion-making. 
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In 2002 the government came up with the Opportunity and Obstacles to Devel-
opment planning methodology (O&OD) as a mechanism of engaging people 
from grass roots to a platform through which their voice could be channelled to 
district plans.  
The community voice and O&OD strategies all together aimed at addressing 
peoples’ concerns and communicating the appropriate interventions from which 
the people or higher authorities could solve the problem. From the 1960s till the 
year 2000, there was no strategy adopted by the government in place for facilitat-
ing the civic engagement in the planning process to realise a true sense of collec-
tive action phenomenon. From 2001 to 2003, IHRDC conducted a study for fa-
cilitating the mode of enhancing civic engagement in communicating which 
identified and felt the needs of the communities. The HILL villagers’ efforts of 
developing the water project entailed a vivid example of collective action of civic 
engagement in planning. The HILL village is amongst a number of villages that 
were studied. The community voice strategy was pre-tested in 2004 in Rufiji and 
the pre-test went hand-in-hand when the O&OD was being implemented. The 
findings were communicated to the Utete District and the Morogoro Rural Dis-
trict and it was found that both strategies needed to be merged to form a compre-
hensive planning strategy which would be used to tape the concerns of the people 
into the district planning process. 
 
The history of HILL village 
HILL village was found in 1975 with the registration number 256/1975. It was a 
product of the Villagization program. Tanzania adopted the policy of villagiza-
tion in 1967 as part of a national strategy for development. This policy entailed, 
among other things, the resettlement of all households outside areas of dense set-
tlements into villages. It was assumed that the welfare and standard of living of 
the majority of people could be improved. Since the majority of the population 
lived in isolated homesteads, large-scale resettlement was recommended as the 
first step in the direction to modernisation (Nyerere 1967). It was assumed that 
what had prevented nucleated settlements before was the lack of organisation. 
Once the organisation would be provided, the benefits of living together in vil-
lage communities would materialise almost automatically (Mlay 1981). It was on 
these grounds that HILL village evolved. The HILL village was founded in the 
south-west of Rufiji District in the Coastal Region. It is located almost 15 km 
from Ikwiriri Township. Many of the inhabitants of the village are Ndengereko 
tribes such as the Matumbi, Makonde, Zaramo, Pogoro, Ngindo, Yao, Manyema, 
and Nyagatwa. The indigenous language is Ndengereko, although Swahili is used 
as a national language and is understood and spoken by almost every village 
member. The most common economic activity is agriculture, which is still rudi-
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mentary. The agricultural activities practiced in this area include cash crops 
(cashew nuts) and food crops (maize and cassava) produced at a very small scale. 
 
Collective action experience at the village 
Since the foundation of HILL village, various participation forms have been 
noted. With these forms, the concept of collective action was made evident in 
some areas. But in most cases it was made stagnant by the circumstances. Passive 
participation dominated, meaning that the people were only informed about what 
was going to happen or had happened (Blackburn, Holland & Chambers 1998). 
The information shared in the village came from external professionals. The ena-
bling environment for people to influence decision-making was as good as ab-
sent. The external professionals defined both the problems and their solutions 
and could modify them in the light of people’s responses (Makemba et al. 2003). 
The mechanism for engaging people in the process was the provision of mate-
rialistic incentives such as resources, food and the like. People were not given the 
opportunity to experiment with group decision-making on their own. The villag-
ers could merely form groups to meet predetermined objectives. From 1992 on-
wards (the beginning of decentralisation), the first notable achievement was a 
joint analysis of the environment that involved, to some extent, the people. This 
in turn led to action plans and to the formation or strengthening of local institu-
tions. People started to realise the importance of collective decision-making and 
collective management of public. After 2000, external factors provided the com-
munity with resources and technical advice, while the control over how to apply 
these resources was firmly in the community’s hands.  
 
Water development profile 
During the 1970s, HILL village witnessed the construction of big water infra-
structure by the government. Its goal was to provide the people with access to 
safe and clean water nearby. Unfortunately project proved not to be sustainable, 
primarily due to poor management. Moreover, it was an external initiative and a 
sense of local ownership was distant. No member of the community felt respon-
sible. Instead, it was thought that the government would continue to maintain it. 
With an increasing population, lack of resources and intensifying pressure on so-
cial services by the community, the central government found it difficult to man-
age various projects developing all over the country. Then the project crumbled. 
The water infrastructure was damaged, parts were stolen and the whole thing was 
left functionless. Re-establishing the water works in a sustainable form would 
require the full participation of the people themselves. This called for fostering a 
form of collective action that invited all stakeholders to participate in designing, 
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communicating, identifying, prioritising, and analysing the constraints and op-
portunities and ultimately, finding the appropriate solutions. 
 
The process of echoing community voice  
Echoing the voice of the HILL people into district plans as evidence based strat-
egy had its foundation in local government reform principles. Among other 
things, the principles emphasised the collective action mechanism of civic en-
gagement to addressing specific local problems and the involvement of people in 
identifying locally felt needs, preferences, challenges, and workable solutions. 
Around 2000, the mechanism of civic engagement was not common in the policy 
repertoire of local government authorities. Therefore, the Ifakara Health Re-
search and Development Centre started research on ways and means for enhanc-
ing civic engagement, a project that ran from 2001 to 2003. The HILL village 
was one among many villages which benefited from the study. 
The process started by a research team introducing itself to the district offi-
cials. The purpose was to enable the District Management Team to get ac-
quainted with the basic outline of the project. The District Executive Director 
then officially introduced the team to the ward executive officers and village 
leaders. Community entry or introductory meetings were followed by sensitisa-
tion and awareness creation meetings, community reflective actions, and feed-
back meetings at district and community levels. 
During the sensitisation meetings, the community members and leaders came 
to understand and value the importance of true community participation as ad-
dressed by the local government and other reform sectors in the country. During 
the sensitisation meetings, facilitators used adult learning methods to address 
various local government reform issues. Serialised and un-serialised pictures 
were introduced to facilitate a change of the mindset of the people. The expected 
roles of the community members were outlined. Community members were in-
vited to provide their opinion on how best the project objectives could be 
achieved. As a result, the study protocols kept changing from time to time in or-
der to incorporate community views and suggestions. Similar meetings were also 
conducted at sub-village (hamlet level) to which all community members were 
invited. Each HILL village hamlet had its separate meeting, where members were 
encouraged to build interest for participation in the upcoming project activities. 
Later on, people from each hamlet were involved in a series of exercises. 
These were intended to enable them to reflect on their village environment. The 
ultimate goal was to enable the member of the community to review their village 
history, find current development issues pertaining to HILL village, find avail-
able opportunities and how they could be tailored to address community needs 
and preferences (reflective activities). These reflective activities involved village 
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social and resource mapping, development of seasonal calendars, Venn diagrams 
and needs identification. These exercises helped the villagers to develop village 
profiles which were taped for reference during the actual village planning proc-
ess. A village census was done as well to determine the actual village population 
and categorise the various population groups (men, women, children, people with 
disabilities, perceived poor, and those perceived very poor) in order to enrich vil-
lage profiles. 
 
Having developed the profiles, community members at the hamlet level were 
asked to identify and select hamlet representatives who would be involved in de-
velopment of the village action plan (VAP). The criteria for selection were de-
bated and it was agreed that gender, occupation, age, location representation and 
past experience would be included as well as individual commitment in commu-
nity development activities. Five members were supposed to represent each ham-
let. Four representatives were selected from each hamlet and every chairperson 
due to virtue of the position became a member. These individuals from each 
hamlet formed Village Participatory Planning Group (VPPG). Also other repre-
sentatives came from the village government council and private institutions that 
were present in the village (e.g. religious groups, schools and health facilities 
etc.). The hamlet members selected four members based on gender, age and indi-
vidual attributes that reflected qualities such as confidence, seriousness, open-
ness, transparency and so on. The HILL village had four hamlets and every 
leader of the respective hamlet was automatically in a planning team by virtue of 
that position. The village leaders that were the chair persons and the village ex-
ecutive officers were also part of the team by virtue of their positions. Two influ-
ential males and two influential females were selected. These were people who 
knew the history of the village very well and were well respected by the commu-
nity.  
The Planning group involved the various institutions that were available at the 
village. The head teacher of the only primary school in the village, one pastor and 
one sheik were selected. The planning team also involved one health attendant 
and chairpersons from the political parties such as NCCR Mageuzi, CCM, 
Chadema and Pona. And the VPPG incorporated two people with disabilities, a 
lady and a man. The team had 36 participants. The VPPG elected a chairperson, a 
secretary and treasurer through secret votes. Of these selected members, not one 
person with a title at the village government. 
The VPPG was responsible for all matters that arose until the end of the de-
velopment of the village action plan. This event marked the end of frontline fa-
cilitation by a research team. The team was left to provide technical support and 
facilitated communication with district officials according to the community 
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needs. The VPPG reviewed all the information collected from each hamlet to 
form a coherent village profile. Community preferences were categorised accord-
ing to governmental departments such as administrative, education, health and 
environment and were then later prioritised. The criteria for prioritisation in-
cluded importance, urgency, availability of community resources it could pro-
vide, ability of the community in implementing associated activities, the avail-
ability of financial support to supplement where the community efforts ended and 
the sustainability of the outcome after implementing the developed plan. After 
community priorities were identified, it was observed that community prefer-
ences were in greatly varied which influenced a meeting with the District Man-
agement Team (DMT) as feedback for what had transpired overall. This meeting 
also involved the VPPG members. 
The HILL village planning team were ensured support from the DMT mem-
bers who comprised of all district departments. The team continued with the vil-
lage action plan development. DMT sent personnel to work with the research 
team and the VPPG to provide guidance so that the developed plan could be 
technically feasible. Participants formed subgroups to debate and document 
whatever transpired. The subgroups were guided by terms of references as fol-
lowed: causes of each problem, predisposing factors for each problem, conse-
quences as a result of the problem, possible solutions (what needed to be done) – 
whether they had been tried before – what the results were, how the solutions 
should be implemented, who should implement them, what resources would be 
needed and their costs, where should the resources come from, what the indica-
tors for implementation would be and finally who and how would a follow-up 
and evaluation be done. 
The water project initiatives 
Essence of water project initiatives 
As a result of the debates, a consensus was reached. Lack of safe and clean water 
came up as the most urgent problem to be solved. This problem was strongly ar-
gued especially between women who turned out in small groups from each ham-
let during the sensitisation meetings. In the end, the VPPG listed it indeed as the 
priority problem. From a historical perspective, women always suffered the most 
because of the lack of clean water nearby. They had to travel long distances in 
search for water. It might take a whole day to obtain water from sources such as 
ponds, rivers and locally drilled wells. This had an adverse impact, not only on 
the women who walked long distances carrying heavy water baskets, but also to 
children and the community at large. Water related diseases were unbridled. 
There were many instances of predator animals such as lions and crocodiles at-
tacking the water fetchers.  
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Local administration of the water project initiatives 
The necessity of developing a sustainable water project was undisputed. The vil-
lagers, via the planning body, sat down and discussed how to solicit financial and 
non-financial contributions from each member of the community. The planning 
team was very close to the people, so whatever transpired in the meeting was 
communicated to the people at the hamlet level. With this, every member of the 
community was aware of what came out of the meetings. When the decision was 
passed to embark on a water project, the community had already acknowledged 
that idea even before the report of the VPPG was read in front of the general as-
sembly. The planning team proposal of doing away with the present village lead-
ers and replacing them with leaders to be newly elected became a rumour at the 
village. The situation was tense to the extent that the village government leader 
refused to call a meeting with the general assembly. The influence of the VPPG 
forced the village leader to call a special meeting to present the report to the vil-
lage assembly. The general assembly, according to law, has the overall supreme 
power of enforcing any decision or matter taking place at the village. The pro-
posal from the VPPG could not be adopted if the general assembly did not en-
dorse it. The village assembly had a role of adopting or refuting the report.  
The general meeting was called by the village government leader; the team 
suggested the District Executive Director to be invited during the meeting, the 
idea being that he would inform the people about the proper way of removing the 
village officials from office and replacing them. The announcement of the meet-
ing was also dispersed to NGOs and the public in general.  
On the meeting the VPPG chair person presented the action plan (report). The 
meeting embraced the plan but proposed that the village leadership should be 
fired or advised to resign. The people did not trust the current village leadership 
and they were not prepared to contribute financial or non-financial resources for 
village development programs to a corrupt government. Their idea of an immedi-
ate solution was to replace the leadership. 
As it turned out, the relevant bylaws made it impossible to replace the leader-
ship overnight. Yet a strong leadership was needed to facilitate the process to 
implement the water management project. At the end of a very heated debate, the 
District Executive Direct (DED) addressed the people. Among other things, he 
told them about the proper procedures for replacing the village leadership. One of 
the ways that he indicated was a ‘vote of no confidence’. It required a two-thirds 
majority on a vote of no confidence by HILL villagers to make the village leaders 
resign. Only then a new election could be called for. As the DED continued ad-
dressing the people, it was recognised that the village leaders might have failed 
because they lacked knowledge of the guidelines. One influential person told the 
people that village leaders had been working using their own experience and 
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knowledge; they had not a single document to guide them. He also urged his col-
leagues, the villagers, that they needed water and that they were wasting time 
dealing with the issue of village leaders. In conclusion, he yelled: ‘let these peo-
ple ask for forgiveness’.  
The community members bought his idea and compelled the respective leaders 
to ask for forgiveness and for a promise to cooperate with the people in dealing 
with their problems, including their initiatives of developing a water project. Fi-
nally the village leaders acknowledged their mistakes and promised to rectify 
them. The people forgave them and requested the DED to provide them with the 
guidelines, manuals and training on leadership and any other relevant support. 
The DED agreed and promised to work on all issues raised by the people. The 
readiness of leaders to correct their mistakes and the support promised by DED 
increased trust and restored confidence to people over their village government 
and they were highly motivated to work with it. The village assembly adopted 
the report, and called for a team to rewrite it on the basis of the corrections tran-
spired during the meeting, before endorsing it to the higher levels for implemen-
tation.  
 
Soliciting funds  
Since the people had regained confidence over their village government, they be-
lieved that their financial asset to be contributed will be in safe hands. Therefore, 
they suggested that every household should contribute Tsh 200,000, and those 
who had no money in terms of cash could bring anything worth Tsh 2,000 which 
could be sold with the money being presented to the respective committee re-
sponsible for collection of water funds or to the chair person of the participatory 
planning body. The payee was asked to provide receipt to the payer. This was 
thought as a panacea for enhancing control of the cash. Also the village govern-
ment set some precepts to punish those who would corrupt the system in collect-
ing money from the people. 
The total amount of Tsh 2 million was raised from the villages. This marked 
an event never experience before since 1970s when the village came into being. 
The district executive director supported the efforts initiated by people by putting 
forward another Tsh 3 million. This made the money solicited by community tan-
tamount to Tsh 5 million. Since the World Bank had set some funds to support 
water related projects initiated by local communities, these were channelled 
through the district. The district used the HILL village action plan and integrated 
it into its plans. The village proposal qualified to get aid from the World Bank. 
The World Bank provided financial assistance of Tsh 60 million. In total, the 
fund raised was Tsh 65 million. The solicited funds were used to purchase a gen-
erator, water pipes, and other important equipments deemed necessary. The dis-
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trict provided water engineers and surveyors whose costs were met by the dis-
trict.  
The assistance from the World Bank came timely, when the people were 
highly motivated and ready to work with their leaders. This spirit revealed itself 
in the way people surrendered their lands in order to facilitate the laying down of 
the water infrastructure. This went hand in hand with physical participation in 
provision of labour, for instance in trench making exercises. Men also made 
bricks for constructing the power house. The women fetched water and partici-
pated in transporting bricks to the selected power house site collectively. The un-
derground water was drilled and pumped up by the generator. Convenient public 
water collection points were built and some selected households got tap water.  
 
Management of the project 
The HILL village water project was launched by the former Prime Minister Ed-
ward Lowasa in 2004. From this date on, the water problem became an historical 
event. The problems associated with this problem were solved. No longer did 
women have to walk long distances in search for water and no longer could water 
fetchers be threatened by predator animals. The project was people centred right 
from development stage. The people felt as if they themselves were the owners of 
the project and that they were ready to support it.  
Having this water resource installed was in itself no guarantee that it would be 
sustainable. Through proper decision-making in community meetings, the people 
agreed that water would not be consumed freely. To ensure sustainability of the 
project, anyone enjoying the benefit of clean drinking water should contribute at 
least something.  
There were selected public sites (water points) where water was to be har-
vested and some households were connected with tap water. With regard to water 
collection points, harvesters were asked to pay Tsh 10 per bucket. At every point 
there was a person to take care of it and to collect money from people. The 
money was to be submitted to the water committee head, a person who acted as a 
treasurer. Houses connected to tap water were given a fixed rate of payment. The 
income from the project was used to run the project. That included maintenance 
of the generator and the power house, the purchase of fuel, the payment of the 
security guards. Furthermore, some funds were saved to purchase new generators 
whenever the existing ones would become obsolete.  
There were still management challenges since investiture of the water project. 
One issue was the theft of water pipes – an occurrence that irritated the people, 
especially since the village government remained silent when held accountable. It 
was even suggested that the village leadership were involved in the robberies. 
Furthermore, there were some conflicts between the participatory planning body 
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(PPB) and the village government. The PPB was becoming more popular than 
the village government itself, since it was very close to the people and reporting 
back every aspect associated with water management activities. When necessary, 
extraordinary village meetings were arranged in order to restore calmness. Some-
times the village leaders were force to call for a meeting.  
Another challenge involved mishandled financial resources from the project. 
The perpetrators were forced to resign and pay back money in cash or goods. It 
was also observed that some households connected with water, were freely serv-
ing their neighbours and local constructors against the will of the people. All 
these challenges required the village government to use its authority and to be 
active in solving local problems, particularly water management problems. 
Questions 
1. Explain the pros and cons of collective action in the area of development projects.  
2. What models and theories can be born from this case? 
3. Why were the water projects initiated by the government during the 1970s short lived? 
4. What lessons can one learn from this case? 
5. Explain how the community voice (NGOs) and O&OD (LGAs) strategies could  
institutionalise the collective action strategy 
6. What benefits and challenges are addressed from water project at HILL village? 
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3 
Good governance 
Rashid Mfaume 
Introduction 
Quite often, collective problems are solved by establishing public bodies. These 
public bodies are entrusted with exclusive powers such as: The power to annex 
property, or the monopoly of violence. The use of these powers call for a norma-
tive framework on assessing whether or not these public bodies function ‘well’ or 
‘poorly’. The decision on how to use these powers can be referred to as ‘govern-
ance’. The normative framework that judges the way this governance is con-
ducted is the principles of good governance.  
Good governance is not only a normative model that can be used to judge 
upon acts and deeds of public bodies; it is also an explanatory model that ex-
plains and predicts the effect of public policy, including the support for public 
bodies and decisions of these bodies. Principles of good governance are therefore 
relevant when it comes to implementation and enforcement of public policy.  
This chapter deals with the concept of good government. The following sec-
tion contains an overview of the elements of this concept. The case of Nyamuma 
village shows the relevance of this concept for public policy making.  
The concept of good governance 
From governance to good governance 
To understand the concept of ‘good governance’, it is relevant to point out the 
more general term, governance. According to UNESCAP (2011):  
The concept of ‘governance’ is not new. It is as old as human civilisation. Generally  
‘governance’ means: The process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are 
implemented (or not implemented). Governance can be used in several contexts such as cor-
porate governance, international governance, national governance and local governance. 
26 Mfaume 
 
 
Another way of putting it is defining governance as a process, a use of powers or 
authorities to manage public affairs. It comprises of mechanisms, processes and 
institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise 
their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences (UNDP 
1997). The World Bank defines governance as the manner in which power is ex-
ercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources (World 
Bank 1992). In this perspective, there are three distinct aspects of governance: (i) 
the form of political regime; (ii) the process by which authority is exercised in 
the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development; 
and (iii) the capacity of governments to design, formulate, and implement poli-
cies and discharge functions (World Bank 1992). 
Another international organisation, the Organisation for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) provides the following definition (OECD 1995):  
The concept of governance denotes the use of political authority and exercise of control in a 
society in relation to the management of its resources for social and economic development. 
This broad definition encompasses the role of public authorities in establishing the environ-
ment in which economic operators function and in determining the distribution of benefits as 
well as the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.  
Therefore, the operational definition of governance is a manner in which public 
officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape public policy 
and provide public goods and services. Governance is actually the entire process 
of decision-making. Not only the substantial decision on the content of the public 
policy, but also the more organisational decisions on the design of the institu-
tions, the actors involved in implementing the policy and the legal form of the 
agreements between these actors (contracts etc).  
With the addition of ‘good’, the term ‘governance’ receives a normative mean-
ing. Apparently governance can either be ‘good’ or ‘bad’. The cited references 
often have this pejorative understanding. USAID for example calls good govern-
ance the capacity of the state, the commitment to the public good, the rule of law, 
the degree of transparency and accountability, the level of popular participation, 
and the stock of social capital. Without good governance, it is impossible to fos-
ter development. No amount of resources transferred or infrastructure built can 
compensate for - or survive - bad governance. 
 
Actors and perspective of governance 
Since governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which 
decisions are implemented, an analysis of good governance focuses on the formal 
and informal public actors involved in decision-making and implementing the 
decisions. In this framework the government as a whole is the most important ac-
tor when it comes to public policy. The government is actually not only one ac-
tor. Quite often we see more than one governments involved. And even within 
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one public body there are more entities that can be distinguished, like depart-
ments, politicians and public servants.  
The actors surrounding the government vary depending on the level of gov-
ernment that is under discussion. In rural areas, for example, other actors may 
affect governance in comparison to the urban regions. In rural areas, one could 
expect influential landlords, associations of farmers, cooperatives, NGOs, re-
search institutes, religious leaders, finance institutions of political parties, the 
military etc. The situation in urban areas is a little different. Besides the actors 
mentioned before, in urban areas there are also various active civil society 
groups, like neighbourhoods or communities.  
All these actors are interconnected depending on issues and interest at stake. 
For example at the national level, the media, lobbyists, international donors and 
multi-national corporations may play a role in decision-making or in influencing 
the decision-making process. All actors other than government and the military 
are grouped together as part of the ‘civil society.’ In some countries in addition to 
the civil society, organized crime syndicates also influence decision-making, par-
ticularly in urban areas and at the national level. 
 
Good governance 
The principles of good governance refer to the situation in which the government 
adopts a way of understanding with all the actors involved, weighing conflicting 
interests and providing access to all interested parties. This is represented in eight 
characteristics or preconditions that need to be fulfilled (see also Figure 3.1).1  
 
Figure 3.1 Characteristics of good governance 
 
                                                 
1 These are the eight characteristics that have been identified by UNESCAP, a NGO that works in Asia 
and the Pacific. See <www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp>. 
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Participation by all stakeholders is an important precondition of good govern-
ance. Participation could be either direct or through legitimate intermediate insti-
tutions or representatives. Participation requires some kind of organisation. After 
all, there has to be a procedure, a moment in the decision-making where the 
stakeholders can voice their opinions and be confident that they will be heard. In 
many countries, including Tanzania, the most important mechanism of participa-
tion is by means of indirect representation through elected people’s representa-
tives. It is important to notice that all forms and mechanisms of participation pre-
sent challenges since a representative democracy does not necessarily mean that 
all groups within the society are equally represented.  
 
Rule of law. Good governance requires a fair, legal framework that is enforced 
impartially. ‘Fair’ refers to the weighing up of colliding interests. Any public 
policy results in a weighing of opposite interests. The planning of a road for ex-
ample leads to the weighing up of the interest of on the one hand the economy 
and users of the road while on the other hand the residents living nearby the road 
who face the disadvantages. If there is no direct conflicted interest, there is al-
ways the more general perspective of the tax payer who has an interest in an effi-
cient spending of public money.  
All in all, the quality of this balancing of interests has to be fair, meaning that 
the public measure should not harm too many interests related to the aim of the 
measure. And if in the light of the public interests, a particular interest is harmed, 
this interest should be compensated in some kind of way.  
The impartial enforcement refers to the unprejudiced and equal treatment of 
citizens. Public policy should not benefit specific citizens without a justified rea-
son. Given these two prerequisites, the rule of law actually results in the institu-
tional framework of the separation of powers. The separation of powers results in 
an independent legislator, acting with a direct legitimacy of the citizens and lay-
ing down general binding rules, an impartial and incorruptible administration and 
police force, that is empowered with the authorities to enforce the general rules, 
and finally an independent judiciary. These three powers function independently 
from each other, and they control each other. Without this separation of powers, 
there is the risk that the government exceeds the authorities assigned to it. The 
concept of the rule of law therefore transcends into some kind of constitutional-
ism: general constitutional rules of the organisation of the state and its institu-
tions.  
 
Transparency means that the decisions taken and their enforcement are done in a 
manner that follows rules and regulations. It also means that information is freely 
available and directly accessible to those who will be affected by such decisions 
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and their enforcement. This requires that enough information is provided and that 
it is provided in easily understandable forms as well as in the media. Transpar-
ency cannot be separated from an adequate provision of information. Safeguard-
ing an independent and active press is therefore an element of good governance. 
Lack of transparency generates public perception of wrong doing and reduces 
trust.  
 
Responsiveness. Good governance requires that institutions and processes try to 
serve all stakeholders within a reasonable timeframe. Claims and applications 
can never be ignored just like that. Delay or ignorance affects the confidence in 
the government and its policy.  
 
Consensus orientation. There are several actors and many view points in a given 
society. Good governance requires mediation of the different interests in society 
to reach a broad consensus in society on what is in the best interest of the whole 
community and how this can be achieved. Consensus building can be achieved in 
several ways. Involvement of the relevant stakeholders, a participatory procedure 
in which policy is discussed and presented, are all important preconditions.  
 
Equity and inclusiveness. A society’s well being depends on ensuring that all its 
members feel that they have a stake and do not feel excluded from the main-
stream of society. One could call this ‘inclusiveness’. The other side of the coin 
is equity. The prerequisite of inclusiveness after all affects all members of soci-
ety. 
 
Effectiveness and efficiency. Good governance means that processes and institu-
tions produce results that meet the needs of society while making the best use of 
resources at their disposal. One could call this effectiveness. The concept of effi-
ciency also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and the protection of 
the environment. In the democratic setting, effectiveness and efficiency would 
mean that the actions of authorities do not compromise the democratic ethos and 
societal culture. If government authorities are interested with the end results 
without considering how the results have been achieved (the means), then that 
normative, instrumentally rational view would mean that the ethos of democratic 
governance is jeopardised. Instrumental rationality is when the actor considers 
only the end without considering the means in which the end has been achieved. 
 
Accountability is a key requirement of good governance. Not only governmental 
institutions but also the private sector and civil society organisations must be ac-
countable to the public and to their institutional stakeholders. Who is accountable 
to who varies depending on whether decisions or actions taken are internal or ex-
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ternal to an organisation or institution. In general, an organisation or an institu-
tion is accountable to those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Ac-
countability cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law. Deci-
sion-makers in government, the private sector and civil society organisations are 
accountable to the public, as well as to institutional stakeholders. This account-
ability differs depending on the organisation and whether the decision is internal 
or external to an organisation. When considering accountability, three questions 
may be considered: 
• Accountability for what? Here referring to material or substances to account 
for.  
• Accountability to whom? Here referring to people and levels of reporting,  
answerability and the final people affected or whoever needs to be served.  
• How to be accountable? Here referring to the means and the processes of 
executing accountability.  
 
In a democratic setting, accountability would mean all three perspectives. 
 
Good governance: A normative framework with some explanatory value 
The eight characteristics of good governance as mentioned before are only at-
tempts to clarify this normative framework. The characteristics are interlinked 
and cannot be seen as independent variables. On a more abstract level, one could 
recognise intrinsic values (equity, democracy), institutional preconditions (de-
mocratic and transparent decision-making procedure, separation of powers) and 
more or less neutral objectives (effectiveness, efficiency). All in all, good gov-
ernance is not a neutral perspective.  
Nevertheless, if one would explain why the implementation of public policy 
fails or encounters severe resistance, the explanation will often be related to fail-
ures in the design of the decision-making procedure, which were not sufficiently 
transparent, or did not provide access to all relevant stakeholders, etc. In that 
sense, the normative model of good governance, as described in this section, also 
has some explanatory value.  
The case of the eviction of Nyamuma villagers 
Nyamuma village 
Nyamuma is a village in Serengeti District in the Mara Region. People in Nya-
muma village, like many other people in the Mara Region and Serengeti District, 
are peasants and headsmen. Villagers grow different types of crops including 
maize and cassava. Like many others villages in Tanzania, over the years the 
population of Nyamuma kept on increasing year after year. This resulted in a fur-
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ther expansion of the area occupied by the village. In 1993 Nyamuma was regis-
tered as a village, according to the laws of Tanzania. Being registered as a vil-
lage, means that the village boundaries are clearly demarcated and at some stage, 
the land belonging to the village has to be surveyed.  
 
Ikorongo Game Reserve 
In 1994 the national government started the establishment of Ikorongo Game Re-
serve, situated in the north-west of Serengeti National Park. The establishment of 
this game reserve implied an exclusive right for the government to use this area 
or to grant a concession to private persons. Unfortunately for the residents of 
Nyamuma, the area that was intended to become Ikorongo Game Reserve also 
involved a large portion of the land which belonged to the village of Nyamuma.  
The government issued very scant explanations despite the expressed dissatis-
faction of the villagers. The only explanation given was that in Tanzania land is 
owned by the government and government can seize any piece of land for the 
public interest. Villagers were forced to vacate. What was remained was a small 
portion of the village, that was popularly known by villagers as ‘Iliyobaki’, liter-
ary meaning, the ‘remaining Nyamuma’.  
 
The protest 
The villagers did not reconcile themselves to the decision of the central govern-
ment. Several meetings were held between villagers and the leaders of their ward 
in an effort to find a solution that would result in a reasonable compensation. The 
villagers showed their dissatisfaction on how the whole matter was handled by 
the region and the district authority, both representatives of the central govern-
ment. The dissatisfaction resulted in meetings with the district authority and vil-
lage leaders to discuss the matter and find an everlasting solution. Many prom-
ises were made, including one that the decision would be re-studied, resulting in 
an outcome that would favour the villagers.  
This promise could be understood from the point of view that 1995 was an 
election year, with general elections. The eviction matter was heavily covered by 
the news and every political party including opposition parties picked up on this 
issue as an example of the mismanagement of the current politicians. Though no 
specific party included it in its election manifesto, the Nyamuma issue received a 
priority in the campaign agenda in the Serengeti District. Leaders from the ruling 
party visited Nyamuma village and whenever the issue of eviction came up, they 
quickly assured that the villagers were not going to be evicted because the ruling 
party CCM would stand on their side.  
The 1995 election resulted in a victory for CCM in the Serengeti District as 
well as in the local government. From that moment on, Nyamuma Iliyobaki re-
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mained intact until 2001 when the government started to enforce its previous de-
cision to establish Ikorongo Game Reserve.  
 
The eviction 
On 8 October 2001 Nyamuma villagers were caught by surprise and disappoint-
ment because of an invasion by an armed police force. This police force was 
heavily armed, carrying tear gas canisters and riot control weapons. The police 
was under the supervision of the district commissioner Ole Sabaya and his dis-
trict police commanding officer in charge, both representatives of the central 
government. During the invasion, an announcement was broadcasted: Nyamuma 
Iliyobaki should be vacated by 12 October 2001.  
The Nyamuma villagers were evicted using force from what they thought was 
their territory. Their homesteads and properties were set on fire. The villagers 
had nowhere to go and the district administration that implemented the eviction, 
stated that it was not the concern of the district to relocate the villagers.  
 
The official complaint procedure 
On 20 June 2002 Ibrahim Karosso and other 134 villagers filed their complaints 
to the Commission of Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) with 
assistance from Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC). The CHRAGG is an 
independent government department, established as the national focal point for 
the promotion and protection of human rights and duties. The CHRAGG came 
into existence in the year 2000 following the 13th Amendment of the Constitu-
tion of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977. Statutory, the CHRAGG reports 
direct to the president. Its statutory role is to recommend to the president any ac-
tion to be taken on matters related to violation of human rights and good govern-
ance.  
The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) that supported the villagers was 
formed in 1995 as a private, voluntary, non-profit and non-partisan organisation. 
Its mission is creating legal and human rights awareness in, and giving empow-
erment to, the general public and, in particular, the underprivileged sections of 
the society through legal and civic education, advocacy, research, follow up of 
human rights abuses and provision of legal aid. The target groups or beneficiaries 
of the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) include the indigent, women, 
children, youths, men, people with disabilities, politicians, policy makers, legisla-
tors, law enforcers, community leaders, influential people, civil society organisa-
tions and the general public.  
After having received the complaint, the Commission under its chairman, Jus-
tice Kisanga, investigated the matter by interviewing 120 eye-witnesses. On 13 
December 2004, the commission gave its findings and recommendations. The 
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commission concluded that the exercise of evicting villagers and destroying their 
properties by force was a violation of human rights and good governance. The 
commission ordered in favour of the villagers and recommended that they would 
be re-settled at Nyamuma ‘Iliyobaki’ and be compensated accordingly.  
The order was not implemented. After three months the Attorney General 
wrote a letter to the commission saying that the government would not comply 
with the commission’s recommendations. The Attorney General can be regarded 
as the legal advisor of the central government. With this letter, it became clear 
that the government would never implement the recommendations.  
The matter then escalated in a series of threats and warnings from each side. 
Speaking confidently, the Regional Commissioner insisted that the government’s 
duty was to evict the villagers in order to implement the first decision which was 
to expand the Ikorongo Game Reserve. Re-settlement of the villagers was not his 
responsibility:  
‘they can go anywhere, Tanzania is a vast country. We cannot assume and we are in fact not 
duty bound to look for another place for the villagers. After all, that was not a village, they 
invaded the game reserve land, and therefore they have to leave.’ 
Echoing the regional and district administration, the minister responsible for 
good governance made a strong statement that the government is not going to 
pay any compensation to Nyamuma villagers because the government acted re-
sponsibly in its effort to implement a policy decision. The minister stood firm 
that nobody could compel the government to act otherwise. 
After all these statements from the government, the villagers, with assistance 
from LHRC, filed an appeal to the High Court in Land Division, pleading for 
court action to enforce the commission’s recommendations. The High Court dis-
missed the application on the grounds that it had no jurisdiction to order court 
action to implement the commission’s recommendations. The main argument 
was that the recommendations of the commission are not judicial decisions to be 
enforced by court of law. 
The villagers then filed an appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision 
of the High Court Land Division. In its judgment the Court of Appeal held that 
the High Court was erred in not considering the matter on merit of the case and 
ordered that the matter be remitted to the high court for further consideration.  
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Questions 
1. Explain why the principle of good governance is mainly a normative model.  
2. How can one distinguish the term ‘government’ and ‘governance’? 
3. Why is it necessary to observe the whole issue of good governance? 
4. Identify the problems related to the principles of good governance in the case of Nyamuma 
village.  
5. What changes to the institutional framework would you recommend to enhance the  
principles of good governance?  
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Developing public policy 
Leticia Warioba & Dominik T. Msabila  
Introduction 
Since the declaration of Education For All in 1990 in Jomtien, Thailand and later 
the development of the Framework for Action in 2000 in Dakar, governments all 
over the world have been ardently searching for effective means to improve their 
education systems (Dy & Ninomiya 2003). In many countries educational inno-
vations have been introduced which aim to achieve high quality and sustainable 
educational programmes (Aderinoye 2000). Unfortunately many of these innova-
tions have had unsatisfactory results in a number of developing countries and 
quite often fail to achieve their initial goals and objectives (Dy & Ninomiya 
2003). 
In Tanzania the plans to improve the education fitted in a longer tradition of 
reforms and reorientation on the public policy on education. With the introduc-
tion of the Educational Act in 1962, the government aimed at ensuring that elitist 
tendencies and racial discrimination were wiped out in the education system 
(Mosha 1995). Efforts geared towards changing the education system gained 
momentum in the 1970s when the Universal Primary Education (UPE) was in-
troduced. UPE was seen to be an essential part of social and economic transfor-
mation in the country (Mosha 1995). The launching of the UPE went hand in 
hand with the abolition of school fees which in turn caused enrolment expansion. 
This expansion called for the establishment of new primary schools and teachers’ 
colleges (Sumra 1995). The means were not always sufficient in ensuring the 
quality of education. Therefore, the declaration of 1990 of Jomtien and the 
framework of 2000 of Dakar were a new boost to investments and the reorganisa-
tion of the educational system. In this chapter, this policy reform is analysed 
from the perspective of rational policy making. The education policy is, there-
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fore, an example of two rational models that can be used to formulate public pol-
icy.  
Models of formulating public policy 
Characteristics of public policy 
In general, a policy refers to the formulation of objectives, the identification of 
means and the actual making of decisions on these objectives and means. When 
it comes to public policy, the policy has the specific characteristic of public ob-
jectives: Objectives that benefit the country or a community. In principle every 
member of the community or every citizen should benefit from the public policy 
and the objective of the policy should be related to the ‘public interest’.  
Public policy is the purposeful course of actions aimed at realising the formu-
lated goals of the policy. These specific fields of policy can vary from improving 
the quality of the education to improving the infrastructure or safeguarding the 
public safety in a city. If one wishes to analyse public policy, the field does not 
really matter. What is relevant for policy analysis is the decision-making process. 
This process involves the decision of which goals one wishes to achieve and 
which instruments will be used to achieve these goals.  
Although in principle the policy process is an analytical and rational process, 
in practice the political context might blur the actual decision-making process. 
As Lindblom (1980: 5) states: Policy making is both an analytical and political 
process. One could argue with Dror (1968: 107) that policy is a very complex, 
dynamic process, whose components make different contributions. According to 
Mosha (1995) policies can range from mere statements of intent declared by poli-
ticians to well thought-out and detailed blueprints that clearly delineate priorities, 
specify objectives, and spell out means or instruments for their implementation.  
 
Rational public policy model: The policy cycle 
There are many models to analyse the development and implementation of public 
policy. These models can be used to both to explain and predict the effects and 
consequences of public policy. One can depict the process of policy making us-
ing a cycle. Proponents of this approach are Jones (1978) and Stone (2002). They 
argue that policy making is actually a process which consists of several steps that 
run in a cycle. These steps form a sequence, as shown in Figure 4.1.  
 
Problem definition  
This circle starts as a response to a problem. The first stage is the definition of 
the actual problem. In this stage, the government determines its policy in relation 
to other issues on the political agenda. This also implies a consideration of other 
activities that call for action and a consideration of the availability of resources. 
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After all, some problems are not easy to solve at all. These are the so-called 
wicked problems that will never result in a public policy (Rittel & Webber 1973). 
 
Figure 4.1  The policy cycle 
 
Source: Parsons 1995: 77. 
 
 
The question of whether or not the government responds to a certain problem is 
not always predictable. This is actually a problem of ‘agenda-setting’. Some 
stakeholders or pressure groups are more effective in fixing the attention of those 
that are involved in policy making than others. Examples of effective agenda-
setting stakeholders include the external NGOs or trade unions. These groups 
represent an important power, either financially or in general support. If these 
groups call for action on a problem, the chance that the government recognises 
the urgency of the problem is larger than if the same problem is raised by 
smaller, less significant groups.  
Raising a problem is one thing. But the exact definition of the problem is an-
other. This is actually a very important phase in the development of a policy, 
since the specific definition of the problem gives a direction to the potential solu-
tions to the policy. One might agree on the general problem that has to be solved, 
but might disagree on the detailed specifics of the problem which have to be 
dealt with in the public policy. As an example, Parsons (1995: 87) refers to the 
general issue that there are people sleeping on the streets. This issue can be iden-
tified as a problem of ‘homelessness’. The logical policy would be to create more 
housing. If the same issue is identified as a problem of ‘vagrancy’ the policy re-
sponse may be framed in terms of law enforcement and policing.  
 
 
problem 
problem definition 
identifying alternative 
responses/solutions 
evaluation of options 
selection of policy option 
implementation 
evaluation 
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Figure 4.2 Same issues, different definitions of the problem 
 
 
 
 
Identifying alternative solutions 
Once the problem that has to be solved is clear, the next step is to identify the 
possible solutions. In general, policy formulation refers to the initiation and the 
development of policy options or proposals (Howlett & Ramesh 2003: 13). At 
this stage, policy makers engage themselves in discussing alternative policy 
choices, carrying out an initial evaluation of these options and making decisions 
on the best alternatives to be included in the policy.  
There is more than one method to weigh up the alternatives. The more scien-
tific way to choose the policy measure is by way of an experiment. An experi-
ment is where one specific measure of policy is tested on a specific group and the 
exact consequences of this measure are compared with another (control) group 
that is not exposed to that policy. Such policy experimentation makes it possible 
to assess exactly the consequences of the policy solution. After all, in an ideal 
situation, all the remaining variables are equal to both the group that is exposed 
to the policy (the test group) and the group that is not exposed to the policy (the 
control group). If the experiment shows that that the measure has an effect in the 
test group, while the control group remains the same, that is profound evidence 
on the effect of that particular solution.  
In public policy, it is often very difficult to create a ‘policy experiment’. 
Sometimes it is possible to do such an experiment ‘on paper’. This is called an 
‘impact assessment’. Especially when the policy comes down to a financial 
measure, like a tax increase, it is quite often possible to calculate exactly what the 
consequences of the measure will be for each (group of) citizen or company.  
An impact assessment like this requires information on the group of citizens 
that will be affected by the public policy. When these numbers are not available, 
the only solution to evaluate the different solutions to the policy problem is a ‘ra-
tional guess’ on the possible effects of the different solutions. For this ‘rational 
General problem/issue:  
Many people sleeping on 
the streets 
Problem definition by 
policy makers:  
There is too much 
homelessness 
Problem definition by 
policy makers:  
Too much vagrancy 
Logical policy solution 
Build more houses 
Logical policy solution 
Stricter law enforcement 
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guess’, it is necessary to involve the professionals and peers that are capable of 
analysing the possible effects of the intended policy solution. Therefore, in the 
policy cycle, the policy maker often discusses alternatives with these profession-
als, including government officials, policy-planning organisations, policy ana-
lysts and interest groups (Porter & Hicks 1995: 8). The weighing up of the alter-
natives is then based on their professional assessment of the assumed conse-
quences of each alternative.  
 
Selection of policy option 
The weighing up of the alternatives ends with a formal decision: The selection of 
the solutions that are expected to solve the policy problem. This phase is ‘formal’ 
since, quite often, the decision-making itself is based on a statutory authority. 
One can expect a legislative procedure ending with a decision of parliament 
which is approved by the president. Or when the discussions involved in day-to-
day policy making end in decisions being made; for example in the district coun-
cil; it has to be formulated on paper and signed according to all the formalities in 
order to give it a legal effect.  
 
Implementation 
Once the decision is made, the next phase is implementation. Policy implementa-
tion is an act of putting policy decisions into action in order to achieve specific 
objectives. Mayaya (1981) points out that public policy implementation has sev-
eral logical sequences that must be followed if the goals of a policy are to be 
achieved. He states that, after the approval of the policy, a thorough study has to 
be made by implementing agencies. After all, the policy decision itself is one 
step, but the actual acts and day-to-day decisions are made by these agencies and 
public servants. In this phase implementing public policy contravene with organ-
isational capacities or preferences. Quite often, the public policy neglects espe-
cially the capacity of the agencies that have to implement the policy. This capac-
ity is always limited, both in terms of finances and in terms of human resources. 
To prevent the situation where the public policy is not implemented at all, Ma-
yaya (1981) advocates three preconditions that have to be fulfilled for a success-
ful implementation:  
(i)  Implementers have to be involved in the decision-making and have to 
carry out a cost-benefit analysis  
(ii) The public policy has to be explained to the people and  
(iii) The policy has to contain a policy implementation programme with proce-
dures, plans, timetables, regulations, strategies etc.  
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It is important to emphasise that the task of policy implementation is the most 
important step in the policy making process. It is the actual implementation 
which creates an impact on the initial goals and objectives of the policy.  
 
Evaluation 
Sooner or later after the implementation, the policy will be evaluated. In any de-
mocratic system policies that do not turn out to solve the initial problem, are 
evaluated (and decided upon) by those who elect the politicians. After all, if the 
initial problem is not solved according to the needs of the voters, it will reach the 
political agenda once again, as the starting point of a new policy cycle.  
One could call this feedback through elections a somewhat unstructured 
method of evaluation of public policy. Ideally, evaluation is already part of the 
public policy itself and takes place on the initiative of the policy maker. Such a 
rational policy evaluation can be traced back to the early 1930s, when social sci-
entists advocated the use of empirical research methods to assess the effects and 
consequences of government policies and programmes. Policy evaluation grew 
as an activity after World War II because the growth in the number of pro-
grammes boosted the need for evaluations. Over time, policy analysis and 
evaluation became established fields of study (Hall 2009). 
Evaluation involves the determination of the impact of policies on targets for 
the direct and timely use of those responsible for a policy intervention. Warioba 
(1992: 349) defines policy evaluation as the production of information on the 
value of the policy outcomes. According to Anderson (1994) policy evaluation is 
a systematic process for assessing the design, implementation and outcomes of 
public policies. Anderson argues that evaluation uses social science research 
methods, including qualitative and quantitative techniques, to examine the effects 
of policies. He describes policy making as a sequential process marked by dis-
tinct steps, such as agenda-setting, policy formulation, adoption and implementa-
tion. For Anderson, evaluation is the final step in this process. However, the 
process of public policy evaluation often results in new policy changes, which 
are then implemented and evaluated again. 
 
A scientific evaluation of public policy consists of six steps:   
Step 1:  Learning the legislative history of the policy that will be evaluated. 
All public policies exist in a political context, so it is important to 
know how a policy came to exist in its current form.  
Step 2:  Identifying the key stakeholders of the policy. This means identify-
ing not only the agency charged with implementing the policy be-
ing evaluated but also the intended recipients of services. 
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Step 3:  Describing the policy that is being evaluated in the most detailed 
way possible. Since the evaluation is on the question of whether or 
not the initial goals and objectives are realised, these goals are 
preferably described as quantitatively as possible. In the example of 
the building of more houses as a response to the homeless citizens, 
the policy maker might have expressed its expectations on the 
number of houses needed to solve this problem.  
Step 4:  Collect the data needed for evaluation. The data may be qualitative 
(through interviews, observations), quantitative (numbers, annual 
reports) or a combination of both.  
Step 5:  Analyse the data. Though the goals might be described quantita-
tively, the description of the actual implementation calls for quali-
tative analysis. After all, only a qualitative study can answer the 
question of whether or not the policy caused the observed effects. It 
is important to keep in mind that these effects might also be caused 
by other factors rather than the policy itself.  
Step 6:  Report your conclusions based on the analysis. This should include 
specific recommendations for changes of the evaluated policy. 
 
It is important to bear in mind that policy evaluation is rarely as simple or as 
straightforward as one might think. The initial goals are not always emphasised 
in the documents that contain the policy. Furthermore, if these goals are empha-
sised, one will rarely find a quantitative verifiable expression of this goal. An-
other pitfall lies during the checking of the data to see whether or not these goals 
are achieved. There is quite often the problem that there is a lack of data; the data 
are not reliable or the data are not available yet. Policy-makers often want imme-
diate information on policy effects, but many programmes have long-term effects 
that will not be known in the short term (Hall 2009). And finally: The entire pol-
icy process, including the step of evaluation, takes place in a political environ-
ment. Since the analysis of the effects of the policy quite often leaves room for 
discussion, one can expect that this discussion sometimes has a political tone.  
 
Incrementalism  
The model of the policy cycle is not without its critics who argue that it creates 
an artificial view of policy-making. The real world, these critics state, is far more 
complicated and not composed of tidy neat steps, phases and cycles (Parsons 
1995: 79). An alternative approach is that of incrementalism. Incrementalism re-
fers to the situation where the policy is a continuation of previous government 
activity, with minimal changes made to the previous policy. Lindblom (1968) 
calls this ‘muddling through’. In this view, the development of public policy does 
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not follow the strict phases as set out in the policy cycle, but is rather more cha-
otic and less organised.  
This model appeals more to the decision-making of public policy as can be 
observed in both developing and developed countries. In both situations the pol-
icy maker lacks the capacity or time to carefully analyse the results of the previ-
ous policy. Furthermore, policymakers tend to ‘accept the legitimacy of previous 
policies because of the uncertainty about the consequences of the completely new 
or different policies’ (Dye 2002: 36). Only a few governments are prepared or 
have the capacity to opt for radical changes of public policy. As a result, the pol-
icy process is dominated by incrementalism: Small steps that the policy maker 
tries to move towards for the desired outcome. The result is, quite often, a some-
what conservative policy, since the initial starting points are beyond debate 
(Lindblom 1968). 
 
Two models tested 
The concept discussed in this section was the policy cycle. The policy cycle 
shows a rational method to develop and adjust public policy with a clear se-
quence of phases and steps in the development and evaluation of public policy. 
In real life, the actual decision-making by policy makers might be different. 
Compared to the policy cycle, the model of incrementalism seems more realistic. 
The case of the education policy in Tanzania will show the differences.  
Education policy in Tanzania  
‘Education for All’ policy  
‘Education for All’ is a global movement led by UNESCO, aiming to meet the 
learning needs of all children, youth and adults by 2015. The movement was 
launched in 1990 at the World Conference on Education for All in Jomtien, Thai-
land. In this conference representatives of the international community (155 
countries, as well as representatives from some 150 organisations) agreed to 
‘universalise primary education and massively reduce illiteracy by the end of the 
decade’.  
In 2000, ten years later, the international community met again in Dakar, 
Senegal. It was then clear that many countries were far from having reached this 
goal. They affirmed their commitment to achieving Education for All (EFA) by 
the year 2015, and identified six key measurable education goals which aim to 
meet the learning needs of all children, youth and adults by 2015. The six goals 
of EFA are:  
Goal 1: Expand early childhood care and education  
Goal 2: Provide free and compulsory primary education for all  
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Goal 3: Promote learning and life skills for young people and adults  
Goal 4: Increase adult literacy by 50 per cent  
Goal 5: Achieve gender parity by 2005, gender equality by 2015  
Goal 6: Improve the quality of education  
 
UNESCO has been mandated to lead the movement and coordinate the interna-
tional efforts to reach Education for All. Governments, development agencies, 
civil society, non-government organisations and the media are but some of the 
partners working toward reaching these goals (Aderinoye 2000). 
The EFA goals also contribute to the global pursuit of the eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). The eight Millennium Development Goals include: 
eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; achieve universal primary education; 
promote gender equality and empower women; reduce child mortality; improve 
maternal health; combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; ensure envi-
ronmental sustainability; and develop a global partnership for development (Dy 
& Ninomiya 2003). The EFA goals coincide with the second and third Millen-
nium Development Goals.  
 
Education policy in Tanzania 
During independence, the general situation of the Tanzanian education sector 
was not very good. This was due to the years of negligence. The education struc-
ture inherited was based on race and religion (Omari 2002). There were exclusive 
public schools for Indians, Goans, Africans, and Europeans. These public Afri-
can schools had the least provisions in terms of teachers, facilities and capitation 
grants. Compared to these schools, the European schools had far better provi-
sions.  
Besides these public funded schools, there were schools for Lutherans, Catho-
lics, Anglicans and Muslims (Omari 2002). Realising that such an inimical situa-
tion existed in the education system, the first task of the state was to establish the 
Education Act in 1962 to abolish the schools based on race and religion (URT 
1995; Omari 2002). 
In order to ensure the quality of the education provided, the Education for 
Self-Reliance paper was produced in 1967. The intention was to ensure that the 
provided education would not produce an elite class for white-collar jobs, who 
would get alienated from their villages and environments. The policy goal was to 
impart socialist attitudes and values of cooperation and sharing. Education would 
also aim at learning appropriate skills, basically for menial work that was rural 
tailored and was meant to enhance rural affinity and economic productivity. The 
prescribed curriculum therefore included and integrated both theory and practical 
skills (Omari 2002). 
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Universal primary education 
In 1974, access to education services became a matter of great concern by the 
central government. This had to do with the increased number of pupils. To ex-
pand the capacity of the schools and to make education more accessible to people 
of all social groups, the government abolished the school fees in the so-called 
‘Universal Primary Education’ programme (Omari 2002). The Universal Primary 
Education (UPE) was an ambitious programme that was aimed at ensuring that 
all children between ages of 7 and 13 years would finish at least the primary 
schools by the year of 1977 (URT 1976). To encourage the parents to register 
their children, the government launched many campaigns. This resulted in sig-
nificant enrolment. In 1979, 98% of the children that were supposed to attend 
school were actually enrolled in a primary school (Kuleana 1999). 
Nonetheless, the situation did not persist as it was planned. This was due to the 
fact that the programme was implemented in too much haste and without ade-
quate preparations in terms of training of teachers, building classrooms, provid-
ing desks, textbooks and other teaching and learning materials (Mosha 1995). 
The huge increase of pupils did simply not correspond with the available human, 
financial and material resources (Masudi 1995).  
Another problem was the economic crisis that took place after the war be-
tween Tanzania and Uganda. This crisis worsened the situation. The central gov-
ernment was forced to introduce budget cuts. That led to the decline of enrolment 
rates (Rajani 2004). The Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) dropped from 98% in 
1979 to 77% in 2000 (Kuleana 1999). Meanwhile, the performance of pupils in 
primary school examinations deteriorated (Sumra 2001). A new kind of problem 
was brought to the attention of both the governmental institutions and the par-
ents. No longer was education seen as only a matter of quantitative measures 
such as building enough schools and training sufficient teachers, but also the 
quality of education was focused on by the government.  
  
The Tanzanian response to education for all 
Since 1995, the government of Tanzania has introduced a series of educational 
reforms through a sector-wide development programme (URT 2001). This pro-
gram was a response to the Education for All declaration and the Millennium 
Development Goals. All along, the primary education sub-sector has been facing 
a lot of challenges which stem from, above all, an education system that has been 
trying to educate a very large number of children from relatively poor house-
holds. This has been done within the constraints of a chronic shortage of public 
resources.  
 The policy documents contain a profound analysis of the problems in the edu-
cational sector. Many pupils learn in crowded, poorly furnished and unfinished 
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classrooms. Often the pupils have to share textbooks and other resources. Many 
teachers are poorly qualified and poorly deployed. The curriculum is often seen 
as too diverse and, in some ways, irrelevant for many of the pupils and their life 
needs. Many teachers, head-teachers and other education support staff are also 
poorly prepared for the management tasks.  
The factors in the policy documents that contributed to this situation are, 
above all, the poor economic condition, both at a national level and at the level of 
the individual households. The scarcity of wealth within the households makes it 
impossible to ask for a higher contribution from the parents of the children. The 
current contribution is sometimes a reason for parents to keep the children at 
home. Over the years the percentage of children that are enrolled has been declin-
ing while absence and drop-out rates have been increasing.  
Another reason for this development is the dreadful impact of the HIV/AIDS 
with its devastating effect on human capacity. A case of HIV/AIDS in the family 
quite often keeps the children from participating in the education system. In some 
cases the children themselves are affected by this disease.  
Despite these problems, the Tanzanian government is determined to increase 
the level of education, in order to answer the economic demand for a well-
educated, human capital.  
 
Education and training policy and the primary education development plan 
The challenges explained in the previous section contributed to a new public pol-
icy. The desire to improve the provision and quality of education resulted in the 
formulation of the Education and Training Policy (ETP) in 1995. The Education 
and Training Policy (ETP) encompasses the entire education and training sector. 
The major objectives of this policy are to achieve increased enrolments and to 
expand and optimise the utilisation of facilities. Other policy aims include en-
hancing partnerships in the delivery of education; broadening the financial base 
and the cost-effectiveness of education; and streamlining education management 
structures through the devolution of authority to schools, local communities and 
local government authorities (URT 2001). 
In order to implement the Education and Training Policy (1995), a sector-wide 
approach is adopted. This approach establishes new relationships which promote 
partnership amongst all sectors of society with a vested interest in education 
(URT 2001). This approach enhances the establishment of the Education Sector 
Development Programme (ESDP).  
The Primary Education Development Plan (PEDP) is one of the first outcomes 
of the Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP). The plan was 
launched in July 2001 with the aim of improving both access to, and the quality 
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of, education. Financed jointly by the government of Tanzania, the World Bank 
and other Development Partners, the PEDP goals include: 
• Improving education quality at the school level; 
• Improving retention and completion of the seven years of primary education 
cycle for all children; 
• Providing equitable access to all children, and 
• Building adequate capacity at the school, community, district and central 
government levels. 
 
According to Hakielimu (2003), the Education and Training Policy is perhaps the 
most ambitious attempt, after the Universal Primary Education (UPE) drive in 
1977, to affect primary education in Tanzania. The Primary Education Develop-
ment Plan (PEDP) goes beyond the aims of the Universal Primary Education 
(UPE) which was primarily concentrating on expanding access. The PEDP is 
more comprehensive in its scope. This means that, in addition to addressing ac-
cess, it also emphasises on improving the quality of teaching and learning, in-
creasing the funding available for the school level and making institutional ar-
rangements more democratic and transparent throughout the system (URT 2001) 
Good progress has been made in achieving both access and quality as indi-
cated by different government reports, such as the Basic Education Statistics of 
the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training. Key achievements include: 
Increased access such that the Net Enrolment Rate (NER) in Tanzania improved 
from 58.6% in 2000 to 96.1% in 2006. Another result is the improved quality, 
such that the pass rate of students completing primary education, assessed 
through the Primary School Leaving Examinations (PSLE), significantly im-
proved from 22% in 2000 to 61.8% in 2006. This represents a real improvement 
in learning outcomes (URT 2008). 
Tanzania in now implementing the second phase of PEDP that started in 2007 
and will end in 2011. Based on the lessons learnt from PEDP 2002-2006) PEDP 
II has extra areas of focus. These are cross-cutting issues such as HIV and AIDS, 
environmental education, gender equality, educational research and the monitor-
ing and evaluation of implementations of educational planning activities. Central 
to PEDP II is ensuring adequate availability of appropriate equipment and teach-
ing and learning materials (URT 2008)  
Sumra (2003) adds that, if implemented successfully, the Primary Education 
Development Plan (PEDP) can transform the nature of schooling in Tanzania and 
help ensure that every child is able to enjoy the right to quality primary educa-
tion. 
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Questions 
1. Give a definition of the term ‘policy’. 
2. What do you understand by the term ‘policy cycle’? 
3. Identify and explain the differences between the model of the policy cycle and the  
incrementalist approach.  
4. Identify the steps in policy making with regard to the education policy in Tanzania. Does 
the education policy follow the phases of the policy cycle or is the incrementalist approach a 
better description of the development of the education policy?  
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5 
Implementation of policy 
Leticia Warioba & Dominik T. Msabila  
Introduction 
In the policy cycle, the implementation of policy is identified as a separate step. 
In practice, this phase of implementation is perhaps the most important step that 
determines the success or failure of a policy. A certain policy can be beautifully 
designed on paper. But if it is not implemented well, it will show no effects to the 
actual policy problem. The opposite is also possible: A policy can have its short-
comings or design errors, but once the policy is implemented, these errors can be 
corrected.  
This chapter discusses the concept of policy implementation. This concept is 
illustrated with the case of the implementation of the education policy in Moro-
goro Municipality in Tanzania. 
Policy implementation 
Approaches to policy implementation  
Policy implementation is a complex process that is determined by various vari-
ables including people’s personal interests, resources, the government structure, 
local people’s awareness, people’s attitudes and people’s values. These factors 
influence the way the policy is implemented and hence the approach to policy 
implementation. Warioba & Gibai (2003: 38-40) identify four approaches to pol-
icy implementation: Structural approach, procedural and managerial approach, 
behavioural approach and political approach.  
 
Structural approach 
The structural approach is based on the basic assumption that appropriate organ-
isational structures are needed for policy implementation. Any policy results in 
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organisational questions and problems. Sometimes the implementation takes 
place within the structures of the government, by an agency or a department. In 
other situations, the policy has to be implemented by other governmental bodies, 
such as districts or municipalities. And finally, for some policies, the implemen-
tation depends on private actors.  
In all these situations, implementation of policy results in organisational ques-
tions. Sometimes the implementation takes place within the hierarchy of the  
government. The main mechanism to safeguard an adequate implementation of 
public policy is then the functioning of the bureaucratic organisation. The typical 
mechanism in a bureaucracy is control, reward and punishment. Additionally, 
there is a strong belief under this approach that education, training, and support 
will result in an organisation that is able and willing to accomplish the policy ob-
jectives. 
In the event that the implementation is dependent on the cooperation of private 
actors, the organisational structure takes the form of contracts or joint ventures. 
These specific forms of organisation share that they are based on the idea of mu-
tual agreement. Essentially, the policy maker is the principal and is depending on 
the cooperation of the private agent. The contracts or the joint ventures are just 
organisational forms to ensure this cooperation.  
In the event that the policy has to be implemented by public agencies or other 
governmental organisations, the organisational structure is quite often a hybrid of 
both, hierarchical relations and mutual agreements. The shapes of the organisa-
tional structure differ according to the variation of the specific policy and its en-
vironment.  
 
Procedural and managerial approach 
The procedural and managerial approach ignores the specific structure and fo-
cuses on the procedures that have to be followed. One form of these procedures 
involves managerial procedures. To be more specific, in this approach the im-
plementation is a matter of scheduling, planning and control. The procedural ap-
proach requires, first of all, a design of the programme with clear objectives, 
tasks, performance standards, costs and timing. This programme is then executed 
by mobilising appropriate structures and staff, funds and other resources. And 
finally the implementation according to this procedure approach requires the es-
tablishment of an appropriate scheduling, monitoring and controlling devices to 
ensure that the programme proceeds as intended. This managerial approach en-
ables the policy maker to take action quickly whenever deviations occur. 
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Behavioural approach 
In the behavioural approach to policy implementation, the most important notion 
is that there are limits to what can be achieved through the design of organisa-
tional structures and procedures. Human behaviour and human attitudes are the 
most important factors that make a success or failure of the implementation of 
policy. This behavioural approach begins with the recognition that change often 
encounters resistance. This resistance can vary from open, active resistance, to 
more hidden resistance or indifference. Quite often resistance is related to fear 
and uncertainty.  
In fact, if symptoms and causes of resistance are understood, the strategy that 
follows the behavioural approach is obvious. First of all it is necessary to provide 
the full information at the early stages of the policy process. This is to ensure that 
those who are needed to help implement the policy are able to anticipate the 
changes. Furthermore, this transparency might help to justify these changes.  
Besides transparency, involvement and consultation of stakeholders is another 
strategy to ensure support for the policy. From the perspective of the behavioural 
approach, participative decision-making is therefore (highly) recommended.  
Finally, honesty about problems and dangers has to be made known through 
valid communication. From the perspective of the policy maker, it is important to 
have control of the communication on the policy. Bearing in mind that it is gen-
erally impossible to hide critical information, it is better to control the message 
that delivers this information. After all, the more devastating alternative is to 
leave this to the criticasters. In the long term, that will undermine the support for 
the government and public policy in general.  
 
Political approach 
The political approach focuses on the use of power. The major assumption is that 
organisations are characterised by conflict due to opposing or contradicting peo-
ple’s beliefs and values. The conflict can be between organisations or between 
individuals. The extent to which this conflict becomes dysfunctional will influ-
ence the implementation of the policy. If the conflict reaches high levels of de-
structiveness, it may have negative impact on policy implementation. All in all, 
conflict within and between organisations and social groups is endemic rather 
than exceptional and cannot simply be stamped out.  
In this approach, results in deliberate plans of action to guide decisions and 
achieve rational outcomes are provided by people with power. These powerful 
people are, for example, the president, ministers, members of parliament or other 
political leaders. The decisions and guidelines for policy implementation are pre-
pared at the top and given for action to the people at the grassroots level.  
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Implementation of policy is geared through rewards to those achieving the goals 
and interests of those with power. This reward often results in a political career. 
Those granted a political function receive more powers as well. Since political 
careers run through both public and private organisations, through governmental 
bodies and private companies, the incentive of receiving political power is quite 
often a sophisticated and not easy to uncover mechanism.  
 
Comparing the approaches 
The four approaches are not exclusive. In practice, implementation of policy is 
based on a mixture of instruments that are related to different approaches. Gener-
ally, the implementation strategy depends on the question of what to implement, 
how to implement it and the technique or strategy for effective implementation 
(Dunn 2008: 136-137). While answering these questions the precise approach is 
less relevant.  
It is clear though that some policies depend more on cooperation of individu-
als or professionals. One could think of the implementation of a new curriculum 
in primary schools for example. In this situation, a procedural or a behavioural 
approach involving the teachers or their representatives that have to actually con-
duct the curriculum seems fruitful.  
In other cases, the policy is dependent on cooperation of other governmental 
bodies. A building program for more schools is an example. In that situation it 
might be an option to choose a strategy rewarding those who support the policy 
using a structural or a political approach.  
 
Normative versus descriptive theories 
Sometimes the actor that makes decisions on implementing a policy uses a nor-
mative way of reasoning and in other situations the reasoning is more practical 
by nature. This distinction between normative or prescriptive (what one ought to 
do) and positive or descriptive (what one actually does) is significant. The de-
scription of the approaches in the previous section also has both norma-
tive/prescriptive and positive/descriptive meanings. This section therefore elabo-
rates the differences between normative or prescriptive theories and positive or 
descriptive theories.  
 
Normative or prescriptive theories 
Most implementation theories are normative and prescriptive. They are con-
cerned with identifying the best alternative to take when implementing a policy, 
assuming an ideal decision-maker who is fully informed, able to compute with 
perfect accuracy and is fully rational. These normative theories are concerned 
with prescribing how people actually ought to make decisions. The normative 
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theories help people determine the optimum level of implementation of the pol-
icy (Dunn 2008: 87).  
Normative theories of policy implementation can be divided into deontologi-
cal, teleological and practical normative theories. The deontological normative 
theories claim that certain kinds of actions are inherently right or obligatory or 
right because they conform to some formal principle (Dunn 2008: 351). Accord-
ing to Dunn, deontological theories state that people should adhere to their obli-
gations and duties when analysing and implementing various policy decisions 
and they insist on doing things that are moral or right. Injustice is highly discour-
aged in this theory. By following the deontological theory, leaders will make 
good promises to people and accomplish them in a justifiable manner. Further-
more, by following this theory, policy makers will be able to make consistent 
policy decisions that are in line with what individuals need to and are supposed 
to do.  
In a teleological theory all actions are directed towards achieving certain ends 
which are considered as ‘good’ or ‘rightful’. Politicians using this theory will fo-
cus on outcomes or ends rather than considering the correctness or rightfulness of 
the actual policy decisions and actions. In other words: Lying is allowed if it 
helps to attain the rightful objective. The end justifies the means. Since this the-
ory is concerned about the consequences of the policy decisions, it is referred to 
as the consequentialist theory.  
A prominent variation of teleological theory, one that has deeply affected pol-
icy analysis and implementation through modern welfare economics, is utilitari-
anism. Utilitarianism stands in the tradition of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart 
Mill in the 19th century. According variation of teleological theory an act is con-
sidered ‘right’ if it brings about the best consequences to the largest number of 
people in the community.  
Practical normative theories use a reflective moral action as a process for dis-
covering the criteria on which values and ethics may be known. Practical norma-
tive theories have stressed reasoned moral discourse as a process for creating and 
evaluating ethical as well as scientific knowledge. These theories are sometimes 
referred to as good reasons theories and are practical to the extent that actions are 
deemed right or valuable because they conform to principles, or result in conse-
quences, that have been established on the basis of reasoned transactions among 
persons who affect and are affected by the development and application of moral 
rules in policy implementation (Dunn 2008: 351-352). Simply put, this theory 
lends itself to the transactional model of policy implementation. 
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Positive or descriptive theories 
The positive and descriptive theories are concerned with actual choices. The 
theories attempt to describe what people actually do in certain situations (Suho-
nen 2007: 8). These theories are also referred to as interpretative theories. The 
starting point for these theories has been in empirical experiments and research, 
where it has been shown that people’s behaviour is inconsistent with the norma-
tive theories. These experiments show that the answers of people about their 
opinions (quite often normative) differ from what they actually do. These theo-
ries are relevant for all kinds of behaviour, both on an individual level (street-
level bureaucrats) and on the level of organisations. 
To start small: Individual decision-making is quite often pictured as ‘semi-
rational’ (Simon 1957). This means that individuals make their own costs bene-
fits calculation on the base of their limited knowledge. Costs can be anything, 
from material costs to time involved in the decision-making. The same goes for 
benefits. The result is an individual weighing up of pros and cons on the decision 
to implement the policy or not. Lipsky (1980) shows that this costs benefit calcu-
lation can be affected by time constraints. He shows that within the street level 
bureaucracy, many individual rational decisions take place, effecting the imple-
mentation of the policy.  
The theory asserts that because agencies or organisations recruit people from 
similar backgrounds and subject them to similar stimuli, a sizeable portion of an 
organisation’s membership often shares preferences and beliefs. The preferences 
and beliefs are also referred to as goals and world view of the agency (Montjoy 
& O’Toole 2001: 466). In each organisation, there is a dominant group that has 
power, this groups provides the guidelines and directives on how to undertake the 
actions towards implementing certain policy.  
 
Factors influencing policy implementation 
There are various variables or factors which influence an effective implementa-
tion of the public policy. The content of the policy is a factor, especially in rela-
tion with the preferences and values of those that have to implement the policy. 
The precision and clarity of the policy targets are relevant, since these make it 
possible to monitor and control the actual implementation. Another relevant fac-
tor is knowledge and understanding of the policy by those that have to implement 
the policy. Clear and honest communication on the measures and effects of the 
policy is relevant as well. Finally, implementation is dependent on proper re-
sources management.  
These are just some of the factors that encourage or hamper an adequate im-
plementation. Implementation will ultimately affect the satisfaction of the people 
that are depending on the public policy. Therefore research on the effects of the 
 Implementation of policy  
 
 
55
policy and the failures or successes of the implementation of the policy is very 
relevant. Figure 5.1 shows the relationships between the factors. The case of the 
implementation of the education policy in Morogoro Municipal illustrates the 
relevance of these factors.  
 
Figure 5.1  Conceptual framework for implementation of education policy 
 
 
 
Source: Adopted and adapted from Lekmoung’s (2006) model of policy implementation. 
 
Implementation of education policy in Morogoro Municipality 
Introduction 
Morogoro Municipality is located in the Morogoro Region in Tanzania, about 
200 km from Dar es Salaam. The municipality has more than 50 unplanned 
neighbourhoods. These are densely populated areas with poor infrastructure. 
Residents of these informal neighbourhoods lack basic services such as water 
supply and sanitation.  
Morogoro faces severe challenges. The first challenge is the rapidly growing 
population and secondly the limited resources available. The municipality has 
been unable to exert control over the use of natural resources. Polluted air and 
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water sources, soil erosion, and poor solid waste management are only a few of 
the problems the municipality has to deal with.  
The challenges are not only related to environmental issues. Due to the in-
creased population, there is also pressure on the provision of education. The mu-
nicipality has 59 public primary schools where the Primary Education Develop-
ment Plan (PEDP) has been implemented. The Primary Education Development 
Plan (2002-2006) was launched in Tanzania as one of the first outcomes of the 
Education Sector Development Programme (ESDP) to implement the Education 
and Training Policy of 1995 and the Education for All policy.  
The national policy holds quantitative data on, for example, the required num-
ber of teachers’ houses, class rooms, etc. These numbers enables us to assess the 
actual implementation of the policy. After all, if the output accords to the quanti-
tative goals, that is an indication that the policy was successfully implemented.  
 
The implementation of the education policy in Morogoro Municipality 
To assess the implementation of the education policy as laid down in the Primary 
Development Plan and the Education for All policy, a case study was conducted. 
For this case study, six schools were randomly selected. The selected primary 
schools were: Mji Mkuu, Mwembesongo, Msamvu, Mwere, Mtawala, and Ki-
kundi.  
The data on the question of whether or not the policy was actually imple-
mented, was collected with structured and unstructured interviews with 60 re-
spondents (pupils, teachers and head teachers), observations and documentary 
reviews. Interviews and observations provided primary data while documentary 
reviews provided secondary data. Observations entailed making physical visits to 
the respective schools in order to see in person the way pupils were sitting in 
classrooms; to establish pupil-desk ratio; book-pupil ratio and pupil-teacher ratio. 
The research also aimed at assessing the quality of classrooms.  
Output 
Construction of teacher’s houses 
One of the priority areas in implementing Education for All policy was the con-
struction of teachers’ houses. The argument was that providing lodging for 
teachers is a necessity especially in remote areas where it is less attractive to live.  
The required number, according to the public policy, is based on the number 
of teachers required on the school. This required number is compared with the 
actual number of teachers’ houses. Table 5.1 shows the result of this comparison. 
The table shows that in some schools (Kikundi, Mtawala) there are no teachers’ 
houses at all. In other schools, the number of available teachers’ houses is very 
small compared to the required number. Only in Msamvu do we see a rather sig-
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nificant number of teachers houses, although still far too few compared to the re-
quired number of houses. 
 
Table 5.1 Number of teachers’ houses realized in 2009 compared with the standards 
Primary school Required Available Deficit 
Mwembesongo 38 2 36 
Mji Mkuu 21 1 20 
Mwere 30 3 27 
Msamvu 38 16 22 
Mtawala 37 0 37 
Kikundi 24 0 24 
Source: Research data in Morogoro Municipality 2009. 
 
 
Construction of classrooms 
Another indicator of the actual implementation is in the construction of class-
rooms. Classroom construction is one of the major priorities in the Education for 
All programme. Table 5.2 shows the actual number of classrooms compared with 
the intended number. Mji Mkuu has enough classrooms and fulfils the initial 
goals of the policy. Kikundi has a slight shortage of class rooms. In the other 
primary schools, the deficit is larger. In Mwembesongo, Mwere and Mtawala the 
gap is (almost) 50%.  
 
Table 5.2 Number of classrooms realised in 2009 compared with the standards 
Primary school Required Available Deficit 
Mwembesongo 28 14 14 
Mji Mkuu 17 17 0 
Mwere 17 9 8 
Msamvu 18 8 10 
Mtawala 26 13 13 
Kikundi 16 13 3  
Source: Research data in Morogoro Municipality 2009. 
 
 
Construction of pit latrines 
Sanitation is the third major goal of the Education for All policy. To accomplish 
better sanitation, one of the goals was to build sufficient pit latrines in primary 
schools. Table 5.3 shows the comparison of the actual number of pit latrines 
compared with the required number. Only Mji Mkuu has a sufficient number of 
pit latrines. All the other schools have a (large) shortage of pit latrines. 
58 Warioba & Msabila 
 
 
Table 5.3 Number of pit latrines realized in 2009 compared with the standards 
Primary school Required Available Deficit 
Mwembesongo 60 12 48 
Mji Mkuu 12 12 0 
Mwere 15 6 9 
Msamvu 25 10 15 
Mtawala 39 10 29 
Kikundi 20 12 8 
Source: Research data in Morogoro Municipality 2009. 
 
 
Construction of teachers’ offices 
The construction of teachers’ offices was also one of the top priorities in the EFA 
policy. The goal was not to build an office for every teacher, but a number of of-
fices are required to give the teachers the chance to prepare their courses. Teach-
ers’ offices are also used to assist students on an individual level if they need in-
dividual attention. The actual situation of the visited primary schools shows that 
number of offices available was generally inadequate (Table 5.4) since one office 
was shared by more than twenty teachers and the offices used were formerly 
classrooms.  
 Generally, the number of offices is inadequate. A lot needs to be done in order 
to construct more offices in order for teachers to be able to work comfortably and 
effectively in schools. One of the teachers at Msamvu commented on the lack of 
teachers’ offices made it difficult to help pupils with learning problems. The 
shortage of offices made it less attractive for the teachers to work extra hours 
when it was necessary. The head teacher of Msamvu Primary School noted that 
inadequacy of teachers’ offices was caused by inadequacy of funds given by the 
government for construction. Much of it was focused on classrooms construction 
rather than offices. 
 
Table 5.4 Number of teachers’ offices realised in 2009 compared with the standards 
number of offices Primary school number of 
teachers present required present deficit 
comment 
Mwembesongo 40 3 2 1 inadequate 
Mji Mkuu 22 2 2 1 inadequate 
Mwere 27 3 2 1 inadequate 
Msamvu 40 3 1 2 inadequate 
Mtawala 39 3 2 1 inadequate 
Kikundi 21 2 1 1 inadequate 
Source: Research data in Morogoro Municipality 2009. 
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Recruitment and deployment of teachers 
The education policy is not only on investments in building and infrastructure. 
Another goal is investing in bringing the number of teachers to an adequate level. 
The argument is that the less students per teacher, the more attention to each in-
dividual student and the better the quality of the education.  
Table 5.5 depicts that the teacher pupil ratio (TPR) in the schools that were 
visited during the study ranged from 1:50 to 1:26. This implies that the TPR var-
ies from one school to another because of disproportionate distribution of teach-
ers in relation to number of pupils. Since the goal of the Education and Training 
Policy (1995) of Tanzania is to have a TPR of 1:45, the teacher-pupils ratios in 
table 5.5 provide the proof that the Education and Training Policy (1995) has not 
been implemented adequately. Some schools, like Mwere, Msamvu and Mtawala 
have a TPR that is better than the national standard, while other schools, like 
Mwembesongo are far from meeting the requirement. Therefore a lot of effort 
need to be made to address this problem. 
 
Table 5.5 Teacher-pupils ratio in 2009  
Primary school teacher-pupils ratio 
Mwembesongo 1:50 
Mji Mkuu 1:40 
Mwere 1:26 
Msamvu 1:27 
Mtawala 1:29 
Kikundi 1:40 
Average TPR 1:35 
Source: Research data in Morogoro Municipality 2009. 
 
 
Procurement of books 
The quality of education does not only depend solely on teachers and buildings, 
but above all on the availability of books and manuals. The procurement of 
books was a move to curb the problem of book-pupil ratio that had escalated to 
alarming rates. This was in line with the policy goal of ensuring promotion of 
quality of education in schools. The policy goal is that every student should have 
his or her own book. This makes it possible to study at home if necessary. The 
actual situation in the schools shows a deficit towards this goal.  
The policy goal has not been reached in any of the schools (Table 5.6). The 
initial goal of one book for every pupil is therefore still only a dream. The num-
ber of books available, especially in Mji Mkuu, is very limited. Nine pupils have 
to share one textbook there. 
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Table 5.6 Book-pupils ratio in 2009; standard 1:1 
Primary school book-pupils ratio
Mwembesongo 1:5 
Mji Mkuu 1:9 
Mwere 1:5 
Msamvu 1:4 
Mtawala 1:4 
Kikundi 1:6 
Source: Research data in Morogoro Municipality 2009. 
 
 
Analysis 
The data show that none of the initial policy goals were reached. The output ob-
served at the grassroots level was less than what was aimed for when the policy 
was designed. The interviewed respondents provided some more information on 
the gap between goals and practice. The most important factor is the insufficient 
financial resources to buy books and undertake other educational activities to im-
prove the education. This factor especially addresses the investments in the 
buildings and textbooks. 
More specifically, with regard to textbooks, the liberalisation of the book pro-
duction industry was mentioned as an important factor. Quite often, the required 
books were not available or simply not available at the right time. It was there-
fore difficult to obtain and distribute the adequate number of books.  
Another problem was the lack of support from the communities. It appeared 
nigh on impossible to generate money from the community to increase the funds 
disbursed by the government. The communities were simply not willing or able 
to pay any more than they already did. Specifically, with regard to Kikundi pri-
mary school, it was not only the lack of financial support, but also the lack of op-
portunities to build the required number of buildings. This school is situated on a 
wetland, making the space for new buildings scarce.  
The third factor mentioned was the lack of management skills in the schools. 
The head teachers are quite often teachers instead of managers. In the improve-
ment programmes they are required to register and apply for extra funds. Quite 
often, the head teachers lack the knowledge or the skills to carefully plan these 
investments.  
A fourth factor has to do with cultural aspects. Many schools suffer from a 
lack of reading culture, absenteeism and issues of under-age pregnancy. The lat-
ter causes early drop-out and getting married under age. The girls are especially 
the victims of this situation, emphasising the still existing gender inequality.  
Despite these factors, Morogoro Municipality has realised moderate success 
with the implementation of the Education for All policy. The research shows that 
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the district was successful in recruiting new teachers, resulting in better teacher-
pupils ratios. Also, the purchase of books and desks improved during the years, 
despite the fact that the situation in 2009 was still not complying with the na-
tional standards.  
 
Recommendations for better implementation 
Based on the problems identified in this study, one could formulate some rec-
ommendations to improve the implementation of the policy goals identified in 
the Education for All policy. These six recommendations were formulated:   
1. First of all, the government should find more funds for implementing EFA in 
the country. The district councils as well as other local government authorities 
should be encouraged to find other sources of funds for implementing EFA 
policy. 
2. Secondly, it is important that funds from the government are punctually dis-
bursed to make sure that the planned educational activities are carried out suc-
cessfully and without delay. 
3. Thirdly, the head teachers and teachers should be given frequent courses in 
order to equip them with modern skills and techniques of teaching and manag-
ing school activities. 
4. The fourth recommendation focuses on gender inequality. This issue of access 
to basic education should be given the highest consideration. This should go 
hand-in-hand with establishing ways of ensuring that girls pursue their studies 
without any problems. 
5. Fifthly, effective ways should be sought to promote the reading culture, not 
only among pupils, but also among the other community members. When the 
reading culture is inculcated among all community members, implementation 
of the EFA policy becomes easier. 
6. Lastly, incentive packages for teachers with very big workloads should be 
provided in order to motivate them to work diligently. Diligence among teach-
ers can help in promoting pupil’s performance and enhancing the quality of 
basic education. 
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Questions 
1. What do you understand by the term ‘implementation?’ 
2. Identify and explain various factors that influence effectiveness in policy implementation.  
3. Explain the distinction between normative, prescriptive theories and positive, descriptive 
theories. 
4. What are the main goals of education for all policy? Who is the policy maker?  
5. Which of the four approaches is used by the policy makers to implement this policy?  
6. Why was the policy not fully implemented? 
7. Do the factors mentioned by the respondents point at normative or positive causes for the 
non-implementation?  
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6 
Community participation 
Moses J. Ndunguru & Wilfred U. Lameck  
Introduction  
Public policy addresses citizens. It aims at changing the situation of these citi-
zens, for example, by providing social services like education or health care. 
Quite often, the success of public policy depends on the co-operation of these 
subjects of public policy. After all, only if a large majority of the citizens obey 
the law and pay their taxes, can public institutions function. Participation of the 
citizens in the process of policy development is an important tool to ensure this 
co-operation.  
In this chapter, the concept of community participation is explained. The de-
scription explains the relevance and the various modes of participation. Thereaf-
ter, two different cases on community participation are introduced. The first one 
on healthcare describes a situation in which the government takes the initiative. 
In the second case, on water supply, the citizens themselves take the initiative 
and seek support from the government. Both cases illustrate the relevance of par-
ticipation in public policy making.  
Community participation 
Communities and participation  
The concept of community participation in development activities emerged in the 
late1960s to early 1970s (Freire 1972; Fals 1969, 1972; Rahma 1995; Savita 
2007). It was then formalised in a number of reports of the United Nations, like 
the report ‘Popular Participation in Development’ of 1971 and the report ‘Popu-
lar Participation in Decision-Making for Development’ of 1975. This attention 
for community participation can be seen as a reaction on the failure of the previ-
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ous top-down state-led regimes. These regimes did not provide an opportunity 
for communities to actively participate in the decision-making process.  
Participation refers to a process by which people are enabled to become ac-
tively involved in defining the issues that concerns them (problem definition), in 
formulating the possible solutions and then implementing this policy (Smithies & 
Webster 1998). Participation as a concept refers to any form of interactive policy 
making, both in the private sector, for example in a workers council in a firm, 
and in the public sector. In the public sector participation refers to the involve-
ment of communities. A community as a group of people are united by common 
characteristics. These characteristics might be geographical, values, religious or 
traditions, etc. (CDC 1997). 
 
Features of participation 
The most important feature of participation is the fact that decision-makers 
gather information through participation. Decision-making is therefore based on 
a better knowledge of the actual facts. The information provided by citizens is 
very valuable for decision-making. Citizens can provide information about the 
exact problem that has to be solved or the effects of the possible solutions. 
Community participation is therefore ensures a wide range of viewpoints of 
community members being considered (Richard & Frederic 1996). In this point 
of view, participation has mostly an instrumental function: gathering information 
to make well-informed decisions.  
From a more normative point of view, participation has the function of enlarg-
ing the legitimacy of decision-making. One of the major assumptions of partici-
pation is that the opportunity to contribute actively to the decisions will enhance 
the development of the community. The reason is that involvement of local peo-
ple will give them control of policy making. As a result, there is a reasonable 
chance that the community will maintain the services and ensure that the services 
are provided. Participation therefore enlarges legitimacy of decision-making 
(Chavis & Wandersman 1990; Crook & Manor 1998).  
Both from an instrumental and a more normative point of view, community 
participation is linked with improvements in policy, policy implementation and 
government’s service delivery in general. This is, most of all, explained by the 
fact that participation creates a channelized mode of reaction on policy that, if 
used adequately, does provide the opportunity to make better decisions.  
 
Exit, voice and loyalty 
Given the relevance of participation and its function for adequate policy making 
it is then relevant to explain and predict the actual use of participation procedures 
by the local community members. For this, one could model the relationship be-
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tween the policy maker (decision-makers) and the citizens as a long standing re-
lation with mutual interests and dependencies.  
On this relationship, the general model of Exit, voice and loyalty, introduced 
by Hirshman (1970) can be applied. This model explains and predicts the reac-
tion of dissatisfied customers on services in the private sector. Dissatisfied cus-
tomers can choose either to exchange the supplier for another supplier (exit) or 
can raise their voices and complain (voice). The choice between either exit or 
voice is based on a rational calculation. With both alternatives, costs are in-
volved. The customer has to file a complaint or has to search for another sup-
plier.  
On the other hand, the benefits in the sense of improved service are uncertain. 
If one opts for another supplier the risk remains that the new supplier is not satis-
factory as well. And filing a complaint has the same uncertainty: The customer 
makes it known that he is unhappy, but is uncertain that his complain will result 
in a better service.  
Due to these relatively high costs and uncertain benefits, dissatisfied custom-
ers often opt for a third alternative: Remain loyal. Loyal, but dissatisfied custom-
ers are a threat for the provider. After all, these customers will go to another sup-
plier as soon as they have the chance to do so.  
Though this model of exit, voice and loyalty is based on customer-supplier re-
lations it is quite easy to transform this model to the relation between citizen and 
public policy maker. After all, in this relationship both the citizen and the public 
policy maker have a mutual interest, just like the supplier and the customer.  
The major distinction is that the citizen is normally unable to ‘exit’: Citizens 
cannot really opt for another government or another public policy like in the pri-
vate market. The exit option therefore has a different shape. One option is that 
dissatisfied citizens move to another municipality or district. Especially when the 
citizen is in reality a major employer that employs many residents, these kinds of 
choices are relevant for public policy makers. On the individual scale citizens 
might also ‘exit’. Not by using their power as a customer, but by neglecting rules 
and regulations. After all, disobeying the public policy is one way of exiting. 
This kind of exit forces the public policy maker to invest even more in law en-
forcement, making the entire policy less efficient and probably less effective.  
Compared to the exit option, the ‘voice’ alternative in the relationship between 
citizen and public policy maker is better conceivable. Citizens can raise their 
voices through either legal or political procedures. A dissatisfied citizen can file a 
complaint or lodge an appeal. He can also file a petition to his political leader. 
These are quite visible reactions to dissatisfaction.  
So, if in this relationship the exit is impossible and voice is useless, loyalty is 
the only remaining alternative for the citizen. With the same results as in the rela-
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tion between supplier and customer: Loyal but dissatisfied citizens can easily 
change their behaviour and raise their voices in a more dramatic method (revolt) 
or massively disobey rules and obstruct implementation of policy.  
 
A ladder of participation  
Participation can be seen as a method of giving the citizens an option to raise 
their voice. The model of exit, voice and loyalty shows the importance of this al-
ternative. The next question is then how one could design a procedure that gives 
the citizens the opportunity to raise their voices while participating in the devel-
opment and implementation of public policy.  
There are two dominant approaches to the use of participation in decision-
making: A top-down and a bottom-up approach. In top-down approaches, the po-
litical leaders or policy makers identify and prioritise the issues that have to be 
solved. In this phase, the addressees of the policy (the grassroots communities) 
are less relevant. The general assumption is that the leaders know what the grass-
roots need. It goes without saying that this top-down approach is opposed to a 
participatory approach in which identification and prioritisation of the relevant 
issues is done by the people themselves. The role of public policy makers and 
political leaders is more that of a facilitator. If one would measure the actual par-
ticipation, these two opposing approaches can be used as the two extremes on a 
scale.  
This scale or ladder shows the level of participation. Participation ranges from 
non-participation at the lowest rung to active participation near the top of the 
ladder (Arnstein 1969). The levels of participation include manipulation, therapy, 
information, consultation, placation, partnerships, delegated power and citizens’ 
control. Table 6.1 illustrates the forms and levels of participation.  
 
 
Table 6.1 Arnstein ladder of citizens’ participation 
8 
7  
6 
Citizens control 
Delegated power 
Partnership 
Degree of citizen power in decision-making increases 
and citizens participate directly in policy making and 
service provision. 
5 
4 
3 
Placation 
Consultation 
Information 
One way and two way communication with citizens, 
there is degree of tokenism and room for dialogue and 
citizens have right to be heard. 
 
2 
1 
Therapy 
Manipulation 
Non participation, educate or cure participants by power 
holders. 
Source: Burns 1994. 
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Manipulation is the lowest form of public participation. It is actually a form of 
non-participation. The public policy maker misleads the citizens, give them fake 
information and use the so-called participation as a formal procedure to have 
formally approval. In this form public and observer are manipulated to believe 
that participation is in progress. This takes place for example through citizens 
advisory committees where by officials influence citizens or setting citizens’ ad-
visory groups at the neighbourhood which let people be heard. 
Sometimes the voice of the citizens is heard but structurally neglected. Partici-
pation is then powerless and is used as a therapy instead of an effective remedy. 
Citizens are engaged in an activity which aims at curing their pathology and not 
in changing the cause of pathology. 
Next to the non-existing participation one can think of modes in which partici-
pation has a function, but is not decisive. In the ladder, there are three rungs. First 
of all, there is participation in the sense of providing information. Providing in-
formation is a fundamental form of underpinning public participation. It involves 
a two way process whereby the citizens and public officials exchange informa-
tion. The logic behind this form is that citizens are more informed about the 
problems in their areas and if they are not informed, it can lead to low quality de-
cisions. 
Consultation is a form of participation which involves inviting the opinions of 
the citizens through surveys, neighbourhood meetings and public hearings. This 
form needs to be combined with others because consulting citizens does not 
mean that their opinions will be taken to account. And finally, placation gives the 
citizens some influence on the decision-making, since they are placed in commu-
nity action agencies and public bodies, for example, education boards, police 
commissions and housing authorities. Information and consultation rungs are 
considered as levels of tokenism simply because people can hear and have little 
voice in the development programmes. Placation is, compared to these two forms 
of participation, the highest level of tokenism because it merely allows people to 
advise or give their opinion while the right to decide is retained to those with de-
cision-making power. 
In these three rungs, we see some participation but in all three situations it is 
still the public policy maker, the leader or the politician who makes the final de-
cisions. This is different when comparing the three most extreme modes of par-
ticipation. Partnership, for example, is a form of participation that involves redis-
tribution of powers through negotiations between those that have the power (the 
policy maker, the politician) and citizens. The decision-making and responsibility 
is usually shared through joint decision-making boards such as planning commit-
tees and policy boards. Delegation and finally, citizens’ control are just two 
rungs further up. In the highest form of participation, citizens demand and re-
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ceive control on their neighbourhood or their particular part of society. Quite of-
ten, this results in forms of self-regulation, for example by associations of law-
yers or other professionals.  
 
Assessing the level of participation 
With this ladder, it is possible to assess the procedures and institutional provi-
sions that enable citizens to raise their voice and participate. Participation often 
results in a procedure, like a consultative meeting, or in institutional provisions, 
like committees or boards, etc. Participation, therefore, needs to be embedded in 
national policy and institutional environment has to receive political support and 
has to be built on technical capability (Helling et al. 2005; Mubyazi & Hutton 
2003). Finally, the means of expression and powers to initiate activities and lev-
els of empowerment are important (Acioly 2004; UNDP 1997).  
And even with these institutional provisions, it is not certain whether actual 
participation will take place. If one would assess the actual level of participation, 
it is needed to take into account, for example, the actual number of people that 
attended a meeting and the question of whether or not these participants are a true 
reflection of the community. Establishing a committee is also important but in 
the end, participation deals with the question of whether or not this committee 
truly functions and makes decisions that count. The challenge of participation is 
therefore not only to build an institutional framework that enables citizens to par-
ticipate in policy making, but also to make a framework that is actually used.  
Health service delivery in Morogoro Municipality 
Organisation of health care  
The provision of health services in Tanzania is organised centrally and imple-
mented locally by local government authorities. The government considers 
community participation as a fundamental component in health service delivery. 
For example, the Local Government Acts No. 7 and 8 of 1982 and Regional Ad-
ministration Act of 1997 provide a legal basis for participation in decision-
making (URT 1998). Community participation as prescribed by the National 
Health Policy of Tanzania was expected to be an effective means to adopt the 
service delivery to the needs of the local communities, by improving the health 
and well-being of all citizens with the focus on those most at risk. It would also 
make the health system more responsive to the needs of the people and would 
ensure that health services are available and accessible to all people; creating 
community awareness on health issues and improving capabilities at all levels of 
society to assess and analyse problems and design appropriate actions through 
genuine community involvement (URT 2003).  
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Case study in Morogoro Municipality 
To assess the actual participation of local communities, a case study was con-
ducted in Morogoro Municipality in 2007. A total of 65 respondents were in-
volved in the study. The respondents included community leaders, health service 
board members, health facility service providers, patients and council health 
management team. They were asked questions about their knowledge of the op-
portunities to participate in the planning process and their actual role in the deci-
sion-making.  
 
Knowledge of community members 
In order for the community to participate in activities that promote health care, 
the members of the community need to be well informed about the procedure as 
such. When community leaders were asked to identify ways in which they were 
involved in health activities in the municipality, their responses indicated lack 
information about health development activities in the municipality, with very 
few being able to identify health development activities which involve commu-
nity participation. Out of 40 respondents, 27 (67.6%) were unable to identify the 
health activities in which the community was expected to participate. Only 13 
(32.5%) were able to identify the health activities.  
 
Community decision-making powers 
To assess the role of community participation in health delivery in the municipal-
ity, the respondents were asked questions about their roles in the entire process of 
policy making, from planning, to resource allocation and actual service provi-
sion. The main role that the community leaders identified, was participation in 
numerous meetings. During the planning process, community members could 
take part in forming working groups that could decide where to dump garbage 
and reveal problems facing the community.  
The health service providers indicated that the community had representatives 
in the Health Facility Governing Committee. This body discusses issues in health 
facilities of the community. This organ consists of two members of the commu-
nity. These representatives then have to inform their community. 
Besides indicating the issues and priorities the community, members could 
also have participated in the allocation of resources. The main sources of financ-
ing the health service in the municipality were mainly the central government and 
own sources which included money obtained through council tax and other 
charges. The health service boards and committees worked on behalf of the 
community were able to decide on the allocation of resources.  
The respondents indicated that the main role of the community members was 
to aim for cost sharing through user fees. Every patient who sought public health 
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services at a particular facility was required to pay a user fee. To ensure that the 
community was involved in managing the resources, the community had the role 
to choose one or two people to witness the opening of boxes with drugs when-
ever drugs were brought to the health facilities in their area. Health service pro-
viders indicated that the Health Facility Governing Committee worked closely 
with the government on ensuring facility properties were secured and people paid 
health service charges.  
 
Despite this formal role, the respondents made clear that, in reality, the commu-
nity members did not really use the opportunity to get involved. A vast majority 
of the respondents stated that the community was not involved in the process to 
determine levels of payments. In fact many respondents complained that the 
community members were just invited to listen to what had been decided.  
Participation also plays a role on the actual service provision. The Health 
Management Team of the health facilities stressed the fact that there are a num-
ber of programmes in place to ensure the community directly participated in the 
provision of health services. The community took part in the process through 
training people in first aid. Health service providers showed on their part that the 
community’s role in service provision was to ensure that children were brought 
to health facilities for immunisation and to assist them in providing the commu-
nity with education about their health and life.  
Responses from community leaders confirmed this view. The most important 
involvement of local communities with health care provision was adhering to na-
tional campaigns like child immunization.  
 
The level of participation  
To measure the level of power to make decisions, community leaders were asked 
to rate their power to make decisions in planning whether (i) their involvement 
ranged from limited to none (low level), (ii) involved in joint analysis of issues 
(medium level) and (iii) had voting powers and decisions were binding (high lev-
els). On the one hand, results demonstrated that community decision-making in 
planning and resource allocation was in the medium level, whereby, out of 40 
respondents, 37.5% indicated community participation in health planning was in 
low level; 50% in medium level and 12.5% in high level. On the other hand, 
community decision-making in service provision was ranked low by 17.5%, me-
dium by 47.5% and highest levels by 12.5%. These results help to tell that there 
were signs of implied participation in the municipality.  
 
 Community participation  
 
 
71
Information sharing  
In order to understand the extent to which the community was informed about 
participation in health development activities, the respondents were asked to 
identify the tools that were used to facilitate involvement of the community. The 
community leaders mentioned various tools which were commonly used in facili-
tating community participation in health development activities. First of all, there 
were meetings with the facility management. Secondly, there were seminars and 
workshops, used to inform the community on issues such as the immunisation of 
children. Other means were the mass media, including banners and posters. Fi-
nally, the leaders mentioned open discussions and letters. From the point of view 
of the health service provides, the most utilised tool to inform the community 
were the meetings.  
 
Levels of communication  
To measure the level of communication, community leaders were asked to state 
whether they were (i) involved in ad hoc discussions with the health service offi-
cials; (ii) merely kept informed; (iii) asked for opinions in questionnaires or a 
suggestion box; (iv) consulted on their opinions in workshops or meetings’, and 
(v) involved in collaborative problem definition with the health officials. The re-
sults showed that community was only involved in ad hoc discussion or merely 
informed on what had been decided. For example, ad hoc discussions scored the 
highest with 17 (42.5%) out of 40 (100%) respondents, while in resource alloca-
tion and service provision the community was ‘merely informed’ scored the 
highest by 35% and 42.5% respectively.  
 
Challenges 
The case of the health care provision in Morogoro Municipality shows that there 
are many institutions to enhance participation. The case also shows that despite 
these institutional safeguards, actual participation is rather low. Low community 
participation and low level of awareness in health issues is a problem that was 
mentioned by a number of respondents. Some community members still did not 
understand why they should take part in health development activities. Partly be-
cause they still had the notion that it was the government’s responsibility to pro-
mote health service delivery, while others did not see the importance of taking 
part in such activities at all. Some, community members thought that if they were 
to participate in health activities they would have to pay afterwards.  
Moreover, the findings demonstrated that there were a lot of complaints from 
community leaders on the question of involvement in decision-making. The 
community had very limited opportunities to truly participate in the planning 
process, since many (or most) of the decisions came from above.  
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With regard to decision-making about utilisation of the money collected at the 
health facility level, all facility health providers at both health centres and dis-
pensaries that were visited complained that they had no power or say over the use 
of the money collected to help the facility needs. What was happening at the fa-
cility level was that all the money collected was being sent to the municipal 
headquarters. Health facility service providers expressed that they understood 
that the funds collected had to be accounted for. But the problem was that when 
all the money was taken to the municipal headquarters, nothing was ever sent 
back to address facility problems. For example, the health service providers said 
that in case of power failure or power rationing, they were supposed to buy kero-
sene. This meant that even the health facility governing boards, had no power 
over the resources.  
Lufumbu water project in Ludewa 
Organisation of water supply 
Access to clean and safe water in Sub-Saharan Africa has been a serious prob-
lem. It is estimated that only 16% can access household connection of water and 
only 56% have access to safe drinking water (Florio 1997). The governments had 
been striving to ensure the access to safe drinking water but due to budget con-
straints, the number of cases where water was supplied to all citizens were lim-
ited. 
In 2005, the Tanzanian government conducted a survey in different wards and 
villages that had problems of water supply to assess the possibility of providing a 
water supply to them. Lufumbu village in Ludewa District in Iringa was one of 
them. After analysis of survey findings, the government selected some villages 
but due to limited funds and budget constraints, Lufumbu village was not se-
lected in that programme. 
 
Water supply in Lufumbu village 
The government budget constraint led to the need of community initiatives to fill 
the gap. Lufumbu village has a population of 6,180 inhabitants who depend 
mainly on agriculture. The main crops they produce are maize, beans and other 
cereal crops. The village does not have a reliable market for these crops. There-
fore, everyone in this village is poor and they live under the poverty line, identi-
fied as USD 1 per day. 
The village decided to develop its own initiatives through raising their own 
funds to construct the water project. They started by relying on the simple princi-
ple of gravity and later were joined by water technicians. The cost of construction 
was USD 50,000. Villagers contributed 48%, the Roman Catholic Church con-
tributed 10% and United Nations Development Programme contributed 42%. 
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Objectives of the project were to reduce head loading for women from ten kilo-
metres to two hundred meters through construction of reservoir tanks and draw-
ing points; to improve health of the people through reduction of waterborne dis-
eases by increasing the water supply and to improve agriculture through 
irrigation and the establishment of coffee nurseries. 
 
How the community participated 
The initiative for this water supply emerged when the villagers sat down in a 
meeting. The villagers then decided to raise their own resources to establish a vil-
lage water supply scheme. The scheme was designed to serve the whole commu-
nity. It was implemented by the community itself through clear division of tasks. 
Adult men were in charge of the collection of sand aggregates and stones, con-
struction of intake and the reservoir tank as well as the excavation of the gravity 
main and distribution main. Adult women were responsible for the ferrying of 
and the loading of building materials and water while older persons and children 
participated by cooking food for workers.  
The project took four month and two weeks for its completion and impacted 
people by getting them access to water through 56 drawing points. People were 
also able to collect water from the drawing points which were close to their resi-
dence – only two hundred meters. There was a reduction of waterborne diseases 
after the introduction of project. People were able to use clean water and the use 
of contaminated water was reduced. 
 
The result 
Agricultural products increased as a result of having a water supply, helping in 
the cultivation of vegetables and staple food crops in the village. Coffee farming 
also expanded as a result of the expansion of coffee nurseries which became ef-
fective after the availability of a water supply.  
Moreover, housing conditions improved as a result of having enough water for 
making bricks – in fact, 372 houses were built after the availability of a water 
supply. The availability of water even attracted birds and animals to back to the 
village and improved the ecosystem and induced forestation and reforestation of 
the land. Plantations and maintenance of the trees in catchment areas increased 
and the workload on women was reduced from carrying water for two kilometres 
down to only 200 meters from their residence. The availability of food improved 
as water was available nearby to residences for domestic use. Health was im-
proved as the availability of water helped in running dispensaries and reducing 
waterborne diseases. In addition, a low cost reservoir made by corrugated iron 
sheets and stones (which are 30% cheaper than cement) was built. 
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Questions 
1. What are the means of participation; what powers do those who participate have?  
2. What are the factors that enable and impede participation? 
3. What was the level of participation, in terms of Arnstein’s ladder of participation, in the 
case on the Health services in Morogoro?  
4. What was the level of participation, in terms of Arnstein’s ladder of participation, in the 
case of the Water project described above?  
5. Could you identify the properties of participation in both cases? What were the powers of 
those who participated? What were factors that enabled or limited participation? 
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7 
Symbolic legislation 
Josephat Stephen Itika  
Introduction 
More often than not, legislation, once enacted, does not quite do what the legisla-
tors expected it to do. Whenever regulatory arrangements or administrative laws 
appear not to have their intended effect, it is part of the scholarly task of public 
administration to carefully record the working of the law and to explain why the 
effects of this regulation fell short of expectations, if that is the case.  
The Tanzanian legislature over the past ten years has gone to great lengths to 
create a regulatory basis for cooperation and partnership in the health sector. The 
reason is that private, non-profit organisations contribute greatly to the overall 
health care effort in Tanzania. From the point of view of the legislature, these 
contributions should be more integrated with the efforts of local government au-
thorities at administering health services delivery. Yet, there are many indications 
that the regulatory framework, thus created is not complied with. It does not take 
a leap of imagination to realise that non-compliance renders legislation practi-
cally ineffective.  
For the clarification of such a state of affairs, social sciences possess a number 
of conceptual tools. One of these concepts is ‘symbolic legislation’.  
The concept of symbolic legislation 
Symbolic legislation, as a concept in the social sciences, was coined by the Nor-
wegian sociologist Vilhelm Aubert. Back in the 1950s, he conducted research 
into the actual working of the Norwegian ‘Law on domestic personnel’. This 
piece of legislation was enacted in 1949 with the intention to improve the legal 
position of housemaids in Norwegian households. The law for instance regulated 
a minimum wage and the weekly numbers of hours of labour. Aubert did in-
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depth studies which revealed that the law was rarely complied with. The law had 
not done anything to improve the legal position of domestic personnel. One ex-
planation Aubert gave for this state of affairs was that there were no authorities 
or agencies to enforce the law. The only way the law could work was, if a maid 
would invoke its rules against her employer. This hardly ever occurred: going to 
court to litigate against the employer almost certainly meant that the maid would 
lose her job. Even if the court would reinstate her in her job, working conditions 
would have become unbearable. Beyond that, a maid who had a conflict with her 
employer could, without too much trouble, find another job. And finally, the law 
was complicated and its language was technical, so most domestic personnel 
were not even aware of the improvement of their legal position that the law had 
provided them with.  
However, there is more. These factors were known to the legislature even 
when the law was enacted. The legislation was the product of a compromise be-
tween two political parties, one of which needed strong labour laws for its con-
stituency, while the other did not want to put any legal burden on the households 
and the employers of domestic personnel. The compromise was a law without 
teeth. The law being toothless was important for the latter party. The former 
party needed the law because of its symbolic value. It could show its constitu-
ency it had done something to protect their interests.  
Since the work of Aubert (1952, 1952), there have been numerous studies 
documenting symbolic legislation of one kind or another. Up to this day it is an 
important contribution to our understanding of how regulation works in society.  
 
In short, ineffectiveness of regulation can often be contributed to: 
• lack of programs to implement the law;  
• lack of program to promote the law and to make sure that all affected are 
aware of its meaning and intention; 
• lack of a clear enforcement program; 
• mismatch between the regulation and the reality it is supposed to regulate; 
 
In the background there could be the overall explanatory factor that the legisla-
ture did not intend the law to be effective in the first place. The regulation then is 
merely symbolic. 
The case study at hand is concerned with the workings of the laws regulating 
partnership in health care in Tanzania. It is presented in two parts: The first sec-
tion deals with the regulation itself and its history. The next section contains a 
description of an example of the kind of partnership the laws are supposed to 
regulate. 
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The regulation of health service delivery in Tanzania 
Partnerships in service delivery in Tanzania 
Prior to independence, Tanzania’s health system was concentrated in urban areas 
and services were essentially curative in nature (URT 2001). In 1967, the Arusha 
Declaration stated that the government would finance and provide free medical 
care to all of its citizens (with an exception of grade one and two) and it was 
made part of community rights and one of the fundamental indicators of social 
developments (Abdallah 2002). As part of that declaration, an expansion strategy 
for facilities, especially in the rural areas, was adopted. Results of the strategy 
were impressive. By 1978, a clinic was located within 10 kilometres for 90% of 
the population (Benson 2001). In line with its free-health-for-all policy, private 
for-profit health services were forbidden. The private sector for profit was par-
ticularly hit hard by the enactment of Private Hospitals Regulations Act of 1977, 
which banned health services for profit in the country.  
Private, non profit health facilities, operated by Non-Governmental Organisa-
tions however, continued to provide a large share (currently about one-third) of 
the health services in the country – with subsidies from the government. Despite 
inadequate revenues, the government adhered to these policies throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. Underfunding led to shortages in supplies of drugs, deteriora-
tion of facilities, low staff morale, and poor quality of care (MoH 1998). The im-
portance of the private sector in health service delivery and the move towards 
market-based economic reforms resulted in the establishment of Private Hospi-
tals Regulation Amendment Act of 1991. It also facilitated the re-establishment 
of private medical and dental services with the approval of the Ministry of Health 
in 1991 (Wyss et al. 2000; URT 2002). In July 1993, under pressure from the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the government started a 
phased implementation of user fees for certain health services in its referral, re-
gional, and district hospitals. To ensure that the poor and those who needed care 
the most would not be barred from accessing care because of an inability to pay, 
the Ministry of Health developed waiver and exemption guidelines (Mubyazi et 
al. 2000).  
The demand for better services and the need to improve the population’s 
health status, particularly the rural poor, led to the development of Health Sector 
Reform (HSR) proposals in 1994 and in 1996 with the government ultimately 
approving the health sector reform strategy (URT 1999). Later, the Health Sector 
Reform Plan of Action for 1996-1999 was also endorsed. This action plan in-
cluded six strategies: Decentralisation, improvement of central health systems, 
health management, financing, human resources, and partnership. In 1999, the 
HSR Programme of Work 1999-2002 and Action Plan were developed (MoH 
2000; URT 2003).  
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In order to put more power at the local level, Local Government Reform (URT 
1998) was passed earlier as a policy instrument to facilitate decision-making and 
accountability in municipalities and district councils on public health related mat-
ters as well as other matters. These policy documents have made the govern-
ment’s intent clear to work closely with the private sector for profit and NGOs. 
Therefore, the health sector reforms are closely linked with Local Government 
Reforms, which aimed to decentralise personnel, planning, and financing deci-
sions of service delivery to the districts. As of January 2000, 35 districts had 
been decentralised. Forty-five more districts were to be decentralised by January 
2001 and the remaining ones by January 2002 (URT 2001; URT 2003). Districts 
are responsible for staffing decisions and for setting service priorities in the 
health sector. District health plans are funded through block grants, in addition to 
donor funding provided through the basket financing mechanism. A significant 
emphasis has been placed on human resource development to ensure adequate 
planning and budgeting of services. This is a part of capacity building initiatives, 
stirred by ongoing reforms. Implementation of health plans is monitored and ad-
ditional funding is withheld if standards of achievement are not accomplished. 
The Ministry of Health retains control of policy, regulatory, and strategic func-
tions and also continues to provide certain essential services including immunisa-
tions, family planning, and the treatment of chronic illnesses, tuberculosis, and 
leprosy.  
 
In the year 2000, the Ministry of Health (MoH) developed key performance indi-
cators and outputs for assessing public-private-partnerships in health service de-
livery in the country. The indicators are the degree of collaboration among part-
ners in terms of numbers; contribution of private and public sector to 
partnerships and client satisfaction rate. The performance of partnerships was ex-
pected to be through the following implementation strategies and periods (MoH 
2000: 36):   
• Policy and legal review to be completed by 2001  
• Mechanisms for promoting public-private partnerships (PPPs) discipline, in 
place by 2002 
• Guidelines to enable private providers to qualify for government support, in 
place and operational by 2002. 
• Mechanisms for joint inspection of health facilities, to be in place by 2002.  
 
Unfortunately the frameworks and guidelines had never been put in place. The 
Public Procurement Act (2001) was used to guide outsourcing of public services 
to the private sector, but it was not meant for partnerships involving clinical ser-
vice delivery like diseases diagnosis and treatment as such. As part of strengthen-
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ing the 2001 Act, the government passed a revised act, the Procurement Act in 
2004. However, there are still cries for specific government regulations and an 
organ for managing partnerships in the country. In July 2005, the government in-
augurated health boards which were delayed since 2001 (MoH/PORALG 2001) 
with the objective, amongst others, to promote partnerships in health care at the 
local level of authority. However, it appears that not that much will be expected 
because of many factors including a lack of sufficient public and private aware-
ness, and low implementation capacity at a local level. The following section 
covers a case study on partnerships for public health care. 
 
The regulatory framework for partnerships in Dodoma Municipality  
Firstly, Dodoma Municipality used the strategic plan for 2004 – 2008 as the main 
guidance for the operationalisation of partnerships in health service delivery in a 
style that reflects response to the Ministry of health and the ministry for local 
government reform agendas for partnerships. However, this strategic document 
does not have any section on how to strengthen partnerships within the private 
sector. Indeed, even the term partnership is only mentioned once under promo-
tion of networking and partnerships (p. 19). NGOs are scantily mentioned as 
supporters of Dodoma Municipality initiatives and not real partners. Therefore, 
at the practical level, the areas, style and formality of collaboration with the pri-
vate health service providers have to depend on personal motivation and interest 
of individual officers some of whom may not necessarily have even seen the mu-
nicipal strategic plan document.  
Secondly, Dodoma Municipality uses Comprehensive Health Plan document 
2008 to highlight the relationship between the municipality and the private sec-
tor. However, the document dumps NGOs and Private for Profit service provid-
ers under the blanket of community involvement. Health service provision is just 
mentioned as item 5.8 on areas of interest for partnerships. It reads:  
‘(…) construction and running of dispensaries, health centres and hospitals.’ (p. 12).  
Administratively, partnerships are to be managed under the guidelines of the Do-
doma Municipality Health Board and Committees. These organs were estab-
lished through guidelines issued by the Ministry of Health in 2001. However, it 
was only in July 2005 when the ministry of health formally inaugurated all health 
boards and committees in the country. It means that partnerships have been oper-
ating without any formally institutionalised organ for supervision. Although the 
now established structures for managing health services delivery should improve 
the existing collaborations and facilitate the evolvement of others, it does not ap-
pear that much should be expected due to a number of weaknesses in the boards 
and the committee setup.  
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These weaknesses are partly the reason why such boards and committees are set 
for general management of health care services rather than partnerships per se. 
As a result, the impact on partnerships is likely to be limited because of the fol-
lowing reasons.  
Members of the Dodoma municipal Health Board are elected: One from pri-
vate for profit and one from NGOs against five from the Dodoma Municipality. 
The implications are:  
(i)  When it comes to voting on a key issue affecting the private sector, the 
private sector representative will never win a case.  
(ii)  Since the board is accountable to the full council, sensitive issues, which 
will result into criticisms of lower officials will never reach higher au-
thorities. Even the private sector representative is not motivated to do that 
for fear of upsetting the ‘boss’ and hence endangering the relationships. 
This has strong negative implications on accountability.  
Item 2.4.5 of the (regulatory) document describes the private sector representa-
tive as ‘an important link with Dodoma Municipal Council’ (p. 6). However, the 
section lacks the forceful language of ‘partner’ which waters down the strengths 
of the relationships. 
The document puts an emphasis on participation in planning for health ser-
vices for the local authority in general (p. 6) and nothing on serious commitment 
to serious collaboration. Indeed, the terms ‘cooperation’ and ‘participation’ are 
used instead of ‘partnership’. 
For the Hospital Management Committee, the same skewed representation of 
the private sector is noticed. More importantly, the private sector representative 
has to be recommended by the Health Management Team whose members are 
heads of departments of health sections in the Dodoma Municipal Council (p. 
18). This section may deny a strong and critical private sector representative to 
be recommended due to fear of being challenged. 
At the operational level, there is no establishment of a forum for the private 
health service providers to launch a common strategy for partnership or even get 
feedback from their representatives on what was going on in the collaboration. 
Even where the representatives participated in Dodoma Municipal Council meet-
ings, there was no formal feedback to the members. Therefore, the supposed link 
between the private and the municipality was very weak and took the informal 
route depending on individual initiatives and relationships. 
Thirdly, the Local Government (Urban Authorities Act) 1982 gives local au-
thorities powers to work with the private sector. Section 54(2) (a) states that  
‘the local authority shall provide their services in an efficient and cost effective manner and 
‘foster cooperation’ with civic groups and other persons or authorities (…) improve health.’ 
(Section 54 (5), sub c)  
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This provision could form the basis for setting operational guidelines for partner-
ships, something that has not happened.  
Other legal frameworks that set the interactions with the private health service 
providers are provided by the Private Hospital (Regulations) Act (2002), but yet 
are silent in setting partnership between the public and private sector in public 
health delivery. There are only 2 sections which establish the link between the 
government and private sector as cited herewith; Part II c 7 (1) reads as follows: 
‘there is hereby established the board to be known as the Private Hospitals Board (…) be re-
sponsible to the minister for the registration, control and regulation of the business of private 
hospitals and of persons and organisations running private hospitals.’ 
Under normal circumstances, this law should have been the basis for the director 
to demand performance reports in general and those related to areas of collabora-
tion from the private health providers as directed through Management Informa-
tion System, famously known as the ‘MTUHA’ guidelines. However, only few 
officers were aware of the law and in practice, supervisions of private health pro-
viders are only made occasionally.  
The Hombolo Hospital – Dodoma Municipal Council partnership 
Background 
Hombolo Hospital is located at the Hombolo Makulu ward, Hombolo division 
which is classified as a rural area. Hombolo Hospital has a long history which 
dates back to the 1930s. It was started by the colonial government as a special-
ised hospital for the treatment of leprosy in an area around Kilimatinde. In 1962, 
just a year after independence, it was shifted to Hombolo due to shortage of wa-
ter but now it is under the ownership of the Anglican Church, Diocese of Central 
Tanganyika (DCT). It was not possible to get information on how it changed 
ownership or whether it was under the same missionaries even under the colonial 
government. It was officially opened by the government in 1963. It changed its 
name and became known as Hombolo Leprosarium Centre. ‘Hombolo’ meant 
‘Maji ya Uzima’ (Water for Life). It was funded through partnership with Ger-
man faith based organisations which contributed to 98% of the budget. The re-
maining 2% came from the government of Tanzania. Treatment of leprosy was 
seen as a temporary function because it was the government’s plan to reduce lep-
rosy to minimal levels by the year 2000 and then to eliminate it. This target was 
also used by donors to gradually reduce the funding of the hospital. In 1998, 
funding from Germany ceased while there were still about forty leprosy cases 
under treatment. This shortage of funds forced the hospital management in that 
same year to shift its focus from specialising in leprosy alone to general practice. 
It was registered as a hospital with a 51 bed capacity and it changed its name to 
Hombolo Hospital. This new name was neither known to the municipal officials 
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nor to the patients. They use ‘Hombolo Health Centre’ and ‘Hombolo Leprosa-
rium Centre’, interchangeably. This is a confusion which is still going on. 
In 2000, the financial crisis forced the management to stop attending leprosy 
cases, although it was a difficult decision to tell patients ‘to go away’. Some pa-
tients had no homes to go to while others were not ready to face the stigma asso-
ciated with leprosy at their homes. As a result, some patients decided to build 
their own homes around the hospital. They continued to receive free health ser-
vices as neighbours in need.  
 
Photo 1 Some leprosy patients waiting for free health services 
 
Photo by Josephat Itika, with the consent of the group participants. 
 
 
The nature and motives of partnership 
There are two versions on the story about how PPP started. On the part of Hom-
bolo, it was said that, from 2000 to 2004 the hospital faced critical financial con-
straints which led to inability to pay for electricity bills, repair vehicles, buy 
medicines and pay salaries. During the same period, the DCT requested support 
from the municipality but it was only in 2003 after the appeal to the minister of 
health that the municipality started to collaborate with Hombolo. The partnership 
came into operation in 2004 and evolved out of Hombolo’s desperation for sur-
vival. There were no formal discussions that involved all the partners on the 
terms and conditions of collaboration. It was in the form of ‘requesting for some-
thing from the municipality and you get feedback or you don’t, depending on the 
will and commitment of the one or few municipal officials’. As a result, there 
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were strong feelings of mistrust, dissatisfactions and frustrations in the process of 
collaboration because of lack of transparency in the whole collaboration process. 
Few statements made by the head of the hospital give light in this regard. This 
will become clearer when we shall look at the way contributions to the partner-
ship were made. Even the institutional status of the health centre was not clear. 
For example, although Hombolo was registered as a hospital in 1998, it was at 
times referred as a health centre and also used as a designated district hospital 
because it received government grants through basket funding. According to one 
official from the municipality, it did not qualify as a designated district hospital 
because it had no qualified staff, although in terms of resource allocation it was 
treated as a DDH.  
 
Contributions to the partnership and its effects 
Since the type of partnership was not developed jointly by following some spe-
cific principles, even stakeholder contributions to the partnership lacked trans-
parency and mutual consideration of each other’s strengths and limitations. For 
example, it was alleged that in 2003, the municipality promised to pay Tsh 3 mil-
lion for supporting the running of the hospital but that figure remained in the 
books of accounts of the Dodoma Municipal Council. There was no way to ac-
quire that information, because it was upon the discretion of the government to 
make it available or not.  
In the 2004/2005 financial year, the municipality supplied various items. It 
supplied Hombolo Hospital with 22 mattresses, blankets, 200 bed covers (shuka), 
200 mosquito nets, 2 wheel chairs, 1 stretcher, and 80 buckets, The records from 
the municipality show that Hombolo was allocated an excess of Tsh 15 million 
for the 2004/2005 fiscal year. However, no records for the value of the items de-
livered could be accessed and this figure was not revealed to the Hombolo man-
agement. The disappointing part of the contribution is that it took the form of 
supplies that the hospital had not really asked for. No consideration was given to 
the real needs of the centre and, as a result, the contributions were little appreci-
ated by the Hombolo management. The following statement from the manage-
ment reflects such dissatisfaction: 
‘(…) we do not understand why they brought all these goods for (…) we have never told 
them we need such items and of that quantity (…) we need money to repair water tanks and 
buy a new water pump.’ 
Referring to accountability for the goods received, he said: 
‘I am not interested in accounting for goods that I did not request.’ 
There were complaints that they had no representative in the municipal health 
management through whom they could let their voice be heard. This complaint 
was perhaps a more a reflection of the futility of representation rather than the 
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lack of it: All faith based health service providers had elected a representative to 
the municipal health board. Although it was noted that in principle, Hombolo had 
to participate in the planning process of the municipality (as a district designated 
hospital, a DDH), the style of the involvement in the council budget process was 
questionable as the manager said:  
‘One day we received a letter asking us to prepare our budget and present it to the municipal-
ity on the same day (…) this was impossible. We had to forget about it.’ 
When asked for comments, one official from the municipality acknowledged that 
it was possible that they did not receive budgets from Hombolo. However, the 
blame was passed back:  
‘they are a problem (…) they do not like to cooperate (…) sometimes we have to do for them 
because we do not have an option.’ 
Collaboration in staffing matters was also an area of criticism as one officer said: 
‘in 1998 they brought one nurse here to provide MCH services. She left just after a year. 
Since then we have been asking for replacement but all in vain.’ 
The problem of insufficient health staff is a common problem not only in Hom-
bolo but also in government owned dispensaries, health centres in the municipal-
ity and the country at large. 
Lack of effective communication and respect of the Hombolo management as 
a partner was also a concern. It was felt that the way communication was made 
between the municipality and Hombolo was un-procedural and reflected disre-
spect as one comment was made that 
‘In the morning, a nurse would come with a letter and tell me she is invited by the municipal-
ity to attend a seminar on the same day. I wonder why the municipality does not communi-
cate to me so that I can plan my work schedules early enough. As a result, patients miss ser-
vices without good reasons. We told them that since most patients who suffer from leprosy 
prefer treatment in this centre, the government could give us the medicines to treat them (…) 
there were exchange of words. They said they could get treatment at Hombolo Bwawani 
health centre. But when they go there, they do not get services. They come back. According 
to our ethics, you cannot leave a patient to die because you cannot pay for the services.’ 
It was not possible to establish the validity of this complaint. In fact, there is 
room for other explanations of the same facts. For example, if there were feelings 
that the head of the hospital was likely to be uncooperative, bypassing communi-
cation could be intentional and perhaps initiated by the staff themselves.  
Hombolo provides MCH staff for delivering services at Hombolo and Zepise 
village through an outreach programme. Since staff involvement was not initially 
planned and agreed upon, it is perceived as a burden to the hospital as a comment 
was made that 
‘They take my nurses for MCH services including outreach programmes at Zepise village 
(about 5km). Although they pay them Tsh 3,000 as outreach service allowance (…) what 
about my work which remains undone?’ 
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Here, the Hombolo management seems to be caught in between serving two dif-
ferent interests. While they strive to deliver ‘commercial’ services at the same 
time they want to meet the spiritual obligation of saving humanity. Although 
church based health services are not meant for profit, at the end of the day operat-
ing costs have to be covered. In this situation, the shortage of staff means no ser-
vices and no income. On the other side of the coin, providing MCH services also 
means opening up opportunities for patients who will be ready to pay for other 
services including laboratory tests. Therefore it is the question of ‘take and give’ 
rather than about making loss. Indeed, some of these complaints may be due to 
existing personalised tensions between the two stakeholders rather than the sub-
stance of the allegations because, according to the Dodoma Municipality budget, 
50% of staff salaries of Hombolo hospital were paid through basket funding. 
Such tensions continued to affect the way collaborations were interpreted by 
both parties. In fact, every action taken by the Dodoma Municipal Council was 
perceived to be against the best interests and the progress of the hospital. A series 
of allegations, recorded by the researcher, illustrate these ill feelings: 
‘We wanted to run training programmes for disability prevention because we are experts, but 
they do not allow us. They want to bring their staff to work with us here and get paid allow-
ances and leave us empty handed. Every time our nurses go to get vaccines from Mlowa 
Bwawani Health centre because we do not have a refrigerator here. This causes a lot of in-
convenience. We have asked for it since 2001 but to date nothing. Nowadays, I am seen as a 
trouble maker (…) when the municipal officials see my face they say: “There comes a nui-
sance”. Sometimes they do not come to collect health reports. I send someone and pay the 
transport costs and lunch.’  
On one of the days, the researcher was conducting this study, MCH services were 
neither delivered at Hombolo nor Zepise. Mothers with children on their backs 
waited for hours only to be told that there were no vaccines, because the Mlowa 
Bwawani Health Centre did not receive the share for Hombolo.  
The same negativity and mistrust are expressed by one Dodoma Municipality 
official as he said: 
‘Have you been at Hombolo? Did you see how the place is dilapidated? Why do they neglect 
their own buildings? They are not serious. If they cannot take care of their own property how 
do you think they can take care of our refrigerator? We pay them 50% for salaries but we do 
not know if they pay the other 50%.’ 
If the problems of informality, lack of transparency, and mistrust could be 
solved, partnership between the municipality and Hombolo would be a com-
mendable endeavour in improving quality health care in the area. The tensions 
are counterproductive despite the resources committed because of a lack of 
strong appreciation of the role of each partner.  
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Questions 
1. What is the difference between partnership, collaboration and participation? 
2. What elements of the cooperation between the municipality and Hombolo were affected by 
what parts of the regulation of public-private-partnerships in health care? 
3. What factors can you identify that made the regulation ineffective in the Hombolo case? 
4. How do you think the regulation of the partnerships could be improved? 
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Dynamics of stakeholders 
perspective 
Josephat Stephen Itika  
Introduction  
Organisations can be thought of as having a principal, a boss, or owner for whom 
they exist and account for. This holds for business organisations, as well as for 
public agencies or private, not-for-profit, Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs). Public agencies may have a council or a minister as their ultimate prin-
cipal. In a simple model of organisational behaviour, the organisation will aim at 
satisfying the interests and demands of the principal, be it the stakeholder or the 
political superior. As far back as the 1960s, scholars began to challenge this no-
tion. They argued that for the average organisation there are more interests at 
stake than just those of the principal. For an organisation to be successful, pros-
pering and sustainable; managers need to know how to deal with a variety of in-
dividuals and groups that have a stake in what the organisation does. The stake-
holders of a business organisation may include customers, suppliers, employees, 
financiers (stakeholders, bondholders, banks, etc.), communities and government 
agencies.  
Therefore, since its early introduction, the concept of ‘stakeholder’ has drawn 
the attention of a great many scholars. It has been developed in different ways. 
One approach is explanatory: That is, the concept may help us gain a better un-
derstanding of how organisations actually operate. Another approach is essen-
tially normative and part of business ethics: Its premise is that organisations 
should take into account the interests of all those who are affected by the organi-
sation’s actions. This chapter uses stakeholder theory to explore the dynamics of 
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involving different stakeholders in the process of establishing a community 
health care project. 
The concept of stakeholders 
Freeman (1983) laid the groundwork for today’s debates regarding stakeholder 
theory (Scholl 2001; Philips 2004; Murdock 2004). These debates have culmi-
nated in two definitions of the concept, one fairly narrow and another with a 
wider meaning. In the narrower sense, a stakeholder is considered as ‘any group 
or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisa-
tion’s mission’ (Freeman 1983). Later in 1984, the word ‘mission’ was replaced 
by ‘objectives’ (Freeman 1984). Later scholars pointed out that different stake-
holders have different stakes in an organisation, since the way they influence the 
organisation or are affected by the organisation will differ. This has led to the 
distinction between key stakeholders and non-key stakeholders, depending on the 
magnitude of risk the association with the organisation has for an individual or 
group (Reed 1999; Clarkson 1994; Cohen 1995; Scholl 2001). A wider definition 
takes the term stakeholder to embrace ‘all those who have legal, moral, or pre-
sumed claims or who have the capacity to affect an organisation’s behaviour, di-
rection, processes or outcomes’ (Mitchell et al. 1997).  
The latter definition is adopted in this chapter because it takes care of all pos-
sible scenarios of stakeholder relationships, particularly where collaborations are 
still taking shape as is the case in Tanzania. 
As noted above, stakeholder theory is primarily a private sector firm theory. It 
challenges the neo-classical economic theory of the firm and maintains that, the 
firms that are managed for the good of stakeholder satisfaction thrive better than 
those firms that only pursue purely profit motives (Scholl 2001). Stakeholder 
theory asks three critical questions: ‘Who are the stakeholders, what do they 
want, and how are they going to try to get it?’ (Freeman 1999). Despite the fact 
that stakeholder theory is primarily for the private sector firms, the insights from 
this area can be applied in part to public sector settings. Public agencies operate 
in environments that typically contain a wide variety of interests. By posing those 
same three questions about public agencies, more insight can be gained in their 
relative successes and failures.  
Under stakeholder theory, the private sector, the government and the commu-
nity can all gain from partnerships if there is trust and cooperative endeavours 
rather than opportunistic and selfish behaviour (Jones 1995). In this case, as is 
well argued by Reed (1999), citizens typically are key stakeholders who have a 
genuine stake in municipal service delivery, and – in the present case, in accessi-
ble, affordable, reliable and quality health services. Stakeholder theory provides a 
possible scenario of a win-win situation for all stakeholders. The government 
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may gain through enhanced capacity to deliver health services to citizens while 
NGOs will also improve capacity to deliver and achieve value for money and 
humanitarian goals (Fiszbein, in Collins 2000). The community and individuals 
will have better types of access to quality and reliable health care services (Fu-
kunyama 1995; Fiszbein & Lowden 1999). The central government and Ministry 
of Health are expected to provide policy and other regulatory frameworks and 
hence have indirect links with the private sector. The local authority ideally is an 
implementer and monitor of partnerships. 
Although these positivist outlooks applaud the power of collaborations in en-
hancing public service delivery (Birmingham 2000; Austin 2000), there are also 
frequent doubts from anti-globalisation movements and from the moral version 
of stakeholder theory (Gray & Hay 1986). These two schools of thought provide 
a critique of the utility of collaborations, particularly where the government or 
the private sector are weak in terms of motivation and resources required for 
forging effective responsibility and accountability mechanisms (Humes 1999; 
Reich 2000; Hartwich et al. 2003). Such limitations are likely to make the most 
powerful stakeholders gain at the expense of the general public (poor, less in-
formed, less influential) but also there is a theoretical opportunity for every 
stakeholder to perform better under partnerships than working alone. The dynam-
ics involved in bringing stakeholders together, opportunities, challenges and les-
sons unfold in the Ntyuka dispensary project as will be described in the following 
section. 
The case of the Ntyuka Dispensary project 
Introduction 
One of the services local governments in Tanzania should provide is health care. 
The Local Government Services Act, No 10 empowers local authorities to work 
with different stakeholders to complement government initiatives on the issue of 
better health for the people. More specifically, the Health Sector Reform Plan of 
Action for 1996-1999 set six strategies for the improvement of health services 
delivery: Decentralisation, improvement of central health systems, health man-
agement, financing, human resources, and stakeholder collaborations. As part of 
the implementation of health policy, local authorities may harness support from 
different stakeholders to improve health service provision particularly for the 
poor (URT 2000). Ntyuka project fits this conceptual framework. 
 
Ntyuka dispensary project 
The Ntyuka dispensary is located in Ntyuka village which is about seven kilome-
tres from Dodoma town, along the Mvumi road. Administratively, it is one of 
forty villages of the municipality. Creating this dispensary was initiated by the 
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community so that villagers would not have to walk the seven kilometres to the 
town centre to obtain health services. The construction project was started in 
1993. The foundation stone was laid by the then Prime Minister and Member of 
Parliament Honourable John Samwel Malechela. As part of the inaugural cere-
mony he contributed 20 bags of cement and 30 corrugated metal sheets. Al-
though preliminary construction work started, no more was done. After these first 
promising activities, the project came to a halt, a standstill that lasted twelve 
years. It was only in 2004, that new initiatives were taken that finally resulted in 
the realisation of the dispensary at least in terms of presence of physical struc-
ture.  
What went wrong for all those years cannot be told with precision. Different 
participants give various accounts of what happened. The following section pro-
vides a brief reconstruction of the way different stakeholders in the project (the 
community, NGOs and the municipality) contributed and attempted to collabo-
rate. It took four different partnership arrangements for the Ntyuka dispensary to 
be built. Each of these collaborations are described below.  
 
Ntyuka village – Dodoma Municipal Council partnership 
The first phase of the project showed collaboration between the people of 
Ntyuka, represented by its village government and the Dodoma Municipal Coun-
cil. It was not possible to gain an unbiased account of who took the initiative for 
the reactivation of the dispensary project.1 According to the village government 
officials and the councillor, it was they who initiated the idea and mobilised the 
community to contribute labour and cash and later asked for support from the 
municipality. The municipal officials claim, however, that it was a planned inter-
vention aimed at combining efforts of the community and the municipality to 
improve health services. However, all agree that personal efforts of one of the 
municipal health officers made the collaboration possible. More likely, the col-
laboration started through informal networks and relationships and developed 
into a more formalised system in which the municipality actively participated. 
The community contributed labour, cash and materials while the municipality 
provided technical support, transport and cash as shown in Table 8.1. The com-
munity provided labour for collection of sand, stones, and (construction work) in 
the initial phase of the dispensary building. The village land was also the source 
of sand and stones. Cash was used to buy cement, water and timber. The munici-
pal technician was responsible for the drawings, site planning and setting the 
building structures. One lorry from the municipal council was used to ferry mate-
rials to the construction site. The cash was used to buy materials and pay some 
                                                 
1. No documented evidence could be found. Most of those who were in office by then were no longer 
available for various reasons such as death and transfer. 
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skilled workers. This initial partnership helped to build four rooms and a veranda 
up till roofing stage. 
 
Table 8.1  Contributions to the construction of the Ntyuka dispensary 
Partner Contributions 
Community 1 Labour 
 2 Stones 
 3 Cash (Tsh 500 per adult) 
 4 Land 
Village government 1 Sensitisation 
 2 Coordination 
 3 Supervision 
Dodoma Municipal Council 1 Technician 
 2 Transport 
 3 Cash (Tsh 2.4 million) 
Source: Meeting with village government officials 
 
 
Although both Dodoma Municipal Council and the community were now par-
ticipating in the dispensary project actively, the collaboration turned out to not be 
strong enough to overcome a number of major difficulties. First of all, it was to-
tally unclear what was done with the collected resources such as money and 
building materials. There was gross irresponsibility both on the side of the com-
munity leadership and with the municipality. This led to disappointment and dis-
illusionment among the people, and this had a very negative impact on the will-
ingness of the villagers to continue contributing towards the completion of the 
project. As one community member commented in a meeting held at the project 
site: 
‘The problem in our village is poor community sensitisation and mobilisation. We were 
ready but the leadership was a big problem. It is only when we got a new village government 
(…) now you can see we are here for work.’  
Another member added 
‘(…) people contributed money but no one can tell how it was spent (…) we are very disap-
pointed.’ 
The problem of poor leadership was also observed as the village chairman noted 
that 
‘This construction work was supposed to be supervised by the village social development 
committee but no one is around here (…) it is a problem (…) some might be drinking local 
brew while we are here (…) you try to bring leaders and people together but it does not work 
as expected (…) we do not have many people here who can be good leaders.’ 
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There were also feelings among the village government officials that the munici-
pality was not supportive enough and nothing could be done about it, as one 
leader described: 
‘We have been asking for support from the municipality for a long time but it is very frus-
trating. It has reached time when they see you as a trouble maker and as only demanding 
what you do not deserve (…) even their contribution was in piecemeal (…) sometimes you 
get Tsh 400,000 (…) you wait again for a long time. It is only one official who helps us to 
push things in an informal manner and we are grateful for that.’ 
The second major issue that was poorly dealt with was the location of the health 
facility. The dispensary was to be built on what officials called ‘village land’. 
This concept was misleading: There was no such land because each piece of land 
belonged to a particular family. Indeed, on the dispensary building site there was 
no formal demarcation between public and private family and personal land. Due 
to improper planning at the very initial stages of the project, the issue of location 
and landownership was not taken seriously, partly because of misinterpretation of 
the principle legal framework which dictates that all land belongs to the state and 
general lack of culture of compensation for family land when taken by the state. 
The land owner resisted the release of the area for the project with bitterness, 
demanding compensation but it was in vain. Later, due to fear of community an-
ger and pressure from the higher government authorities, he gave in with despair. 
When the village chairman was consulted on the land issue he commented that 
‘He is complaining about his plot but he will also benefit from the health services (…) we 
are going to continue with construction (…) If you talk of compensation, it means I have to 
pay from my own pocket or go to jail (…) The municipal council has no such plans on com-
pensation.’ 
The Village Land Act (1999) recognises the power of village government in 
planning and allocating land for public utilities. However, the taking of individ-
ual plots without any compensation including reallocation amounts to arbitrari-
ness and abuse of power. Furthermore, the land use situation in Dodoma Munici-
pality is complicated because in Dodoma Municipality all land and its devel-
opment is controlled by the Capital Development Authority (CDA). The CDA is 
a separate government authority established by the Capital Development Author-
ity Act (1973) for the purpose of developing the area into the modern capital city 
of Tanzania. Therefore, the Dodoma municipal government most likely did not 
even have the authority to use the land for the project without approval from 
CDA. 
A third critical problem is the issue of water; a dispensary cannot operate 
without water. Dodoma Municipality has plenty of water, but the distribution 
tank nearest to the village is just about 4 kilometres away. People walked up to 
seven kilometres to buy water from the Dodoma township. Those who could af-
ford the bus fare used the local commuter buses. Twenty litres of water were sold 
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at Tsh 20. According to the village executive officer, consultation with Dodoma 
Urban Water and Sewerage Authority (DUWASA) had made it clear that the cost 
of construction of a water supply system for the village would amount to Tsh 40 
million which was a nightmare to raise. However, if health and water projects 
had been integrated from the planning stage, local support would have been 
much better. Referring to community readiness to participate in their projects, 
one old man said: 
‘We are ready to dig trenches for laying pipes (…) our wives have to walk at night all the 
way to town and sometimes deliver at home or on the way (…) we can even contribute 
10,000 each for the water project (…) Let them tell us and they shall see our commitment.’ 
The efforts of the Dodoma Municipal Council and the community were not 
enough to complete the dispensary project. One health officer from the munici-
pality suggested to the village leadership to seek support from two NGOs. As a 
result, two new partners arrived on the scene. The next sections will discuss their 
involvement. 
Collaboration between Ntyuka village community and CMSR  
Characterisation of the partner 
CMSR (Centro Mondialita Svillupo Reciprocco) is a local, not-for-profit NGO, 
affiliated to the parent CMSR International with headquarters in Livorno, Italy. It 
was registered in Tanzania in 1977 but started to operate as a local institution in 
1979. The objective of CMSR in Tanzania is to promote health, education, water 
supply and social development of the people particularly the poor and at risk. It 
works through partnerships with international NGOs and the donor community, 
including the World Health Organisation (WHO), CARE International and the 
Italian government. 
 
Motives for collaborations 
Community collaboration with CMSR started in April 2005. The village execu-
tive officer and the local councillor were proud that the partnership was the result 
of their own efforts on one hand, and guidance from one of the municipal health 
officers on the other.  
‘We noted that our building was rotting, the roofing sheets donated by honourable John Sa-
muel Malechela (the one who laid the foundation stone) were also rotting. Money from the 
municipality was not enough. Our people were contributing money and labour to construct a 
shallow dam for harvesting rain water (…) there is hunger (…) we decided to look for other 
sources of support.’ 
It started through informal discussions with one of the municipal health officers 
(classified as a friend) who advised them to visit CMSR for some ideas. The offi-
cer knew that CMSR did support community initiatives. CMSR officials were 
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met. After several consultations, site visits by CMSR and proposal writing, their 
request finally was honoured. The types of contributions made by CMSR and the 
community at this stage of the project are shown in Table 8.2. 
There was a strong commitment from both parties to ensure that all the finish-
ing work was completed so that the dispensary could be opened as soon as possi-
ble. Therefore, although the village asked for 2 million, CMSR made available 
7.5 million – almost four times the amount requested. Site visits by CMSR engi-
neers had made it clear that such an amount was required to finish the project. 
CMSR decided to work directly without using formal municipal bureaucracy be-
cause it feared that more formal engagement of the municipal bureaucracy would 
have continued to delay the work. According to the CMSR official, the municipal 
leadership would be officially informed when submitting a quarterly project de-
velopment report. However, the village government officials said that the mu-
nicipal management was aware of the collaboration (through the health officer), 
but nothing more, since there was no formal communication from the village 
government. The CMSR was very concerned about the problem of water but no 
decision was made on how it could be solved. The contribution from CMSR was 
still not enough because there were also plans to build a toilet and a few houses 
for key health staff. Therefore, further search for partners was conducted. 
 
Table 8.2  Contributions to the dispensary project 
Partner Contributions 
CMSR 1 Funding (Tsch 7,500,000) 
 2 Technical advise 
 3 Supervision 
 4 Identified and paid contractors to supply water for 
construction work 
 5 Identified and paid contractors for civil work 
Community 1 Unskilled labour 
 2 Land 
 3 Supervision 
Source: Meeting with village government officials. 
 
 
ALDPA – Ntyuka Canadian embassy community partnerships  
ALPDA (Agricultural and Livestock Production and Development Association) 
is a local NGO registered in 2002. It aims at working with the community to re-
duce poverty through initiation and development of various projects to comple-
ment government efforts. According to the chairman, ALPDA noted that the dis-
pensary building was at a standstill for a long time and tried to intervene. The 
management approached the village leaders for advice. It was agreed that a tech-
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nical proposal was to be written with support from the ALPDA, so that assistance 
could be sought from donors. Finally a proposal for renovation of the building 
was sent to the Canadian Embassy in 2004. The Embassy agreed to support the 
community initiative, under condition that the municipality would make a com-
mitment to contribute to the partnership, too. The initial plan of the ALPDA, 
Community collaboration, changed after inclusion of the Canadian Embassy and 
Dodoma Municipality.  
 
Table 8.3  Summary of total stakeholders contributions to the Ntyuka dispensary 
Partner Contributions 
ALPDA 1 Advice 
 2 Coordination 
 3 Accounts for the donor money 
Canadian Embassy 1 Funds (Tsh 8,000,000) for staff house and toilet 
Dodoma Municipal Council 1 Funds (Tsh 4,500,000)  
 2 Technician for drawings and structure settings 
 3 Lorry and fuel for transport 
CMSR 1 Funding (Tsh 7,500,000) 
 2 Technical advise 
 3 Supervision 
 4 Contractors paid to supply water for construction 
work 
 5 Identified and paid contractors for civil work 
Community 1 Unskilled labour 
 2 Cash 
 3 Sand and stones 
Village government 1 Coordination 
 2 Community mobilisation 
 3 Supervision 
Individual community members* 1 Land for the construction of the buildings 
Prime Minister** 1 20 bags of cement 
 2 30 corrugated metal sheets for roofing 
*  This was a forced contribution rather than collaboration because the village government took the land 
without consent of the owner. 
**  Honourable John Samuel Malechela, former Prime Minister and Member of Parliament. Contributions 
were made in1993.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This case is an interesting example of a project around which many actors come 
together for a common social goal. Table 8.3 summarises the contributions to the 
construction of the dispensary project since 1993. Pulling the resources together 
will not only enable the completion of the dispensary but also provide for a staff 
house and a toilet. There seem to be plans to mobilise resources that would con-
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tinue so that the problem of water shortage will be solved and the dispensary be 
upgraded to a health centre. Still, some of the early problems may still threaten 
the sustainability of the facility. There never was a formalised project written up, 
or a clear and formalised contractual engagement that bound the people, commu-
nity leadership and the municipal council. This lack of a clear foundation for 
partnerships led to difficulties that contributed to unusually delayed completion 
of the project and weak accountability mechanisms since 1993. Formalisation of 
the collective responsibility of the village and the municipal government is re-
quired to ensure the sustainability of the dispensary in the future. 
 
Questions 
1. Why did the dispensary take such a long time to be completed? 
2. Usually, organisations operate by using formal channels of communication. To what extent 
do you think the informal channels of communication were instrumental in managing stake-
holders’ interests? 
3. Who was the most powerful stakeholder in the accomplishment of the health project, and 
why? 
4. By looking at the nature of partnerships, to what extent was there a win-win situation for all 
stakeholders? 
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Professionalism 
Wilhelm L. Mafuru 
Introduction 
The delivery of certain social services, such as education and health care, needs a 
scale of government that goes beyond the local communities. Local communities 
quite often lack the capacity to provide these costly services. On the other hand, 
the national government has an interest in safeguarding the quality of these ser-
vices. This interest has to do with the redistribution of wealth and means between 
the different regions and districts. Quite often, education and health care are iden-
tified as national interests, sometimes even stated in the constitution as a respon-
sibility entrusted to the national government.  
Especially when it comes to education, the result is a tense relation between: 
On the one hand, the involvement of the national government, formulating the 
requirements and providing the means to a certain extent to provide education 
and, on the other hand, the local communities that are also involved in the quality 
of the educational services. After all, education is part of local cultural prefer-
ences and local communities will search for means to be able to maintain their 
values. To make things more complex, quite often these social services are also 
supported by non-governmental institutions, like churches. This chapter is about 
the tense relation between central and local and between formal rules and practi-
cal application. 
Concept 
Social services in local communities 
Social services, such as health care and education depend to a large extent on the 
performance of professionals, like doctors, nurses and teachers. It is not easy to 
control the way these professionals operate. The actual consumers of these social 
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services are the local communities. The challenge in the social service delivery is 
to involve these local communities and to create a sphere of accountability be-
tween the professionals and the consumers. The quality of the social services, 
therefore, depends on the network of at least three (groups of) actors: The central 
government and its servants; the local communities and the professionals that de-
liver the services.  
 
Central government  
The responsibility for adequate provision of social services often leads to a legal 
framework that forms the normative base of the quality. The result is a regulatory 
framework with norms on, for example, the level of education required for work-
ing in either hospitals or schools. Other norms might affect the infrastructure of 
these facilities, like the number of class rooms required.  
This legal framework is normally accompanied with a top-down financing to 
realise these services. Both interventions (the legal and the financial framework) 
lead to a system of supervision and intervention mechanisms from the central 
government to safeguard the adequate level of the social services. 
 
Local communities 
The facilities that provide the social services are located in local communities. 
These local communities form the second group of actors that affects the quality 
of the social service delivery. Local communities are considered as the consum-
ers of the social services. They therefore have a stake in the quality and quantity 
of these services. It is impossible for the central government to realise an ade-
quate level of services in schools and hospitals without the support of these local 
communities, both financially and supportively.  
The involvement of the local communities is not only the result of the fact that 
the members of the communities are consumers of the facilities. Quite often the 
social services have a history within these communities. These services are con-
sidered collective goods of the community itself. Caring for sick and disabled 
persons, and caring for infants are social habits that exist in a family or a tribe 
even without the institution of a (public) school or hospital. The question remains 
whether or not the local communities still form a social group that feels a collec-
tive responsibility for these institutions.  
 
Professionals  
The third group of actors consists of those that actually deliver the social ser-
vices: The trained personnel like teachers, nurses and doctors. These profession-
als form a separate group of actors, since they share the same background. These 
actors have the monopoly on the information on the actual quality of the service 
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delivery. One could consider this group as a semi-autonomous social field. The 
concept of semi-autonomous social fields explains the limited effectiveness of 
the central (formal) rules in the group of professionals. According to Moore, 
semi-autonomous social fields have their own customs and rules and the means 
of coercing or inducing compliance. The qualities which compel the individuals 
in the fields to adhere to the internally generated rules, immediately form the 
forces that dictate the mode of their compliance or non compliance with the for-
mal rules (Moore 1973: 721-722). 
The semi-autonomous social fields have their own defined boundaries and any 
attempt to direct change often fails to deliver the intended objectives. Even when 
it succeeds, wholly or partially, it frequently comes out with the unexpected con-
sequences. The formal rules are seen as thrust upon the ongoing social (local) ar-
rangements in which there are already binding obligations existing. Given the 
prevailing operational environment in these social fields, the local ‘legal’ orders 
are often stronger than the formal rules directed against them (Moore 1973: 723).  
The operational environment of semi-autonomous social fields, in most cases, 
is characterised by the extra-legal activities. The justification of such activities in 
semi-autonomous social fields is based on moral obligations whose compliance 
lies on members’ desire to avoid expected losses and ultimate exclusion. Moral 
obligations are the only obligations of the relationship that are not legally en-
forceable; however they depend on the value of the relationship itself for their 
enforcement. The force behind these obligations of relationships in the social 
fields is the intention of the individuals to aim at staying and the need to perform 
well in it (Moore 1973: 727-729). The internal environment of semi-autonomous 
social fields provides strong pressures for the individuals to conform to the estab-
lished system of interdependence if one continues to remain in the social fields 
(relationship). Also in semi-autonomous social fields, the rules are produced 
within the field of action itself, and some other rules (normative orders) arise as 
the individuals in semi-autonomous social fields perform their work (Moore 
1973: 728). 
 
Teaching profession in Tanzania in Moore’s perspective 
This chapter is interested in using the concept of semi-autonomous social fields 
to understand the effects of the centralised teacher recruitment in the teaching 
profession in the ward secondary schools. The aim is to show the extent to which 
the internal arrangements of the teachers in these schools limit the effectiveness 
of the formal rules governing the provision of education service in Tanzania. The 
Tanzanian situation has been brought in Moore’s perspective of semi-
autonomous social fields when the case of the Chagga of Mount Kilimanjaro in 
Tanzania is discussed. The Chagga case provides a synopsis of the extent to 
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which local formation or internal structure can be resistant to the central efforts 
which are aimed at it. In the context of the Chagga, three pieces of legislation, 
namely the 1963 Act, which declared that there would no longer be any private 
freehold ownership in land; the introduction of a ten-house cell system as a direct 
attempt to change local social relationships and the abolition of chieftainship, 
were found to have very limited effects. Actually the land issue in the Chagga 
society, according to the customary system, has been tightened in the lineage sys-
tem and is based on the mutual rights and obligations of kin and neighbours 
which have continued to be intact as they were before and even after the 1963 
Act (Moore 1973: 733). That means that the values of the Chagga lineage organi-
sation, for example, that kinsmen should help each other; that brothers should 
support each other or that land should never be sold without the consent of one’s 
brothers; are still observed (Moore 1973: 735). Moore also provides the observa-
tion that such values as help, support and consent held in the Chagga society 
have relevance even to the current situations confronting modern societies. Ac-
cording to Moore (1973: 735), 
‘These values may also be interpreted as the ideological side of a very considerable modern 
mutual social and economic interest. They are not merely a survival from a traditional past.’ 
Furthermore, the state-introduced ten-house cell system in 1964, for the purpose 
of collecting and distributing information, was only found to be grafted on the 
local branches of lineage and neighbourhood. It is reported that within the 
Chagga society, the system of selecting ten-house cell leaders was arranged in 
such a way that it was in favour of all neighbours at the time (Moore 1973: 737). 
In this way, it can be said that the introduction of the ten-house cell system made 
little difference to the dominant Chagga lineage with its pre-existing neighbour-
hood patterns. In this locality, Moore (1973: 737-738) provides that 
‘(…) ten-house cells are units of neighbours; they inevitably involve people who have (…) 
attachments to kinship, affinity and neighbourhood (…) The members of the ten-house cell 
are (…) men whose primary identity for one another is as neighbour, affine or kinsman.’  
Although the 1963 abolition of chieftainship succeeded, for the Chagga, the 
chieftain families continued to prosper and their children joined the emerging lit-
erate elites. Being well economically, at least compared to their subjects, Chagga 
chiefs were able to afford to pay for the education of their children. Thus, with 
the abolition of chieftainship, the chiefly offices may have gone, but it seems that 
the powerful extended networks were already in place. According to Moore 
(1973: 740), 
‘(…) the informal position of advantage of these men is the network of connections that 
members of chiefly lineages had with persons in positions of power and authority both in 
businesses and in government.’ 
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Therefore, what this chapter draws from the Chagga case is the idea of lineage 
organisation (interdependence). Through it, the chapter aims to explain the extent 
to which the internal arrangements in the teaching profession in the in ward sec-
ondary schools limit the effectiveness of formal rules governing the provision of 
education service in Tanzania. It seems the pressures directed to teachers to con-
form to the local agreements and structures, emanating from their environment, 
cause the influence of the formal rules to be less effective. In Moore’s (1973: 
729) perspective: 
‘(…) the social field is semi-autonomous not only because it can be affected by the direction 
of outside forces impinging upon it, but because individuals inside the social field can mobi-
lise those outside forces’. 
According to Moore (1973), the local lineage organisation advocates for the 
bound unit of individuals, closely connected through their own contingent inter-
ests, being contiguous and sometimes through affection, as is the case for teach-
ers in ward secondary schools in Tanzania. The reason for positioning teachers in 
this way is that their social set up in the localities seems to make them rely on 
each other for help, support and consent regarding various issues that happen in 
their environment and they automatically become involved. For example, it is 
reported that local teachers have agreed to overcome the pressure of their work 
by modifying their teaching modality and focus more on teaching by reviewing 
the past examination questions. This has happened despite the directive by Mo-
EVT that requires the adequate teaching of students in accordance with the ap-
proved syllabus in each subject (Sauti za Marafiki wa Elimu (the Voice of 
Friends of Education) 2004). Hence, the concept of semi-autonomous social 
fields in this chapter has the objective of providing the ground for explaining the 
extent to which teachers’ coping with their workloads limits the effectiveness of 
the formal rules on the provision of education service. 
The case of Milengwelengwe Secondary School 
Central and local involvement  
The government of the United Republic of Tanzania removed all restrictions in 
the provision of secondary education by the mid 1980s. This ended the era of na-
tionalisation of education of the late 1960s through till the early 1980s. In this 
era, the provision of secondary education was completely under the control of the 
central government. Only a few religious secondary schools (seminaries) were 
spared by this policy (Samoff 1987).  
The changed position of the government made it possible for other providers, 
especially the private sector, to provide secondary education. However, the new 
providers had the main characteristic of being strategic investors. They made 
careful calculations before they made investment. The specific location of the es-
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tablishment of the school became a relevant aspect of this choice. The result was 
that many private schools were founded in the urban and affluent areas. As a re-
sult, the rural (remote) areas were left unattended (Ikoyi & Ikoyi 2005). The 
emerged situation, in this respect, was the systematic isolation of those who were 
in the remote and rural areas as well as those who could not afford the higher 
school fees in the private secondary schools.  
During the 1990s, 9% of the students who completed primary schools were 
admitted in private secondary schools, while only around 6% were able to find a 
place in the still insufficient public secondary schools (Therkildsen 2000). The 
new policy measure was to enhance decentralisation, to support local communi-
ties in their efforts to establish schools. As a result, ward secondary schools 
emerged in Tanzania. This policy was implemented by means of a directive from 
the central government in the early 2000s, which required each ward to have a 
secondary school. These secondary schools were built in the wards by the local 
communities with some support from the central government (Osaki 2004). 
To lower the differences between regions and districts, the central government 
is still involved in the appointment of educational staff. The teachers in the ward 
secondary school are recruited and appointed by the central government and, 
sometimes against their will, posted to work in certain remote wards.  
This shows the tense relation between, on the one hand, the responsibility of 
the central government and on the other hand, the wish of involvement and ac-
countability in local communities. The case of Milengwelengwe Secondary 
School shows how the central government, the local communities and the com-
munity of teachers operate and try to provide an adequate level of education.  
 
Milengwelengwe Secondary School 
Milengwelengwe Secondary School is a ward secondary school located in 
Mngazi ward in Morogoro District. This school is located about 130 kilometres 
southeast of Morogoro town. The school was established in 1994 and converted 
into a ward secondary school in 2003 due to the directive to establish a secondary 
school in every ward.  
However, as pointed out by Mr Mwakalinga, the village executive officer of 
Mngazi, the new development in the provision of secondary education in the 
ward did not mean any change in the position and role of the local communities 
in the internal affairs of the ward secondary school. The local communities and 
their leaders continued to have limited involvement in the affairs of the school, 
and the only thing needed from them was their contributions to erect school in-
frastructure such as classrooms, elaborated by Mr Mwakalinga.  
A group discussion with the community members made clear that no partici-
pant was in the position to provide basic data on such things as the number of 
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teachers available in the secondary school and the number of students enrolled in 
each class or even the round figure of the total number of students in the ward 
secondary school.  
On the other hand, the public servants at the ward were not able to provide this 
information either. Responding to that, Mr Mwakalinga said ‘our job is just to 
construct and not to inspect’. As a result, the local leaders in the ward were 
shocked by what happened in the ward secondary school as revealed by Mr 
Mwakalinga, when he said: 
‘In January 2008 I went to our secondary school. It was a private visit and I wanted to in-
quire whether I could get an opportunity to develop myself academically. Suddenly three 
young men approached me. I introduced myself to them and started to explain the purpose of 
my visit. One of them responded to my inquiry without introducing himself and others to me. 
When he finished his explanations, he introduced himself and his colleagues to me. I was 
shocked to learn that one of the three young men was not a teacher by profession but a form 
six leaver who was engaged by the school administration.’ 
On the other hand, Mr Mwakalinga had the view that the limited involvement of 
the local leaders especially, the chairpersons of the kitongoji (the local neigh-
bourhoods) in the affairs of their ward secondary school was due to their ‘lack of 
education’ to understand and analyse the issues of the school.  
The data obtained from the ward office showed that fourteen out of fifteen ki-
tongoji chairpersons in the ward had only primary education qualification. Only 
one kitongoji chairperson had ordinary secondary education qualifications 
(Mngazi ward 2008). This state of affairs limited the kitongoji chairpersons from 
being involved in the school board as members, despite being prominent people 
in the ward. The minimum qualification for any person to be the member of the 
school board is a secondary education qualification (The National Education Act 
of 1978). The situation was different on the side of employed officials working in 
the ward, namely Ward Executive Officer; Ward Education Coordinator; Village 
Executive Officers of the four villages of Vigolegole, Mngazi, Sesenga and 
Milengwelengwe in Mngazi ward. These officials had ordinary secondary educa-
tion qualification and above (Mngazi ward 2008).  
 
Working as a teacher in the Ward secondary school 
The weak relation with the ward and the local communities resulted in the situa-
tion that the staff of Milengwelengwe Secondary School formed a separate com-
munity. During the interview, Mr Salmat, the deputy head of school, stated that 
part of the welcoming procedure of new staff members  
‘includes finding temporary accommodation for the newcomers, while the school administra-
tion works on the places where the teachers will settle. This also goes hand-in-hand with 
helping them to formalise the requirements of their job by filling in the employment forms 
which are later forwarded to the Principal Secretary of the Ministry of Education and Voca-
tional Training (MoEVT) in Dar es Salaam.’  
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The first week of the teacher’s presence in the school environment was regarded 
as the ‘socialisation week’. At this moment, a new teacher was informed of im-
portant things to be observed both in the school environment and the villages 
around. According to Mr Salmat, the most significant information availed to the 
teachers once they arrived was the consensus agreement among the teachers for 
helping each other. The agreement required the members (teachers) to contribute 
a certain amount of money each and give to a colleague who happened to have 
problems like sickness. These funds also provided some benefits in case of death 
of a family member or special occasions such as weddings and births of babies.  
Mr Salmat stressed that the daily life in the ward secondary school was char-
acterised by a high degree of tolerance and patience. This applied to the side of 
the teachers as well as that of the school administration. Mr Salmat also pointed 
out that normally the school administration did not impose immediate sanctions 
to any teacher who violated the internal rules or procedures, and he further pro-
vided the following: 
‘Since September 2007, one of our teachers, Mr Mohamed, had been absent. I, personally, 
made the efforts to contact him several times through his mobile phone but all in vain. For-
tunately in November 2007, after several attempts, I managed to reach him through the 
phone. We had a friendly conversation but he was reluctant to disclose the problem pre-
vented him from coming back. I assured him that the school administration had not written 
any warning letter to him for that. Of course, it was true that no letter was written on this 
case. This only happened in this month [October 2008] after seeing that there is no possibil-
ity for him to come back. That is when we decided to write a letter to the Principal Secretary-
Ministry of Education and Vocational Training informing all about Mr Mohamed.’ 
Regarding the communities in the villages around Mngazi ward, Mr Salmat 
noted that teachers were advised to maintain an attitude of self-respect and re-
spect for others. This also involved keeping distance from the matters happening 
in the local communities, especially local communities’ politics. On the other 
hand, the members of the school community were divided in their opinions as far 
as their lives and working in the local environment were concerned. There were 
those who were not pleased with the local situation and wanted to leave. Others 
felt comfortable to continue working in the secondary school. Both groups had 
their specific reasons and feelings to support their views. For example, Mr Ayub, 
one of the teachers who wanted to leave, said:  
‘who would like to work here? This school does not have even a single computer, we are on-
ly using an old typewriter and a worn out duplicating machine which does not function prop-
erly. In most cases we are forced to write examinations on the blackboards. Worse still, there 
is no electricity here!’  
Mr Burwai, a supporter of the preference to stay, was pleased to continue work-
ing in the local environment. Mr Burwai was the most senior and experienced 
teacher in the school. He had been in the school since 1998 and had well estab-
lished himself in the local environment. He had big farms of maize and rice 
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where he spent his time when out of the normal teaching hours. Like any other 
newcomer by then, he had the thoughts of leaving the place as soon as possible 
but without quitting his career. Despite several attempts, he was never successful. 
Then he decided to stay and face the reality of the situation and utilise the oppor-
tunity. As a result, he was able to achieve what he had. That is, a grinding mill 
project, 40 acres of land used for agriculture, and a modern house just close to 
the ward secondary school. Given these achievements, Mr Burwai stated that he 
did not see the reason to leave. 
 
Relationships in the ward 
Generally, there was ‘lack of mutual collaboration’ between school community 
members and the members of the local community in the ward. During the inter-
view, Mzee Mkwayu, one of the prominent elder people in the ward, indicated 
that some teachers, especially the young ones, did not feel concerned with mat-
ters in the local community. Mr Mwakalinga pointed out that such teachers 
viewed things like village meetings and whatever took place in the villages 
around as insignificant and a waste of time and they never attended. Mr Mwa-
kalinga challenged this attitude and viewed it as a way for these teachers to iso-
late themselves from the rest in the ward. 
The views of Mzee Mkwayu were confirmed by Mr Ayubu who stated: ‘we 
want to live here peaceful until we leave. We do not want to be involved in un-
necessary confrontations with wazee (elders) in this locality.’ 
Mzee Mkwayu was critical of this teachers’ position and said that it was not 
appealling to be a good example to the common people around them. The 
Mngazi ward leaders pointed out that the local community in the ward share the 
view that teachers were a group of elites who were there for their own interests 
and did not come for sincere rendering of education service per se. Mr Samwel, 
the member of the Ward Development Committee (WDC) provided the follow-
ing comments: 
‘Even in the WDC meetings, members of the school administration rarely attend. In fact, one 
the agenda for deliberations in the meetings is the implementation of secondary education 
development programme in the ward. Members of the secondary school administration are 
the key individuals to provide the WDC with the insights on what happens in the school’s 
academic development.’ 
Education provision in the Ward secondary school 
The shortage of teachers 
A teacher is a crucial person who stands at the centre of education service deliv-
ery. Teachers’ continuous presence and assured commitment play a significant 
role in the provision of education service to the community. In general, teachers 
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in secondary education are trained to teach two subjects. Table 9.1 shows that 
despite the teachers being trained in two subjects, they teach only one. As a re-
sult, a number of subjects were not taught at all. It was not clear for how long 
such a state of affair would persist. 
 
Table 9.1 Teaching in Milengwelengwe Secondary School 
Identity Sex Subjects trained to teach Subject teaching 
Teacher A1 Male  Kiswahili and History School Administrator 
Teacher A2 Male English and Geography Geography 
Teacher 1 Female Kiswahili and History Kiswahili 
Teacher 2 Male Kiswahili and History History 
Teacher 3 Male Kiswahili and English English 
Teacher 4 Male Kiswahili and English English 
Teacher 5 Male Civics and History Civics 
Source: Milengwelengwe Secondary School (2008b) Staff Workload Report. 
 
 
Given the four classes and the nine subjects offered in Milengwelengwe secon-
dary school, the total aggregate number of teachers required was supposed to be 
36. But for this ward secondary school, at least a total of 18 teachers (bearing in 
mind that a secondary school teacher specialises in two subjects) could address 
the shortage. Table 9.1 shows that the actual number of teachers was only seven, 
including the head of the school.  
 
Unanswered plea for teachers 
The Ward secondary school suffered from a complete absence of ‘professional’ 
teachers to handle science subjects. The plea from the school administration to 
the Ministry of Education and Vocational Training (MoEVT) continued to be un-
answered. In the year 2007, the school requested for four teachers to teach sci-
ence subjects but no one was posted to the school. ‘The same request was re-
submitted in January 2008, stressing the urgency of the matter but it all ended in 
vain’, said Mr Salmat. The MoEVT did not even provide the school with some-
thing to do as a short term solution to the problem.  
Fortunately in March 2008, the school administration heard that there were 
new teachers who were expected to complete their training in May 2008 and that 
they would be recruited in the financial year 2008/2009. According to Mr Sal-
mat, on the basis of that information, in April 2008 they wrote a reminder letter 
to the Regional Education Officer (REO), but all was as usual: No teacher was 
allocated to their ward school in July 2008. Surprisingly, the public servant re-
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sponsible for education reallocated to other schools, even the two licensed teach-
ers posted to Milengwelengwe Secondary School in the year 2007. 
 
Short term coping strategy 
In the situation where their pleas for more teachers were not answered by the 
higher authorities, the staff tried to find their own way to cope with this shortage. 
The school started to rely on the service of the untrained teachers. Working on 
this short term strategy, Mr Salmat explained, the school administration had to 
inform the school board. Without hesitation, the school board allowed the school 
administration to deal with the matter on its own.  
Although the school board provided its consent on the matter, given the re-
moteness of the ward secondary school, the school administration was unable to 
engage qualified teachers, even on a part-time basis. According to Mr Salmat, 
this made the school administration to be left with only one option. That is, to try 
to convince the sixth form leavers who were willing to help the school. Mr Sal-
mat further pointed out: 
‘In 2007 this option included the radical decision to engage three form six leavers to assist 
teaching Biology, Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics.’ 
Despite the fact that such ‘teachers’ helped the school to cover the gap, Mr Sal-
mat was somehow doubtful of them: 
‘The engaged-form six teachers in most cases lack teaching methodologies and sometimes 
they fail to transfer knowledge to the students.’ 
Mr Salmat also hinted that there were situations where students came to his of-
fice complaining that they did not understand what the ‘new teachers’ taught 
them. This made students lose interest for the subjects. 
Mr Salmat also indicated that the ‘engaged form six leavers’ were only tempo-
rarily assisting the school. Their availability was never guaranteed for the whole 
year. They lacked commitment to stay longer at the local school. For instance, in 
September 2008, two ‘engaged teachers’ left the school in the middle of the term 
even without issuing a notice. Their decision really confused not only the school 
administration but also the students since these individuals were the only ones 
responsible for mathematics and chemistry in the whole school. ‘In other times, 
they actually leave as soon as their examination results are out or get any other 
opportunities outside the village. Normally they do believe that life outside the 
village is at least more promising’, said Mr Salmat.  
 
Policy implication of the short term coping strategy 
The decision taken by the ward secondary school to engage form six leavers in 
teaching contradicted the provision of The National Education Act of 1978. The 
Act provides that no person shall teach or be employed as a teacher in any school 
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unless he is ‘an authorised person’. According to the Act a teacher means a per-
son who is ‘certified, licensed or registered as a teacher’. The Education and 
Training Policy (1995) also states that the qualification of teachers and their abil-
ity to perform well in classroom is a key to improving the quality of education. 
The policy further points out that ‘the minimum qualification’ for a teacher in 
secondary schools shall be ‘possession of a valid diploma in education obtained 
from a recognised institution’.  
Also, the Public Service Act of 2002 and its Regulations (2003) and Public 
Service Management and Employment Policy (1999) provide the guiding princi-
ples for recruitment in public service and state that ‘the selection of candidates in 
(…) public service shall be based on merits.’ 
 
Problems with recruiting new teachers 
Milengwelengwe Secondary School, like any other secondary schools located in 
the remote areas, suffered the consequence of the centralised recruitment process. 
For instance, Mr Salmat was the only teacher responsible for teaching geography 
in the whole school. He explained that he had to move from one class to another 
throughout the week. This was a tiresome experience for him and most of the 
teachers in the school were in similar situations. They did not have enough time 
to rest and evaluate the subjects. The most difficult part for each teacher was dur-
ing the evaluation of students in both continuous assessments and final examina-
tions. Mr Salmat stated that he was required to evaluate all 396 students in the 
school, ranging from form one to form four.  
‘This teaching experience causes the morale of a teacher to deteriorate. Exposed to this situa-
tion, a teacher becomes exhausted and fails to care to check whether students understand the 
lesson or not. It becomes difficult for the teachers to take note of the students who have 
problems in understanding the subjects, unless one is very committed. This makes teachers 
only count the sessions and classes. The circumstances do not even allow the conduct of pri-
vate counselling to the students.’ 
The teaching practice in the ward secondary school was also affected by the fre-
quent absence of the teachers. Although the Employment and Labour Relations 
Act of 2004, section 27 (1) (a) states that  
‘(…) an employer shall pay an employe (…) during working hours at the place of work on 
the agreed pay day,’ the remoteness of the school did not provide any opportunity favouring 
its application. Instead, the teachers’ employing authority opted for the provision of section 
27 (1) (b) (ii) of the Employment and Labour Relations Act of 2004, which provides for ‘di-
rect deposit into an account designated by the employee.’ 
Given these circumstances, it became inevitable for teachers to structure absence 
in their monthly teaching schedules for the purpose of having at least four to five 
or even more days off for travelling to Morogoro to withdraw their salaries de-
posited in their bank accounts, explained Mr Salmat. 
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Moreover, Mr Salmat indicated that the lack of responsiveness on the part of 
the local community in the ward was a factor affecting the practice of teaching in 
the ward secondary school. For instance, the response of the members of the 
community on the extra teaching to the students during the vacations was not en-
couraging. According to Mr Salmat, the teachers supported the initiative, but 
most parents and members of the local community were not ready to incur extra 
costs associated with it. This was envisaged by the fact that in June 2008, out of 
62 form four students, only the parents of three students agreed to pay. In the 
group of the form two students, out of 109 students, only 10 students received 
some extra courses.  
However Mr Mwakalinga said that it was not true that the local community 
was not responsive but rather, they raised the argument ‘why should they incur 
additional costs while they do not see a match between the value of their efforts 
in developing the school’s infrastructures and the academic results the ward 
school produces?’  
 
Motivation of teachers to teach in the Ward secondary school 
The location of the ward school was not supportive for the motivation of the 
teachers. There are examples of teachers who left soon after reporting, as well as 
those whose reports came to the school stating that they would come but then 
never reported. The disheartening circumstance was that the teachers were re-
quired to travel to Morogoro every month at their own cost to collect the salaries. 
It is also obvious that teachers did not take the whole of their salaries to the vil-
lage. Some amount remained in their bank accounts in town. This situation 
forced them to be the frequent travellers to Morogoro. This was not only costly 
for the teachers, but was also less encouraging since the time it took to travel 
could not be spent in the school, preparing for the courses.  
According to Mr Salmat, the obvious and immediate effect was a lack of con-
tinuity in the teachers’ teaching schedules. This resulted in leaving students idle 
for a number of days, of course doing absolutely nothing. In some occasions, 
when students learnt that teachers were not present in the school, some decided 
not to attend. This constituted to another cause of students’ absence in the ward 
secondary school. 
The interruptions on the ward school’s calendar also affected the coverage of 
syllabi in the local school, apart from those subjects, for example mathematics, 
chemistry and biology, which were not taught at all. In the view of Mr Salmat, 
the structured absence contributed to insufficient teaching which generally had 
the impact on the students’ performance in the school. Over the years, the form 
four national examination pass rate has been below 6%. In the form four national 
examination results of the year 2007, out of the 64 students who sat for national 
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examination only three students passed with division three. That means the pass 
rate was less than 5% (NECTA 2007).  
 
Internal protocol in the Ward secondary school 
In Milengwelengwe Secondary School, both teachers and the members of the 
school administration emerged to be tolerant and patient to each other. For ex-
ample, the school community members became reserved, even if they viewed 
that certain behaviour practised by their colleagues jeopardised the accomplish-
ment of the school objectives. Things like deliberate teachers’ absence and ab-
sconding from class sessions, as per the master time table did not receive the 
needed reaction from either the colleagues or the school administration.  
Mr Ayubu, one of the teachers in the school, revealed that in April 2007, the 
school got a surprise visit by the officials from Public Service Management 
(PSM). These officials came for verification of the employees in the school. Un-
fortunately, their colleague had gone to town and overstayed for a week. Luckily 
enough, he came back before the PSM officials completed the exercise. Mr 
Ayubu further stated that the ‘good thing’ was that even the school administra-
tion had not served him with a warning letter for what he did. To the school ad-
ministration the only thing that mattered was that the teachers were still working 
and willing to teach at least some courses.  
This mutual interest of teachers and administration was an important aspect of 
social affiliation. According to them, good personal relationship counted more 
than adhering to the principles guiding their profession as teachers on the one 
hand, and the school administration procedures on the other hand. In this way, 
the interests of the ward secondary school were being overshadowed by the ef-
forts exercised by both parties (teachers and school administrators) to please each 
other. 
Patience and tolerance controlled the internal protocol of the ward secondary 
school. The two overwhelmed the life of the members of the school community 
in their environment. However, this had adverse effects on the school administra-
tion procedure and the way sensitive issues were handled in the school. For in-
stance, a complex issue such as the one which involved a teacher who absconded 
from teaching was just lightly handled. It took almost a year (from September 
2007 to October 2008) for the school administration to react on that issue. In-
stead of initiating disciplinary action as laid down in the Public Service Act of 
2002 and Public Service Regulations 2003, the school administration went on 
negotiating with the ‘absent teacher’. By doing so, the school administration was 
sending a message to the concerned teacher and others that its concern was 
peaceful co-existence in the local environment. In other words, the administration 
did not want to be looked upon as a source of misery to others. This was the posi-
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tion of the members of the school community and ‘it was like a norm to be ob-
served’ in Milengwelengwe Secondary School. 
The implication of concentrating so much on managing the individual personal 
relationship internally drifted the ward secondary school into being a ‘relation-
ship maintenance institution.’ For instance, the school Report (2008a) on the 
Manning Level provided a different picture, contrary to what was observed at the 
school. The report showed that the ward secondary school had ten ‘available’ 
teachers; while the revelation from the school master’s time table, and the work-
load allocation report at that time (October 2008), showed that the school actu-
ally had seven teachers that were available. A thorough inquiry on this disparity 
revealed that in September 2007, three teachers left for studies to some higher 
learning institutions to pursue non-education related courses. Knowingly, these 
teachers decided not to request for the lease letters from MoEVT. They did so 
because they were aware of the provision of the Education Circular No. 7 of 
2006. The circular provides that, among other things, ‘a teacher will only be pro-
vided with a lease letter and entitlement for the salary every month once they 
pursue a course relating to the teaching profession (education courses) only.’ 
However, their case did not fit the provision of that circular. But given the inter-
nal protocol in the school, they were just reported as individuals who were avail-
able! Both the school administration and teachers reserved this matter despite 
holding a huge workload. Thus, three teachers continued to pursue their courses 
and at the same time receiving their salaries every month. Though they did not 
have the official permission to be outside their duty station from MoEVT, they 
had the consent from their colleagues. 
Questions 
1. Why and how do professionals who are engaged in social service delivery emerge as semi-
autonomous social fields? Explain by citing examples from the case. 
2. Why are the internally generated norms in the social fields stronger than the centrally for-
mulated rules when professionals perform their duties in social service delivery? 
3. Based on your reading of the case, what do you consider to be the importance of profession-
als for society? What are the pros and cons of having professionals behaving as semi-auto-
nomous social fields in social service delivery? 
4. On the basis of the analysis of the case and revelation of the concepts in this chapter, why is 
it that the local communities and professionals tend to diverge in the locality? 
5. Does the case help you to broadly view the professionals in public service as semi-auto-
nomous social fields? Explain. What can be the factors that determine the likelihood of the 
professionals to prefer staying and working longer in a particular social service delivery set-
ting? 
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Intergovernmental relations 
Henry A. Mollel 
Introduction  
In every state system, governmental authority is to some extent dispersed over 
more than one governmental body. Quite often, one could distinguish a certain 
level of interdependency between these bodies with a central body, a state au-
thority or a federal government, and with decentralised bodies, like districts or 
municipalities. Even in the most centralised systems, there is a pressure to subdi-
vide governmental activities and to attribute some power for taking decisions and 
executing tasks to authorities other than the central government. And on the other 
hand, even the most grass roots kind of state organisation will experience incen-
tives for concentrating part of the governmental authority in one central unit.  
Between these two units, intergovernmental relations exist. These relations are 
complex by nature. On the one hand, these relations often aim at recognising a 
certain level of autonomy for local communities. On the other hand, central in-
volvement is needed to support and protect national interests.  
This chapter highlights general theoretical concepts of intergovernmental rela-
tions. These general notions are applied to the practical experience of Decentrali-
sation by Devolution (DbyD) in Tanzania, particularly in the area of social ser-
vices. The case of Tawa Health Centre shows the way general principles are 
applied to the complex reality of decentralisation in Tanzania.  
Intergovernmental relations  
Definition of intergovernmental relations 
Governments are configured to suit the context in which they operate. One could 
therefore see many variations in organisational structure of the state system. De-
spite this variation, there is always some kind of hierarchy between central gov-
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ernmental layers and sub-central or local governmental layers. There is an em-
pirical logic in the division of governmental tasks within a hierarchy. On the one 
hand, a low level of government is inevitable since local communities will search 
for a structure to get involved in decision-making that affects the collective inter-
ests (Oates 1972). On the other hand, a central involvement is needed to solve 
problems and disputes between local communities and to guarantee economic 
stabilisation and equal distribution of wealth. The relation between the two layers 
is therefore of specific interest and can easily cause tensions between local inter-
ests on the one hand, and on the other hand, national preferences. This relation 
between governmental layers can be defined as intergovernmental relations.  
The simple explanation of intergovernmental relations is the interaction be-
tween the different spheres of government. The size and number of these spheres 
are often determined by the institutional arrangement of a particular country. For 
example, the United States has a federal system of government. This means that 
there is a central government (the federal government), a sub-central sphere (the 
50 states) and within these states a further division in local governments (coun-
ties and municipalities). The same can be observed in the unitary state, for exam-
ple South Africa, where the Constitution states explicitly that ‘government is 
constituted at national, provincial and local spheres of government which are dis-
tinctive, interdependent and interrelated’ (Van Zandt 2003).  
The constitution is a source of powers that are dispersed over the different 
spheres of government. The dispersion of powers can be categorised in either 
centralised systems or decentralised systems. In a centralised system, the powers 
are concentrated at the central level and the sub-central governments operate as 
de-concentrated agents for the central government. The alternative is a decentral-
ised system which involves transfers of powers from the central governments to 
the lower levels (sub-central governments) in a political-administrative and terri-
torial hierarchy (Crook & Manor 1998).  
 
As stated before, a state system is never fully centralised or decentralised. Be-
tween these two extremes there are at least three models of the intergovernmental 
relations between central and sub-central that need to be clarified. These are de-
concentration, delegation and devolution.  
De-concentration is the process by which the central government disperses re-
sponsibilities for certain services to its regional branch offices without involving 
any transfer of authority to a lower level of government (Litvack et al. 1998: 4). 
This is often considered the weakest form of decentralisation (Rondinelli 1999: 
2). Delegation refers to a situation in which the central government transfers re-
sponsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to local 
governments or semiautonomous organisations. These are wholly controlled by 
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the central government and are accountable to the central government (Bergh 
2004: 781). Devolution occurs when the central government transfers authority 
for decision-making, financial allocations, and management to quasi-autonomous 
units of local government (Bergh 2004: 781). Commonly, devolution involves 
the transfer of responsibilities for services to municipalities that elect their may-
ors and councils, raise their revenues, and have independent authority to make 
investment decisions (Litvack et al. 1998). 
One could consider these three forms of organisation as a scale of decentrali-
sation: from less decentralisation to more decentralisation. Inevitably, the actual 
degree of decentralisation has to be derived from the actual dispersion of powers 
within the intergovernmental relations. These are not only legal powers, but also 
political, administrative and financial. Political powers aim at giving citizens or 
their elected representatives influence in public decision-making (Rondinelli 
1999). This public decision-making involves the formulation of policies and im-
plementation of measures. The administrative powers follow these public pow-
ers; implementation is in the end an administrative matter that needs bureaucracy 
that is capable of implementing these measures and accounting for the results 
(World Bank 2002). The financial powers might be considered the core compo-
nent of decentralisation. If local governments are to carry out decentralised func-
tions effectively, they must have an adequate level of revenues, either raised lo-
cally or transferred from the central government. These financial powers have to 
be supported with the authority to make decisions about expenditures.  
If one would want to assess the degree of decentralisation within a state struc-
ture, the financial powers are an obvious point of departure. In the end, local de-
cision-making is only relevant if this decision-making involves the expenditure 
of means. The highest forms of decentralisation, therefore, almost inevitably in-
volve the powers and authorities to decide upon financial matters. In the words of 
Ebel & Serdar (2001: 25):  
‘Devolution is usually synonymous to fiscal decentralisation where sub-central governments 
have clear expenditure assignments, substantial budget autonomy, and legally recognised 
geographical boundaries within which they perform public functions.’  
 
Local government financing mechanisms  
The first mechanism that determines the actual financial powers of local govern-
ments is the mechanism of collection of own revenues. These revenues often 
have the form of taxes or levies. The underlying philosophy of transferring the 
authority to collect these revenues is that local governments possess the distinc-
tive advantages over the central government to perform some public sector obli-
gations more efficiently. The efficient use of resources by the local government 
is often linked to the assumption that local governments can choose the mix of 
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public services and revenues that best meets the preferences of the people in their 
areas of jurisdiction.  
The power of local governments to collect taxes can easily cause tensions with 
the taxes collected by the central government. Therefore, careful decisions need 
to be made on whether levies and taxes should be collected locally or centrally. 
There are a few well defined principles for this choice. The most important prin-
ciple is that local taxes should be related to those who benefit from the local ser-
vices that are being financed by the revenue. Another principle is that local gov-
ernment should not levy taxes that cause businesses to adopt inefficient methods 
of doing business that might harm the growth in the local (and national) econ-
omy. And finally, there is the more general principle that local government 
should not levy taxes that impose heavy administration and compliance costs 
(Bahl 1995). 
Despite these general principles, there is yet a uniform agreement among pol-
icy makers about which specific taxes should be assigned to the local govern-
ments (McLure 1994; Oates 1993). There are many forms of local revenues that 
can be raised. These are, for example property taxes, user charges, and fees for 
licenses or other public services. Despite these options, too often, especially in 
the developing countries, the revenues generated from these own-sources fail to 
match the expenditure needs of these local governments (Cheema & Rondinelli 
2007). This is associated with the fact that, local governments commonly use too 
many unproductive revenues and tax bases that are already taxed by the central 
level. In addition, some sources suffer from design flaws, such as stagnant bases, 
complex structures, and ineffective administration.  
To counterbalance these imbalances, local governmental bodies often depend 
on intergovernmental transfers. These transfers also intend to serve redistribution 
objectives, reducing fiscal capacity differences and encouraging expenditure on 
national priority services (Cheema & Rondinelli 2007).  
There are two basic types of intergovernmental transfers: conditional and un-
conditional. In the case of conditional grants, the central government defines, to 
some extent at least, the purpose for which the local governments have to use the 
funds (Oates 1972). This type of grant is considered to encourage expenditure on 
national priorities. Where the grants are unconditional, there are, in contrast, no 
specifications and local governments can employ the grants according to their 
own set of priorities (Oates 1972).  
The importance of these financial transfers determines the actual functioning 
of intergovernmental relations. The most important aspect of decentralisation is, 
therefore, the development of a structure that allows an appropriate mix of differ-
ent sources of revenue for local governments (own-revenues, conditional and un-
conditional transfers) while at the same time ensuring an appropriate balance be-
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tween the degree of local autonomy and central control. More often, the inter-
governmental transfers systems have undermined the local government incen-
tives to raise revenue through taxes, borrowing and so forth (Oates 1972), thus 
lessening the local government autonomy. As a result, the local government be-
comes too dependent of the central governments and the real essence of decen-
tralisation remains at a crossroads. 
 
Theoretical perceptive on financial decentralisation  
Financial decentralisation is the balance between local autonomy on the one hand 
and on the other hand, central control. In this section, we focus on the suitability 
of different local government financing mechanisms and the rationale for replac-
ing the local financing by central financing. As a point of departure, Masgrave 
(Masgrave as cited in Oates 1998: 629) states:  
‘The purpose of government budgets is to stabilise growth, redistribute income, and allocate 
fiscal resources has long been the starting point for discussing the division of fiscal power 
and responsibilities among units of government. The stimulation of economic growth and the 
distribution of income, he argues, are proper budget objectives of the national government. 
The mobility of capital and that of labour rule out local government success with policies in 
other areas. This leaves allocation as the main role for local governments (i.e., the decision 
about how much to spend for each service and how to finance these expenditures). The na-
tional governments, it is said, are closest to the voter-consumers and are in the best position 
to read local preferences for public services and for various kinds of taxes and user charges. 
The proper degree of decentralisation, then, will depend on how the efficiency gains from 
getting government closer to the people compare with the advantages that result from giving 
national governments more discretion to peruse fiscal policy.’  
In view of Masgrave, the transfer of some financial obligations (power and au-
thority) to the local level governments is associated with the limitations of having 
only one level of government perform the function of the public sector finance. 
In this regard, some financial obligations are therefore worth being decentralised 
than being managed centrally. 
From an economical point of view, Oates (1972: 13) provides three desirable 
characteristics of decentralisation in the public sector:  
‘First, decentralization provides a means in which the levels of consumption of some public 
goods can be tailed to the preferences of subsets of the society. In this way, economic effi-
ciency is enhanced by providing an allocation of resources that is more responsive to the test 
of the consumers. Second, by promoting increased innovation over time and by providing 
competitive pressure to induce local governments to adopt the most efficient techniques of 
production, decentralization may increase both static and dynamic efficiency in the produc-
tion of public goods. Third, a system of local governments may provide an institutional set-
ting that promotes better public decision-making by compelling a more explicit recognition 
of the costs of public programs.’ 
This economist point of view is not exceptional. Even non-economists perceive 
that local governments are closer to the people and therefore have a potential ad-
vantage to enhance participation in government, to provide an outcome that is 
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closest to the preferences of the people, and allow the potential process to guar-
antee a more efficient operation of local government (Bahl 1995). In both ways 
of reasoning, the result is the same. The aim is still to provide a mix of services 
that match the demands of local population and furthermore, to make the local 
government officials more accountable to their voters for the quality of services 
they provide. Another aim is to make the local populations become more willing 
to pay for public services, now that their preferences have been taken into ac-
count.  
The challenge that remains is to create a balance in which both the central 
government and the local government can operate without the central govern-
ments taking over control. This is quite an issue in the decentralised system of 
governance. For example, Ribot (2002: 2) argues that 
‘Many central government agents fear, and therefore block, decentralisation. By preventing 
transfers of meaningful powers to local democratic bodies, or transferring them to local 
agents, who are only accountable for the central government and other line ministries, pre-
vent decentralisations from moving forward. As a result, to date the potential benefits of de-
centralisation remain unrealised because government discourse has not resulted in the en-
actment of necessary laws, or where decentralisation laws do exist, they have not been 
implemented.’  
These sources show that it is quite difficult to provide the recipe for the best in-
stitutional arrangement that guarantees successful decentralisation. Instead, it is 
quite often a matter of trial and error: New institutional arrangements follow old 
ones. The case of Tawa Health Centre illustrates this struggle.  
Case of Tawa Health Centre in Morogoro Rural District  
The DbyD policy in Tanzania 
The institutional arrangements in the United Republic of Tanzania have changed 
from a strong position of local governments right after the independence in 1961 
to a de-concentrated system, with a strong position of the central governments 
under the Arusha Declaration of 1967 and the abolishment of the local govern-
ments authorities (LGAs) in 1972. In 1982 these LGAs were re-established 
again, to enhance participation of the people in local development. The final step 
in the development of the intergovernmental relations is the Local Government 
Reform Program of 1998 that aims at reinforcing the role and powers of these 
LGAs. This program is based on the principle of Development by Devolution 
(DbyD). The assumption is that only if local governments are able to make their 
own choices, sustainable development will occur. Within this program, the cen-
tral government has to financially support local initiatives, as laid down in local 
plans (Mollel 2010). The case of Tawa Health Centre shows the real functioning 
of this institutional relation.  
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Tawa Health Centre 
Tawa Health Centre is a primary health facility in Morogoro District. It was es-
tablished in 1958 by community members in support of the government. The 
health centre is situated 74 kilometres from the district headquarters of Moro-
goro. This district is the local government authority that has to formulate the 
preferences for local development.  
The road connecting the health centre and the district headquarters is a dirt 
road. According to the health centre in-charge:  
‘During the rain season, travelling between the health centre and the district headquarters is 
difficult. Most of the cars cannot reach the Tawa area since some parts of the road become 
impassable.’  
The main economic activity in Tawa is agriculture. Most of the people are peas-
ants with a few involved in livestock keeping. The area has also few entrepre-
neurs. The entrepreneurs are involved in running small restaurants and small 
shops. There is also a market place which operates once a week. The market 
place provides opportunity for peasants to sell their farm product in exchange for 
other goods such as cooking oil, kerosene, sugar, salt and the like. 
Tawa Health Centre is located in Tawa village. Tawa village is one of six vil-
lages that form the Tawa ward. All these villages within the ward depend on the 
services of Tawa Health Centre. The ward is the administrative layer within the 
local government authority that has to inform the district on the actual needs and 
preferences. The district then has to incorporate the preferences of all the wards 
in one comprehensive district plan. According to the decentralisation policy, the 
decisions of the central government on granting funds, is based on this document.  
The actual situation in Tawa Health Centre is rather poor. There are many 
shortages. Table 10.1 shows the condition of the health centre in terms of build-
ings, staff and equipment over the years 2000-2008. The far right column shows 
the actual need of the identified items, based on the national standards.  
The table shows that little improvements were observed in areas of staff and 
equipment. There were also minor improvements in buildings, more specifically, 
the painting of dilapidated walls of old buildings. But despite these changes, the 
health centre still faces serious problems. According to the in-charge:  
‘There are great shortages of infrastructure in the health centre. The health centre is not ca-
pable of delivering services that the health centre is required to deliver. For example, we 
have to refer minor surgeries to the regional hospital.’  
The comparison with the national standards confirms this conclusion. Tawa 
Health Centre leaves much to be desired in terms of infrastructural necessities to 
deliver the basic health services. 
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Table 10.1 Infrastructure of Tawa Health Centre between 2000 and 2008 
Service areas Years N.S.* 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
Staff 15 13 11 15 16 15 15 17 18 15 
Buildings            
 Operating rooms 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 15 
 Wards 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 
 Staff quarters  8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 15 
Equipment           
 Autoclave 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
 Delivery kit 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
 Delivery bed 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
 Microscope 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
 Weigh scale 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 
 BP monitor 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 1 4 4 
 Stethoscope 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 4 
 Diagnostic set 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 Ambulance bag 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
* N.S. = National Standards 
 
 
Planning process in general  
To assess the actual decentralisation in Tanzania, one could reconstruct the in-
volvement of the local communities in the decision-making on the granting of 
funds. For this, information was gathered through interviews and group discus-
sion with local community members and public administrators at the district 
level. Furthermore, the plans of the ward were compared to the plan of the dis-
trict council and the actual decisions of the central government.  
The planning process in Tawa village began with training of the village coun-
cils, conducted by the facilitators sent from the district headquarter. The training 
aimed at informing the community members about the process of developing the 
community plan.  
Thereafter, the village council developed a draft of their respective village 
plan. The developed draft was then presented to the village general meeting. In 
the general meetings, community members were given the opportunity to ques-
tion, reject some of the identified development preferences and identify the new 
ones. Subsequently, the final draft of the village plan with development prefer-
ences of the entire community members was developed. The village plan was 
then presented to the ward level, which was compiled and submitted to the dis-
trict headquarters.  
When asked about the actual involvement in this planning process, it became 
clear that the members of the community, who attended the meetings in which 
the plans were adopted, were neither aware of the planning process nor the con-
tent of the community plan. Even at the ward level, where the local plans were 
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compromised, the public servant had no idea of what was contained in the village 
plan. No one could mention one development preference identified regarding 
Tawa Health Centre.  
 
Tawa Health Centre in the planning process  
It is interesting to search for the actual preferences in the planning process re-
garding Tawa Health Centre. After all, one could observe some changes over the 
years. The relevant question is therefore: Are these changes the result of the use 
of the decentralised planning process, or are there other valid mechanisms?  
 
The content of the village plan  
The plan of Tawa village showed that some of the development preferences re-
lated to shortages of the health centre infrastructure that were incorporated into 
the community plan. Such development preferences were those related to build-
ings and staff. No development preferences related to equipment were observed 
in the plan.  
 
Table 10.2 Preferences of Tawa Health Centre in the village plan 
1. Construction of staff houses  
2. Construction of the building for Mother and Child Health (MCH) services 
3. Adequate staff 
4. One Public Health Nurse  
 
 
None of the respondents at the grassroots level had any idea about these prefer-
ences in the community plan. In this regard, it was not possible to get clarifica-
tion about unclear contents of the plan.  
 
Planning at council level 
As stated before, the local plans are the input for the Comprehensive Council 
Health Plan (CCHP), adopted by the District Council. This CCHP forms the base 
of the national Comprehensive Council Development Plan and budget (CCDPB).  
The account of the head of health department at the district council shows that 
the development preferences incorporated into the CCHP are those identified by 
the grassroots people. The head of department said that the CCHP is developed 
based on information received from the grassroots or collected by the CHMT 
members. He argued that 
‘Before 2000, most development decisions were done at the district headquarters, but after 
the reform every development activity has to originate from the grassroots level.’  
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Contrary to this account, the district health secretary stated that the information 
used to develop the CCHP is collected by the Council Health Management Team 
(CHMT). This CHMT is the group of public servants working at the district level 
that have direct contact with the in-charges of the facilities in the district. They 
gather information through quarterly reports and request letters received from the 
in-charges of the primary health facilities.  
According to head of economics departments of the district, in most cases, the 
development preferences received through community plans are similar to those 
received through other methods, such as the quarterly reports. In this view, it is 
not necessary to use the community plan for the decision-making at the district 
level, since the data gathered through other means is just as adequate.  
The statement that community plans are not always useful was confirmed by 
other public servants involved in the planning procedure at the district level. 
There are four reasons. Firstly the national guidelines provide the same priorities 
that must be included in the CCHP. Secondly, the budget ceilings which are de-
veloped centrally have less consideration of the actual development preferences 
identified at the grassroots level. Thirdly, the frequent changes of national priori-
ties confuse courses of action undertaken at the local level. And fourthly there are 
simply too little funds compared to actual development preferences received 
from the grassroots. These factors make the planning process a routine activity 
with little input to the actual development preferences of the grassroots people.  
 
Content of council plan in relation to Tawa Health Centre infrastructure  
To check whether or not the village plan has, indeed, little impact, the content of 
the village plan was compared with the CCHP. A first indication of the relevance 
of this plan was the fact that the community plan of Tawa village was found 
shelved in the economics department, with no sign of being used. It was under-
neath the old box, full of dust.  
The CCHP was reviewed to establish the development preferences related to 
Tawa Health Centre infrastructure. The reviewed CCHP was for the financial 
years 2005/2006, 2006/2007 and 2007/2008. These financial years cover the 
similar period as with the community plan of Tawa village.  
The three CCHPs showed that the development preferences identified in the 
community plan of Tawa village were not reflected in the council plan. The issue 
of staff included in one of the CCHP was not specific to Tawa Health Centre. It 
was stated in a general term, which made it illogical to link with the health staff 
needs, contained in the plan of Tawa. This issue of staff in the CCHP was pre-
sented as ‘support deployment and re-deployment of health workers’.  
If one compares the preferences stated by the community (table 10.2) with the 
actual decisions as stated in the CCHP (table 10.3) it becomes clear that the is-
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sues identified by the district are not based on the community plan of Tawa vil-
lage. According to the district health secretary, the issues in the CCHP are based 
on the information gathered through quarterly visits, request letters from the in-
charge and support supervision visits made by public servants of the district.  
 
Table 10.3 Development decisions in the council plans related to Tawa Health Centre  
1. Restore and equip VCT services in Tawa Health Centre 
2. Install grilled doors and windows in Tawa Health Centre  
3. Conduct maintenance of Tawa Health Centre ambulance  
4. Procure office equipment and supplies for Tawa Health Centre 
5. Procure and supplies dental equipment for Tawa Health Centre  
6. Purchase and install solar panels and accessories for Radio calls installation in Tawa Health
Centre  
7. Conduct wiring and install generator electric supply to Tawa Health Centre  
8. Restore Tawa Health Centre 
9. Purchase binocular microscope for Tawa health Centre 
 
 
Why are local wishes ignored?  
The question remains why the planning process does not function as intended. To 
gather an answer to this question, several officials were interviewed. According 
to these respondents, the Comprehensive Council Health Plan is mainly based on 
the ‘Medium Terms Plans and Budgets’ guidelines and other sectoral priorities, 
including annually set budget ceilings.1 In view of these officials, such guidelines 
not only limit the development preferences identified at the grassroots level to be 
incorporated into council plan but also restricted the choices that could be made. 
For example, one official pointed out that:  
‘Planning beyond ceiling and national priorities was only possible if the council has its own 
resources to implement. But our council is poorly resourced.’  
It appears from this statement that the development preference identified by the 
grassroots people depends largely on the central government transfers. According 
to the district executive director, the central government transfers in Morogoro 
District are more than 85% of the total budget of Morogoro District. The district 
executive director added that most of the central government transfers are ac-
companied by guidelines which limit the council discretion to allocate such re-
sources on the basis of the actual situation in the ground.  
As one example in 2005/2006, Morogoro District council qualified for the De-
velopment Grant and Funds.2 The Development Grant and Funds include the so-
                                                 
2. At the time of this study, the available version of guideline was the one reviewed in 2007. 
3. The council must meet the minimum access condition to qualify for the Development Grant and 
Funds. 
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called Joint Health Infrastructure Rehabilitation Fund (JHIRF) which has been 
categorised specifically for improvement of health facilities infrastructure. De-
spite the seemingly broad scope of expenditures, the JHIRF was actually directed 
to the construction of new dispensaries in every village. This was not part of the 
council plan, but was only a political directive of the central government, that 
stated that health facilities should be accessible in every village.  
These political directives paralyse most of the planned development prefer-
ences, as stated in community plans and district plans. There is no specific 
budget set for these political wishes, expressed by the central government. In-
stead, district councils and, actually, any other institution involved in the plan-
ning process is required by all means possible to address it. As a result, the local 
wishes are ignored.  
Many of the interviewed senior officials perceive these directives as more po-
litical and less realistic. These respondents pointed out that most of primary 
health facilities in the district already have shortages of equipment, staff and 
buildings. Increasing a number of health facilities is like complicating the already 
existing problems, since the available limited resources have to be pulled from 
strengthening the available ones to the new ones. ‘The best strategy would have 
been first to strengthen the available ones’, said one of the senior officials. ‘The 
top-down development directive frustrates council decisions-making’, argued 
another official.  
In situations where the central government directs local governments to im-
plement an unplanned programme, the community participation difficulties are 
hampered. Mostly, the district council had to try harder to make local people un-
derstand the relevance of the decisions and to comply or contribute. Sometimes, 
the council had to use some form of coercion in order to get people to participate. 
Thus, ‘instead of accelerating development activities, local initiatives were con-
fused’ said the official.  
According to senior officials, another constraining factor to the planning proc-
ess is the bureaucratic procedure. This leaves little discretion to the council to 
deviate from guidelines and directives. One senior official argued that 
‘the council budget must be approved by the regional secretariat. They call it advisory, but 
my friend! When you are advised and you refuse to incorporate such advice into the plan, the 
regional secretariat has its own way of communicating to the central government to make 
sure you get stuck.’ 
In this view, it appears that the central government has a great influence on the 
development decisions undertaken at the local level.  
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Infrastructural improvement made at Tawa Health Centre  
Despite the malfunctioning of the planning process, we did see some changes 
that can be related to the preferences as expressed by the local community. The 
data in table 10.1 shows that the main infrastructural improvements made at the 
health centre were renovation, addition of three staff members and equipping the 
health centre with one delivery bed and two blood pressure machines. 
 
Unplanned improvements 
According to the respondents, some of the improvements made at the health cen-
tre, like the painting of the walls, were due to the Uhuru Torch Race. The Uhuru 
Torch Race is a national event whereby the Uhuru Torch, a national symbol of 
Tanzania, is raced to different parts of the country with a government message 
(development slogan) for that particular year. Normally, preparations are made in 
areas earmarked for the race. One of the preparations was that of the painting of 
the walls of Tawa Health Centre and some other minor improvements. The gen-
eral idea was that these renovations would not have been made at the health cen-
tre if the Uhuru Torch Race was not directed to Tawa village.  
According to the health centre in-charge, the major development problems of 
Tawa Health Centre were: The lack of the building for Mother and Child Health 
(MCH), the lack of a laboratory, the lack of a theatre and inadequate staff houses. 
As noted earlier, some of these problems were identified through the community 
plan of Tawa village. Regarding staff houses, the in-charge said that staff houses 
in Tawa are important because the area has no houses for rent. At the time of this 
study, the eighteen staff shared eight available apartments. ‘This is not a good 
situation for our staff’, said the health centre in-charge.  
 
Administrative relations 
Another mechanism that influences the actual development, is related to the ad-
ministrative relations between the officials at the facility level and the district of-
ficials. As mentioned before, the in-charge has to report about the actual state of 
the facility and the needs. According to the health centre in-charge, this proce-
dure is actually the most important means to improve the facility. For those that 
can be dealt with at the grassroots level, the village council is only informed to 
support the process.  
‘The health centre development’s preferences are forwarded to the district 
headquarters or village council in the form of letters’, said the health centre in-
charge. He further added that to ensure that the forwarded development prefer-
ences were acted up on, follow-ups should be made through reminder letters or 
physically visiting the district headquarters or village council.  
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The development preferences, expressed in the form of letters, are accompanied 
by quarterly report and Health Management Information System (HMIS) forms. 
According to the health centre in-charge, the infrastructural needs of the health 
centre are also forwarded to the district headquarters through quarterly reports 
and HMIS forms. These are the means in which development references about 
the health centre are obtained at the district headquarters and incorporated into 
the Comprehensive Council Health Plan (CCHP), said the health centre in-
charge.  
 
Questions  
1. Which actors in the intergovernmental relation are as described in the case of Tawa Health 
Centre?  
2. Give a brief overview of the theory underlying the DbyD policy. What do you think is the 
main reason for this decentralisation policy?  
3. To which extent does the case of Tawa Health Centre reflect the intergovernmental relation 
as prescribed in the policy of DbyD?  
4. What do you think should be changed in the intergovernmental relation to reinforce this 
DbyD policy? Identify also the weaknesses of any of your recommendations.  
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Staffing 
Hamisi K. Kiyabo 
Introduction 
Public policy has to be implemented by organisations. The success or failure of 
implementation of policy is therefore dependent on the functioning of these or-
ganisations. In general, one ought to imagine an organisation as a group of indi-
viduals. Hence, the functioning of organisations depends on these social interac-
tions within this group. A specific social interaction within organisations is the 
interaction between the manager and the subordinates. Managers have many in-
struments at their disposal to steer their employees. They have to decide on who 
they wish to hire, to fire, to promote, and on how they will control and correct 
their subordinates. These decisions are essential for the functioning of all organi-
sations.  
These decisions are not specific for organisations in the public sphere. What is 
special is that in public organisations, these decisions are quite often more regu-
lated, to protect the public organisations from favouritism or nepotism. Both  
favouritism and nepotism are a threat for the public interest.  
This chapter focuses on the way public organisations protect themselves 
against such threats of abuse of power. The concept is the ‘merit system’ as a 
management tool to make management decisions. The question that can be raised 
is whether or not this merit system functions in public organisations and if not, 
what are the real arguments for managers in public organisations to make their 
decisions?  
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Merit system 
Human relations  
Although it is difficult to state precisely when the human relations movement be-
gan, most studies show that the earliest developments emerged in the mid-1800s. 
At the beginning of the movement, the centre of attention was mainly on improv-
ing efficiency, motivation, and productivity. Later on, this research became more 
involved in redefining the nature of work and perceiving workers as complex 
human beings, not like other commodities that could be bought, sold or even 
fired at any time.  
Before starting advancement in technology, most individual craft workers used 
to work on a product from the beginning till the finalisation. Due to the Industrial 
Revolution in the mid 1800s labour became a commodity or another item in the 
manufacturing equation like raw materials and capital. In an industrialised proc-
ess, employees did not have special skills. They were more or less exchangeable. 
Worse still, hours were long and pay was low. Employers did not realise how 
workers’ needs normally affected productivity.  
In this environment, a scientific approach towards the use of labour emerged. 
One of the major proponents was Frederick Taylor, who is regarded as a father of 
the concept of ‘scientific management’. One important feature of the concept of 
scientific management is that productivity could be improved by breaking down 
a job into isolated, specialised tasks and assigning each of those tasks to specific 
workers.  
The automobile industry was one of the famous examples where scientific 
management was implemented. Instead of one employee who was responsible for 
the entire process, assembly lines appeared. Employees were only responsible for 
assembling parts of the car. Meanwhile a new caste appeared: The managers that 
had to supervise and control the entire process of the assembly. As a result, the 
social relations within the firm, between management and employees changed 
dramatically due to the scientific approach of labour. Individual performances of 
employees were generally becoming more visible. Skills that needed training 
were rather limited to just those skills needed on that spot of the assembly line.  
 
Organisation performance 
The success of the organisation can be measured on the base of the organisation 
performance. Organisation performance is not a precisely defined concept (Ther-
kildsen & Tidemand 2007). Spontaneously, the performance of an organisation 
in practice is related to its capacity to deliver basic goods and services, as well as 
the ability to provide a suitable policy and regulatory environment for develop-
ment to take place. With this concept, there is a direct link between organisa-
tional capacity and its performance. Therefore, staff, their merits, motivation and 
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the ways they are managed in a specific organisational context, are crucial to that 
linkage. To illustrate this Therikildsen & Tidemand (2007: 20) use a motorcar 
metaphor:  
‘(…) we maintain a car’s engine, chassis, brakes, tyres, etc. – its capacity – because we value 
safe and reliable transportation – the car’s performance. Lack of fuel, bad roads and poor 
maintenance quickly affect a car’s performance and may eventually destroy its capacity to 
deliver transportation at all. In organisations, the contributions of staff to work are likewise 
part of the capacity (engine) that helps to produce organisational outputs (transportation), but 
only if the environment (road) enables it.’  
Performance should be measured by the results that an organisation produces, 
although it is practically difficult to attain accurate information for measurement 
purposes. One option that can help to measure the results is to focus on simple 
temporary results or internal processes that are widely accepted to be precondi-
tions for outputs.  
 
Merit staffing 
From the perspective of the assembly line, or the organisation as a whole, it is 
clear that the decisions of those on management positions are crucial for the per-
formance of the organisation. Decisions on hiring, firing and promoting are some 
of the instruments that the management has at its disposal. From a rational point 
of view, suiting the scientific management approach, these decisions have to be 
based on merit principles. Only those with the adequate skills and qualities have 
to be appointed and promoted. Those with less quality should be fired.  
From this starting point organisations develop their management systems. The 
management systems based on merit can be divided into ‘career systems’ and 
‘position based systems’. In career systems, the objective is to ensure that initial 
entry to the civil service is based on the knowledge of the candidates, generally 
indicated by a relevant university degree or academic credentials (Therkildsen & 
Tidemand 2007). Subsequent mobility and promotion allow movement within 
the civil service. In position-based systems the emphasis is placed on selecting 
the best-suited candidate for each position to be filled, whether by external re-
cruitment or via internal promotion or mobility. On the other side, the closed ca-
reer systems make appointments through promotion from within the civil service. 
However, the position-based systems allow more open access, with lateral entry 
being relatively common.  
The merit based staffing can be assessed in two ways. Narrowly considered, it 
typically includes educational qualifications and work experience. But, if it is 
broadly defined, merit typically includes criteria like professionalism, integrity, 
and political impartiality (Therkildsen & Tidemand 2007). These concepts 
should be used without unnecessary rigidity. 
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Trust and patronage 
When one thinks through the model of merit, it becomes clear that it has its dis-
advantages. Using employees as a tool within the organisation and hiring and fir-
ing on the base of performances does create a sphere of mistrust. It might even 
cause revolt among the employees who feel unrewarded. This can ultimately 
hamper the performance of the entire organisation. Therefore, from the perspec-
tive of the manager, sometimes it is better to invest in human relations instead of 
the performances of the subordinates. Human relations are based on trust: Mutual 
trust from the manager and the employee. Trust can pay off in the long term. Hir-
ing and promoting on the base of trust ensures the manager of support from his 
subordinates.  
A government operating under diverse and often conflicting conditions has es-
pecially good reasons to look for staff that are both loyal and sympathetic to its 
visions and are a part of relevant networks. This might even oust the more ra-
tional criteria of education and skills. With these requirements, staffing is more 
based on patronage than on merit. It has a rationale since it ensures support; both 
for the manager and (sometimes) for the public policy. Nevertheless, the negative 
connotation is also clear: Patronage has the danger that it results in hiring mar-
ginally qualified people, waste and corruption; and the potential loss of certain 
constitutional rights by employees (Roback & Vinzant 1994). 
Despite this negative connotation, patronage is not always that bad. For exam-
ple, the staffing of the US government officials and the White House personnel 
are based on patronage. This, in return, ensures support from various stake-
holders. Patronage comes in several shapes and sizes and can impact a personnel 
system in a number of ways. This includes dismissal, hiring, promotion, recall or 
transfer of public employees on the basis of sponsorship by a patron; rather than 
through neutral competition among candidates based on their competence, abili-
ties and qualifications. Thompson (as cited by Roback & Vinzant 1994) classi-
fied political patronage into two broad levels: The first level is ‘partisan spoils’ 
which involves dismissing current employees and appointing party-supported 
candidates, primarily on the basis of party membership and political connections, 
in order to maintain the electoral machine that awarded supporters and lead to 
possible electoral victory. The second level is ‘leadership politics’ which focuses 
on top policy positions so as to place loyal people, with an intention to promote 
bureaucratic accountability and responsiveness to the agenda of the elected offi-
cials, in leadership positions.  
In this context, Roback & Vinzant (1994) assert that the more high level posi-
tions the elected officials can fill with their people, the greater the chances of in-
fluencing the career bureaucracy.  
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 Hence, the tension between merit and trust is obvious. There are arguments to 
found the management system of a public organisation on merit, though there are 
also convincing arguments and incentives to use trust as a main base for man-
agement decisions. The case of Kilimahali District illustrates this tension.  
Staffing at Kilamahili District 
Open Performance Review and Appraisal System (OPRAS) 
The main management tool in governmental organisations in Tanzania is the 
Open Performance Review and Appraisal System (OPRAS). OPRAS is a tool 
which is used in all public service institutions to assess performance of an indi-
vidual employee by aligning the objectives of the individual employee with that 
of the department/division/ unit/section and to the objectives of the organisation. 
OPRAS replaced the Closed Annual Confidential Report System (CACRS) 
which was used before in order to assess the performance of employees in the 
public service institutions (Bana 2009). 
This system attempts to link increased managerial freedom with increased em-
phasis on outputs. OPRAS is categorised to be based on the principles of the 
merit system since only measured output and performance can be used when 
making management decisions. This requires public organisations, managers and 
employees to work to performance targets and output objectives that define indi-
vidual tasks. Rewards for performance can then be linked to achievements of in-
dividual employees. OPRAS links performance review to tenure, promotion and 
other processes, which have previously been the means by which staff have had 
their performance evaluated. The system evaluates performance against objec-
tives.  
Clearly stated, OPRAS is a management by objectives system which is under-
taken on an annual cycle. Normally, it involves a planning and a review phase. It 
requires a plan to be agreed by the staff member and the supervisor in an open 
discussion. Each member of the staff has to set his key result areas and perform-
ance objectives. Key performance indicators have to be formulated to measure 
performance against objectives in the key result areas.  
In order to bring out the expected results of OPRAS, there must be a review 
phase in which a formal assessment of annual performance is made and in which 
an identification of staff development needs and resource commitments are also 
made. At the end of the cycle, the organisation manager uses the assessment of 
performance to inform ‘performance related decisions’ about performance pay, 
incremental progression, promotion and unsatisfactory performance. 
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Kilamahali District 
Kilamahali District is among the oldest but backward councils in Tanzania in 
terms of service provision. This district copes with a severe scarceness of means. 
Kilamahali is highly dependent on central government and donors’ contributions 
in its recurrent and development expenditures. The council has a total of 2041 
employees that includes the Council Director, Heads of Departments, Office Su-
pervisors and other staff at operational levels. The council started to implement 
OPRAS since 2004. For the aim of this study 102 employees from all cadres 
were interviewed to assess the effects of the merit-based OPRAS system. The 
actual impact of OPRAS and its merit system is described in Mr Bopa’s point of 
view: 
 
Mr Bopa  
Mr Bopa is the Principal Human Resource Officer who is a vested legal power in 
ensuring that all employees at the district are working to their optimal capacity 
while making effective utilisation of scarce resources. Apart from remuneration, 
Mr Bopa is aware that staffing by basing on merit principles has great contribu-
tion towards boosting staff morale and commitment. Within this area, we see 
how the merit principles are also considered throughout his conduct in relation to 
OPRAS management, hiring, firing, transfer and promotion of staff at the council 
level. 
Mr Bopa, as employing officer, said that the staff’s views on OPRAS were 
ambiguous. Some of them indicated that management decisions based on per-
formance is sometimes ‘unfair’. This dissatisfaction is most clearly expressed by 
employees who perform below average. Perhaps OPRAS, therefore, is most suit-
able to employees who already do relatively well, and is unsuitable to poor per-
forming employees who regard OPRAS as part of western culture that has noth-
ing to do with African culture.  
On the other hand, Mr Bopa pointed that the reward of well performing staff is 
an acceptable principle. However, one of the complaints about the OPRAS is 
precisely that it is not (yet) clearly linked to a system of individual rewards. The 
main problem with performance management from a staff point of view is one of 
‘fairness’ in the size of rewards offered and in the credibility and trust in the sys-
tems used to assess staff performance. Mr Bopa revealed that such views some-
times reduce employees’ morale to do better in their work.  
Management decisions 
Hiring of staff 
Mr Bopa said that human resource management (HRM) in the public sectors of 
Tanzania is in transition from a previously fairly centralised system to a more de-
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centralised one. This contributes to fairly complex HRM-systems in all local au-
thorities including Kilamahali council. On the side of recruiting (hiring) local 
government staff, the task is simple compared to private sectors since most staff 
consider the public sector as a realistic option. Although almost all of them com-
plain about the poor pay in the public service, they still work there since job se-
curity in the private sector is regarded as poor. This is, of course, well known. 
Poor staff management in private firms often magnifies this insecurity. Most 
companies are owned and run by one person or family. Employees are therefore 
directly dependent on their personal relationship to the owners for their job secu-
rity. The absence of strong labour unions amplifies the insecurity hence most 
staff do not prefer to work in private sectors.  
The demands on worker’s time are regarded as higher in the private sector 
than in the public sector. Nearly all employees (96%) who had worked in the pri-
vate sector earlier, revealed that pay in relation to demand is often more favour-
able in the public sector. The female staff regarded this as a major advantage as it 
gave them better ways to attend to their families and children and sometimes 
gave them access to networks of influential people (and potential customers) who 
could be very useful in running their private economic businesses while in public 
service. Employees, under Mr Bopa’s management, enjoy such a clear attraction 
of public sector employment. 
 Talking on the merit principle for organisational performance, Mr Bopa men-
tioned that the criteria for assessing merit in hiring employees’ were based on the 
staff’s personal experiences and academic qualifications. The vacant posts were 
to be advertised and open for all qualified and interested candidates. Mr Bopa 
and his subordinate were to shortlist the applicants, based on their experience and 
qualifications, and then would arranged for interviews. Those who were success-
ful in the interviews were then to be offered employment at Kilamahali council. 
The study realised that only 57% of employees who were interviewed said that 
they received their job based on written applications. They said that some staff 
were hired on the basis of favouritism and some of them didn’t not even apply 
through the normal procedures. Sometimes, the vacant posts were not on time 
and ineffectively filled. For instance, 52% of all responded staff disagreed with 
the statement that ‘vacant posts are filled timely and effectively’. Such practices 
discouraged them to work hard since most of the favoured employees were also 
given supervisory positions as soon as they were hired and when vacancies were 
reported to the management, it took a long time to be filled, and when filled, they 
were accompanied by favouritism. Mr Bopa was said to be the source of such 
evil, especially by favouring his relatives and frequently, the elected officials and 
councillors filled the vacant positions with their people who mostly held supervi-
sory positions, regardless of their levels of education and experience. 
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When the question of why Mr Bopa did not or did not always use the merit 
system when hiring staff was raised, the answer was simply that he was inter-
fered by the elected officials (councillors) and other top officials. Sometimes, 
even executive officials from the central ministries interfered by attaching 
‘memos’ instructing Mr Bopa to consider their candidates during interviews and 
even offering them direct employment at the council. Mr Bopa was not the only 
one who was choosing the people who were to be employed and who were not to 
be employed. Apart from political influences, at the end of the process, it was the 
council that made the decisions, based on the proposals of Mr Bopa.  
Mr Bopa even mentioned an example from 2006 where the council rejected 
his proposal just because he did not include the names of those candidates that 
some councillors, including the mayor, wanted to put forward for direct employ-
ment, though they did not possess the required minimum entry qualifications. Mr 
Bopa was totally embarrassed in that meeting and some councillors went as far as 
to accusing him of corruption because of some of the candidates that he proposed 
to be employed. What Mr Bopa suggested here is that the government is sup-
posed to take measures to reduce the political influence in hiring, firing, transfers 
and promotion of staff. 
 
Firing of staff 
Mr Bopa admitted that the loss of staff through death (mainly by HIV/AIDS) is 
five times greater than through retirement. Thus, the pandemic already had a ma-
jor impact on HRM in the public and private sectors. However, Mr Bopa was 
blamed for taking disciplinary actions and sometimes firing those who misbe-
haved. Employees were more critical of the way that staff discipline was  
managed. About 41% agreed with the statement: ‘nonperformers are rarely disci-
plined,’ just as they express some dissatisfaction with the timeliness and effec-
tiveness of disciplinary measures.  
In this aspect, Mr Bopa admitted that he had a hard time in taking corrective 
measures against disgruntled employees; especially if they were relatives of his 
own, of the councillors or other top government officials. He openly said that 
even when the grounds were clear for sacking such employees, it became very 
difficult to do so for fear of been victimised for his position by the political offi-
cials. The worst thing with this contention was that the hard working employees 
got disappointed and even discouraged to work hard in their positions. As though 
that was not enough, the hard working employees – who, incidentally, had no po-
litical or top officials to defend them – got easily victimised and fired for even 
very minor mistakes compared to non-performers.  
 Some employees who were interviewed told an interesting story about how 
disciplinary matters were dealt with under Mr Bopa. In June 2007 and September 
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2008, three Mtaa Executive Officers and one Account Assistant were dismissed 
from work simply because they were so strict in keeping to their work’s ethics 
that they refused to misuse the resources for the benefits of the councillors and 
some political officials. To make matters worse, in May 2009, two Revenue Col-
lectors were awarded and promoted for being the best performers in the council, 
simply because they were submitting 50% of their daily collections to a certain 
top decision-maker of the council without missing even a single day in a year.  
 
Transfers of staff 
Mr Bopa stated clearly that transfer of staff is implemented within the council on 
merit basis as a tool to improve performance of individuals and the council at 
large. In some cases, individual staff may ask for transfers on basis of health and 
family problems, such as joining their spouses or living near medical centres for 
treatment. Of the staff, less than 49% indicated that they had been transferred. 
The rest indicated that they had not yet been transferred from their duty stations 
since they were first employed. The transferees experienced this less than twice 
during their work life and they were more often transferred by the authorities 
than on the basis of their own request. 
Mr Bopa said that the transfer of employees is normally done to make them 
not be used in one place for too many years, something which may reduce their 
efficiency and effectiveness in performance. This statement could bring more 
value if a good number of employees could support Mr Bopa’s statement that 
transfer of employees is done on merit basis.  
Opposing to this statement, a good number of interviewed employees com-
plained that there is favouritism and nepotism in transferring employees. Staff 
who provide something and those who are well known by the top officials, as 
well as by Mr Bopa, are transferred to good town centres and those who have no 
referees are normally placed in the peripherals of the council. Therefore, most 
staff members were not sure why Mr Bopa chose to leave some employees at the 
same work station for more than five years while others were transferred from 
one work station to another every two or three years while benefiting from trans-
fer and disturbance allowances.  
 
Promotion of staff 
Mr Bopa is the person responsible for the promotion of staff at the council. Also 
promotion, according to Mr Bopa, depends on the performance of the individual 
employees. Such performance is measured through OPRAS. Mr Bopa said that 
there are many challenges in the process of promoting staff basing on Open Per-
formance Appraisal System. Approximately 34% among 102 interviewed staff 
revealed that they have been promoted more than twice in their careers since 
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their first appointment at Kilamahali council. However, they stated that their 
promotions were based mostly on seniority and time they stayed at the council 
and that most of them were not aware of OPRAS as a tool for performance ap-
praisal. This again attracted more attention in finding out more about OPRAS in 
relation to promotion. 
A major objective of performance appraisal through OPRAS is to link the 
goals of the employee with the goals and mission of their work unit, and through 
the work unit, to the overall mission of the organisation. This objective seems to 
be a complex process, requiring a lot of competency and skill. Because of this 
complexity, the organisation should provide training to develop the competency 
required and encourage members to participate in the program so as to attain the 
expected outcome of OPRAS. 
 
Based on the detailed talk with Mr Bopa, it became clear that the implementation 
of OPRAS at Kilamahali council was difficult due to a number of reasons. One 
of the reasons was the organisational inertia: The council demanded too much 
and the timing was not appropriate. The second reason was associated with coor-
dination failures: Inability to tie the right activities together to produce results. 
Plans were not comprehensible and even responsible people were not able to fa-
cilitate coordination of efforts. The third reason had to do with integration fail-
ures. Some activities did not come together at the end and were not aligned cor-
rectly to unit targets. OPRAS did not reflect what one was routinely doing, 
including in the job description. Finally, there was a lack of skills and a lack of 
supervision. Employees were not doing the right things, according to the direc-
tives that were given to them by their supervisors.  
Apart from Mr Bopa’s revelation, a large number of staff said openly that they 
normally heard from other people that the performance of employees was to be 
assessed using OPRAS but that they had never used to OPRAS before at all. 
Some of them said that they found it very difficult when they were told to fill out 
the OPRAS form without guidance from their supervisors who seemed to have 
no or very little knowledge on how to make OPRAS operate the way it was in-
tended. An interesting question here is: ‘how was merit based promotion done at 
the council if those who are supposed to use and to supervise the use of OPRAS 
did not know how to set assessment standards for their subordinates?’ 
 On the other side, Mr Bopa was blamed for demoting some staff on question-
able grounds. Nearly 13% indicated having experienced a demotion or having 
been delayed a promotion due to bureaucratic and politicking the promotion pro-
cedures. Instead of working to maximise their output for public interests, the de-
moted staff showed signs of mistrust for Mr Bopa and his team and they had little 
or no morale to work at all. This resulted in a decline of organisation perform-
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ance as well as service delivery to the public. At the end, the public resources 
failed to benefit the majority rather than being confiscated by the few who were 
directly linked to Mr Bopa’s channel. 
 
Conclusion 
With this picture, we get to know how OPRAS is managed at Kilamahali Dis-
trict. One can be convinced that the public sector reform programs implemented 
across Africa, such as OPRAS, are based on the assumption that all public or-
ganisations’ cultures are inefficient. This assumption is problematic and has had 
significant implications for policy implementation. By failing to recognise that 
not all western imported cultures can easily be adapted in Africa, we ignore any 
potential lessons that could have been learnt from the experiences of organisa-
tions that have managed to perform better under the same African social, politi-
cal, economic and institutional environment, and from the organisations that have 
failed to perform better after trying to adapt Western style of management pro-
grams. It should be known that the performance of an organisation is influenced 
by the culture within the organisation – which results from the ways in which or-
ganisations adapt to their external environment and the ways they ensure internal 
integration. Some organisations develop cultures that support, encourage and re-
ward high performance; whereas others adopt a culture that perpetuates poor per-
formance. Thus, public-sector reforms must be viewed as changing, or in some 
cases sustaining, organisational culture. 
 
Questions 
1. Explain the advantages and disadvantages of both a management system based on merit and 
a management system based on trust.  
2. To which extent does OPRAS reflect the merit system or the trust system? 
3. To which extent do the decisions made by Mr Bopa reflect the merit system?  
4. What do you think is be the best way to make OPRAS work in situations similar to Mr 
Bopa’s organisation? 
5. If favouritism and nepotism form part of a patronage system that limit the implementation of 
the merit based system,what then, in your opinion, can be a right approach that Mr Bopa 
could have used? 
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Leadership  
Cliford J. Ringo 
‘Since people tend to follow those who, in their view, offer them a means of satisfying their 
own personal goals, the more managers understand what motivates their subordinates and 
how these motivations operate, and more they reflect this understanding in carrying out their 
managerial actions, the more effective they are likely to be as leaders.’ (Koonts & Weihrich 
1984) 
Introduction 
An organisation is almost, by definition, built up of sub-units. These sub-units 
can have many names: Departments, sections, divisions or even districts. The 
larger the organisation grows, the more the need of coordination between the 
functional and geographical sub-units of the organisation. The need of coordina-
tion within organisations requires unusual qualities of inspiration and direction 
within the management of these organisations. This has triggered a new emphasis 
on leadership as being one of the major administrative skills in organisations 
(Pfiffner & Presthus 1960).  
Leadership is a principal mean of overcoming program fragmentation and cor-
recting the weaknesses of any organisation. According to Wart (2008: 23), lead-
ership is a complex process involving numerous, fundamentally different types of 
act:  
‘Leadership is technical competence and achieving results, working with and through people, 
making sure that the organisation is in alignment with the environment, and making sure 
there is appropriate and consistent adherence to the organisation’s norms.’ 
This chapter is on leadership styles and focuses especially on the factors that 
make a leadership style effective. Every organisation differs when it comes to its 
values and goals. The most effective style of leadership involves having to adopt 
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to these different characteristics. In this chapter, the concepts of leadership styles 
are firstly explained, then they are illustrated by taking the case of Monoko.  
Leadership styles 
Management and leadership  
Leadership and management are two different concepts. Management and man-
agers are more or less a formal indication of the group of people responsible for 
managing an organisation. Leadership is something else: It is the substantive 
quality of these people to be able to lead the organisation (Gupta 2009; Shafritz 
et al. 2009). Leadership is not restricted to just these groups of officials. Koonts 
& Weihrich (2007: 313) point out that every group of people that performs near 
its full capacity has some person as its head who is skilled in the art of leader-
ship. These skills seems to be a compound of at least four major ingredients: (1) 
the ability to use power effectively and in a responsible manner, (2) the ability to 
comprehend that human beings have differing motivation forces at different 
times and in different situations, (3) the ability to inspire, and (4) the ability to act 
in a manner that will develop a climate conducive to responding to and arousing 
motivations. 
 
Effective leadership 
The question on how to ensure effective leadership in both private and public or-
ganisations is widely discussed in literature on management and administrative 
studies. The answer is quite often a categorisation of styles of leadership. Differ-
ent authors come up with different categories of these leadership styles. The 
categorisation can use different variables. Wart (2008) sees the characteristics of 
the followers being led and the nature of the work being performed as two vari-
ables that result in different leadership styles. If the followers are more profes-
sional and the work that has to be done is not easy to reconstruct, the leadership 
style is almost by definition more reluctant and based on motivation. After all, 
the leader is not capable of re-doing the job his subordinates have to do.  
In the situation where the followers don’t have specific skills and are in prin-
ciple more exchangeable, the work will be better controllable. The style of lead-
ership in these situations can, and will be, more of command-and-control.  
This dichotomy is relevant, regardless the public or private nature of the or-
ganisation. After all, both public organisations and private organisations can pro-
duce mass produced articles. Granting drivers licenses or passports is not that 
complex. Producing a car in mass production is, at least, not less complex.  
The difference between public and private organisations is relevant when it 
comes to the instruments and goals used by the leader. In private organisations, 
contracts are often used as a mechanism, whereas market-driven needs and prof-
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its are seen as motivation goals. In a public organisation, the legal use of force is 
the main instrument and the motivation goals are serving the public interest. 
These are two factors that will affect the leadership style. In a public organisation 
there is limited room for using financial incentives. Well, at least not at the same 
level as a private organisation.  
One could put these factors in a causal-chain model that analyse the effects of 
the leadership styles. In this model, the leadership style is the independent vari-
able. According to Wart (2008), leadership styles include all behavioural vari-
ables exhibited by the leader. The effect of each of the leadership style (the de-
pendent variable) is determined by the intervening variables of the ‘contingency 
factors’.  
 
Figure 12.1  A generic causal-chain model of leadership 
  
 
 
The effects of leadership styles depend on the contingency factors. There are 
many contingency factors that can affect the leadership. The most important fac-
tors are related to characteristics of the organisation. The leadership style de-
pends on, for example, the role of each and every member of the organisation and 
their tasks. Another factor is the structure of the organisation and the question of 
whether or not the exact powers within this organisation are clear. A second 
group of factors is related to the tasks of the organisation: What is it exactly that 
the organisation produces? And finally, there are the contingency factors that are 
related to the environment of the organisation. A critical environment results of-
ten in a very tight, hierarchical organisation. The best example is of course the 
Independent variable: 
Leadership style  
Dependent variable:  
Performance of the  
organisation; does the 
organisation perform as 
desired? Measured in 
production efficiency, 
general level of pro-
duction, employee  
satisfaction, consumer 
satisfaction, etc. 
Intervening variables: Contingency factors that 
affect the effect of the leadership, such as: type of 
work that has to be done, characteristics of the 
subordinates, instruments available, goals of the 
organisation etc.  
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army. This organisation has to act by definition in a critical environment. It is, 
therefore, no wonder that the most effective leadership style is one of ‘command 
and control’. There is simply no room for discussion or motivation speeches if a 
division is under fire.  
 
Categorisation of leadership styles 
Leadership styles have been classified differently by different scholars (Gupta 
2009; Wart 2008; Adamolekun 1983; Koonts & Weihrich 1984). Adamolekun 
(1983) classifies leadership in two broad styles: Authoritarian and democratic. 
According to him, a manager who combines all forms of organisational power is 
using an authoritarian leadership style. The manager who shares power and re-
sponsibilities with others adopts a democratic leadership style (Ademolekun 
1983: 195). 
The democratic or participative leadership style is also mentioned by Jain 
(1986). He states that under this kind of leadership style, decisions are made 
through discussions and consultations with subordinates. Thus, leaders seek the 
guidance of their subordinatesfor making decisions that affect them, they work to 
obtain a consensus from them, they consider their feelings, they share informa-
tion with them and they try to create pleasant working relationships. 
A second categorisation of leadership styles is introduced by Chandan (1987). 
He distinguishes an autocratic leadership style. An autocratic leader keeps the 
decision-making authority and control in his/her hands and takes full responsibil-
ity for all actions. He/she structures the entire work situation in his/her own way 
and expects his/her subordinates to follow his/her orders. The authoritarian leader 
does not tolerate any deviation from his/her orders. Autocratic leaders believe 
that their leadership is based upon the authority conferred upon them by some 
source, such as their (legal) position, knowledge, strength or power to punish and 
reward (Chandan 1987). The autocratic style is therefore an example of a strong 
top-down leadership (Locke 2003 in Wart 2008). 
 
The opposite of autocratic leadership is a laissez-faire or free reign leadership 
style (Jain 1986; Chandan 1987; Gupta 2009). According to Gupta (2009), free 
reign leadership style involves complete delegation of authority. Subordinates 
take decisions themselves. A free reign leader avoids the use of powers and pre-
fers to relinquish the leadership position. He serves only as a contact to bring the 
information and the resources needed by subordinates. 
Both ways of categorising leadership are overlapping. Actually, one could ar-
gue that the second attempt to categorise types of leadership are excrescences of 
the neutral dichotomy ‘authoritarian’ versus ‘democratic’. With regard to the au-
thoritarian leadership style, it is not that difficult to pinpoint the leaders in Afri-
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can countries who changed their style of leadership from democratic to that of an 
authoritarian who does not tolerate contradiction.  
In organisations with a strong democratic, participatory style of leadership, we 
sometimes witness the opposite development. This kind of leadership sometimes 
develops to a free reign or laissez-faire leadership that paralyses the organisation. 
The examples of these kinds of organisations can be seen in former communist 
countries where an attempt was made to create really democratic organisations, 
like farmers communes. The result was that no crop was grown, since the equal 
members of these communes could not agree which crops would be better for the 
common interest.  
 
Does autocratic/authoritarian leadership work? 
When comparing the categories, one could argue that an autocratic or authoritar-
ian leadership style is outdated or at least will not easily succeed. Autocratic 
leadership style often carries negative connotations as is typified by rigidity, the 
complete lack of input from others and the treatment of subordinates as replace-
able parts. This strong, directive leadership was more common and accepted in 
the first half of the 20th century, until the 1960s. Famous strong leaders, such as 
Churchill in Great Britain, Roosevelt in the United States and Nyerere in Tanza-
nia, show that strong leadership could be successful. In the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s this changed. There was a call for a more democratic leadership style. Au-
thoritarian leadership became less and less popular.  
Despite this fact, especially in times of crises, or when major changes are im-
perative, authoritarian styles may still be considered to be appropriate as a short-
term solution (Wart 2008). An autocratic leadership style is effective when quick 
decision-making is required. In emergency situations especially, an autocratic 
leadership is still unavoidable. One can hardly imagine a fire officer holding a 
long meeting with his crew to consider the best way to fight the fire (Koonts & 
Weihrich 1984). Other examples are the outbreak of an epidemic disease, like 
cholera. In these situations one needs a leader to be autocratic and decisive.  
 Koonts & Weihrich (1984) further assert that managers may be autocratic 
when they alone have answers to certain questions. In such circumstance, direc-
tives and detections flow downwards. This style is pertinent when less competent 
subordinates are needed at lower levels or subordinates are uneducated and sub-
missive. Lack of experience and knowledge of the subordinates make it neces-
sary that the leader takes the decisions (Gupta 2009). 
There are some pitfalls of using an autocratic style. Autocratic leadership eas-
ily leads to frustration and low morale amongst the subordinates. Due to the fact 
that the subordinates have little to no leeway to decide themselves, they might 
avoid any responsibility or initiative. This hampers creativity. It is also hazardous 
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since an unexpected absence of the leader will leave the organisation out of con-
trol (Gupta 2009).  
Leadership practice at Monoko 
Introduction 
The case that illustrates the effects of leadership takes place in a training unit in 
Monoko. Though the names are fictitious, the case is based on a real story on this 
unit. The training unit is part of a larger army department. The main function of 
this unit is to provide in-house training to the staff of the army department. Fig-
ure 12.2 shows the organisational chart of this unit.  
 
Figure 12.2  Organisation structure of Monoko 
 
 
 
 
Mr Malema, the in-charge 
Mr Malema is the in-charge officer in this facility since 2006. He is a very smart 
guy and very serious when dealing with official businesses. He was even nick-
named an ‘iron face’ due to his seriousness. You will seldom find him smiling 
while in office. He is also very decisive. When he makes a certain decision, that 
decision is final. 
Some of the employees are of the opinion that Mr Malema’s behaviour is typi-
cal military. He acts as a military officer. His decisions are orders and discussion 
is out of the question. Others say that his behaviour is typically a replica of that 
of his predecessors. They say that Mr Malema resembles a kind of leadership the 
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organisation had two decades ago. One of the employees said that what Mr 
Malema was doing was exploiting the legacy of the autocracy the organisation 
inherited since the independence of Tanzania in the 1961. Another employee re-
marked:  
‘let us not waste the time discussing impossible issues. All military-oriented industries are 
synonymous in terms of the behaviour of their administrators, their language and their or-
ganisation methods. Monoko can’t be an exception.’ 
 
Mr Elichilia, a trainer 
At Monoko there are many interesting stories about the way the administration of 
the unit of Malema is conducted. Mr Elichilia, a resident tutor working within the 
unit, has many of these stories. Mr Elichilia started his long story to support his 
allegations:  
‘Listen, are you aware that nowadays only one third of the incoming mails are forwarded by 
the in-charge to the 2nd in-charge? And in fact, these mails are of less importance! The mails 
of great importance will never reach the 2nd in-charge’s office. Remember that day we had 
visitors from USA. The 2nd in-charge was not even informed about that delegation. Much 
worse: He was not aware of the collaborations which were to be implemented soon between 
the two.’ 
He went on: 
‘Not only that, but also in-charge is the source of inefficiency at Monoko. Look at the two 
persons, Malolo and Leposha. They were the most committed employees in this organisation 
but today they are totally frustrated! The source of the lack of commitment was a delayed 
communication of their scholarship information from the headquarters. This rendered to for-
feiture their chances which were guaranteed.’  
Actually, this is not an exception according to Elichilia. There are several indi-
vidual personal files which have been locked in the cabinet of Malema. Some of 
these files are brought to him for urgent attention but to him the connotation is 
just the opposite. Malema has his own priorities.  
What demoralised Elichilia the most is the way that the staff’s problem solv-
ing mechanisms were working. In 2007, the unit had about 350 members of staff 
and about 300 trainees could enrol for the courses offered. The staff were work-
ing under poor working circumstances, due to poor working equipment. At the 
time, the trainees were enrolled, the situation worsened, of course. There was an 
outcry to invite the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the department, the direct 
boss of Malema, to sit with the members of the staff and discuss the problems. 
Again, the in-charge of the unit was not willing to accept this option. He rejected 
this on the allegation that the CEO had a lot of national issues to deal with and 
should not be bothered with these minor issues.  
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The meeting with the CEO 
Only under great pressure did Malema seem to concede. He ordered that the 
names of all the employees who were proposing the invitation of the CEO to be 
registered. These employees were also ordered to draw up an agenda for the dis-
cussion with the CEO. The discussion was planned on the eve of a farewell 
ceremony for leaving trainees who were about to finish their training. The CEO 
of the department was invited to make it more special. 
This order did not obstruct the dissatisfied employees. Elichilia remarked:  
‘This was in fact not a difficult job. I was the first person to jot down my name on a piece of 
paper and when others followed by enlisting their names, I was busy collecting and writing 
the agenda of the meeting. Only 21 staff members showed up. Others were not willing to 
register their names for the fear of the consequences. After all, the threat of being transferred 
to a very remote area or being denied some privileges was realistic. This could be the re-
venge for participating actively in a movement the in-charge was not really supporting.’ 
On the day of the meeting, the ceremony started as usual, following the usual 
protocols. It was a vivid ceremony which attracted various officials from differ-
ent governmental and NonGovernmental Organisations to the city of Dazluum. 
Various journalists, from both public and private media organisations, were in-
vited to cover the ceremony. Formerly, the ceremony ended after the guest of 
honour has aired his speech. 
When the ceremony was about to end, the announcement was made that the 
staff of Monoko should remain seated after the ceremony, while the others were 
dispersing. This announcement was hailed with cheers. Elichilia remembered 
having the general feeling that the outcry has reached God’s ears. Some of the 
employees were less hopeful. Right after the announcement, one unhappy brutal 
sound lingered in the air with cautious the caution: ‘don’t applaud this early, let’s 
first see what will happen, because it might be an answer from the devils!’  
The meeting started with a welcoming note from the Mr Malema. He thereaf-
ter invited the Chief Executive Officer of the department to talk to the staff. The 
chief hesitated:  
‘I am not here to preside over this meeting, but I would like to hear from you what is bother-
ing you. I think you have a lot to share with me.’ 
He then sat down, awaiting the response of the employees. At that time, there 
was first a dead silence. The members of the unit were puzzled about the genuine 
reasons of this reserved attitude. Mr Elichilia was the first person to speak. He 
started by complaining about bottlenecks in communication within the unit and 
between the unit and other bodies. He added that staff affairs are not communi-
cated in time to the persons involved, with the result that these persons were de-
nied their rights. He explicitly referred to the cases of Malolo and Leposha.  
The group with employees was still silent, but this time due to amazement. 
The explicit accusations by Elichilia was both courageous and hazardous. 
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Malema, the in-charge, who was addressed by these accusations, looked firmly at 
Elichilia, barely able to hide his anger. He couldn’t believe that the meeting 
would end up in an attempt to crucify him. 
Elichilia continued:  
‘There is unnecessary bureaucracy in communicating in this organisation. It takes a couple 
of weeks before information reaches the boss, while actually this information cannot last an-
other day. The hierarchies are excessive! Those whom are delegated authority are not work-
ing effectively. They are not involving their subordinates as ordered by the ministry which is 
housing this department. This is what is draining our commitment and morale!’  
Elichilia pointed at the high turnover rate of the staff of the unit. Many fresh em-
ployees leave within a year. Elichilia blamed this due to the tough communica-
tion within the organisation. Many problems expressed by the trainers and the 
lower employees do not reach the level of the in-charge, but have to be solved by 
intermediate supervisors, who are unable to solve them. He then finished his 
plea:  
‘Boss, regain our confidence through streamlining communication channels within our or-
ganisation, especially upward communication. If this will be implemented, the department 
will be a nice place for everybody to work.’  
After these words, the group cheered and applauded for a couple of minutes. It 
did not take the CEO too long to make up his mind. In a reaction to Elichilia’s 
accusations, the CEO explicitly blamed the in-charge in front of his employees. 
The CEO warned that a leader must open the door to receive information of his 
subordinates and try to work on the problems that these employees raise. He 
added:  
‘We are no longer in those old days where you live by issuing directives; today the world has 
changed. Look, more than 50% of our staff are intellectuals. Can you always drive them by 
orders? Don’t you think that there are some areas where you can deliberate over the strate-
gies to get something accomplished without having to boss someone around? Please assist 
me, otherwise it will reach a time where we will find ourselves having only two-thirds of the 
staff you see here.’ 
Questions 
1. Explain the differences between an authoritarian leadership and a democratic leadership style.  
2. Under which circumstances is an authoritarian leadership style effective?  
3. What are the characteristics in the case of Monoko to conclude that the leadership style of 
Mr Malema is autocratic?  
4. Why do you think Mr Malema opted for this leadership style?  
5. Why would the type of leadership practiced at Monoko be relevant for the protest by his em-
ployees, led by Mr Elichilia?  
6. What are the characteristics mentioned by the CEO to opt for a more democratic style of 
leadership?  
156 Ringo 
 
 
References 
ADAMOLEKUN, L. (1983), Public administration: A Nigerian and comparative perspective. 
London: Longman. 
CHANDAN, J.S. (1987), Management: Theory and practice. New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House.  
DIMOCK, M., G. DIMOCK & D. FOX (1983), Public administration. New York: CBS College 
Publishing. 
GUPTA, C. (2009), Management: Theory and practice. New Delhi: Sultan Chands and Sons. 
JAIN, M.K. (1986), Principles of management. Delhi: Shree Publishing House. 
KOONTZ, H. & H. WEIHRICH (2007), Essentials of management. New York: Mc Graw-Hill 
Book. 
PFIFFNER, J. & R. PRESTHUS (1960), Public administration. New York: Ronald Press Company. 
SHAFRITZ, J.M, E.W. RUSSELL & C.P. BORICK (2009), Introducing public administration.  
New York: Pearson International Edition. 
WART, M. (2008), Leadership in public organizations: An introduction. New Delhi: Prentice-
Hall of India Private Ltd. 
 
 
  
 
13 
E-government and  
e-governance 
George Bea & Edmund Matotay  
Introduction 
The computer is a necessity for any organisation. Public organisations and gov-
ernmental agencies are no exemption. The use of electronic tools such as com-
puters provides opportunities in the sense of easy communication, transparency 
and accountability. On the other hand, electronic governance marks a far-
reaching change in the way traditional bureaucracies, like governmental organi-
sations, function, both internally and externally in the communication with poli-
ticians and citizens. Due to the ICT tools, traditional hierarchies seem less rele-
vant and since all information is easily available, a new strategy is required to 
canalise this information.  
This chapter deals with the effects of ICT on governmental agencies and the 
way they perform their tasks. The concept that is described is the concept of e-
government and e-governance. This concept is then illustrated by the case of Ki-
nondoni Municipality.  
E-government and e-governance 
Definitions 
E-government and e-governance are two interlinked terms, though the exact 
meaning of the two is slightly different. The e- refers to the influence of elec-
tronic tools, like computers, applications or the internet. The exact influence of 
these tools can differ from a rather simple database system that can be used to 
collect and unlock data. An example is a database with all the information on in-
come of every citizen within a certain area that can be used for tax collection or 
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the administration of students’ details, including their marks and paid fees. These 
are rather easy databases that function as an instrument to facilitate public ser-
vants, like the tax payer or the administrator at the university, to do their job.  
More complex systems are the electronic systems that receive their informa-
tion from somewhere else. As an example one could think of information of im-
migration services which is often spread throughout the country, to other public 
agencies, like police forces. The complexity lies then in the technical problem 
that the received information has to ‘fit’ in the local database. Quite often this 
might require a translation of the information from one database to the other.  
A third example is the use of electronic tools within the government, between 
departments and mother ministries or between individual public servants and 
their head of departments. The central ministry for example asks for information 
on the performances of schools or health facilities. This information is gathered 
through forms that are entered in an electronic system. This makes it possible to 
verify the actual state of affairs, to compare the condition of these facilities 
throughout the country, etc.  
These examples show a distinction between e-government and e-governance. 
E-government refers to government’s use of ICT to work more effectively, to 
share information and deliver better services to the public more efficiently. E-
government is then a mean to increase the speed of delivery of services combined 
with reduction in costs’ (Chadwick & May 2003: 5). E-government can be seen 
as the static situation of governments using electronic instruments.  
E-governance is the actual use of these instruments. This refers to the relation-
ships between citizens and governments, both from government to citizen and 
from citizen to government (Pathak et al. 2008: 3; Pathak & Prasad 2006: 435), 
and the effects of electronic instruments on these interactions.  
In general, e-governance enables governments to broaden the involvement of 
citizens and their participation in government’s decision and policy making proc-
esses. It also enables governments to provide better and faster services, extend 
their outreach and access even the remotest of areas (Alampay & Umali 2007: 6).  
 
A general model of governance 
Governance can be seen as the accumulation of interactions between three do-
mains or spheres. These three spheres are the societal sphere, the political sphere 
and the administrative sphere. Between these three spheres, mutual relations ex-
ist. The foundation is the mutual relation between the societal and the political 
sphere. The members of society transfer their power to identified individuals that 
make decisions on their behalf. In return, the latter are accountable to the society. 
This relation is based on trust and accountability. 
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The actual implementation of decisions and the actual provision of services to the 
society are done by the administrative sphere. These are the public servants that 
make the day-to-day decisions in the light of public interest. The administration 
receives their orders from the political sphere. They are therefore answerable to 
the politicians. On the other hand, without mutual consent on the means and 
goals, it is impossible for politicians to implement a certain decision. Therefore, 
this relation between the political sphere and the administrative sphere is also 
mutual.  
Finally, the relation between administration and society. As said before, the 
administration delivers the services to society. In return, the society provides 
support. This support can be financial, like paying taxes, or less visible, like 
obeying the laws.  
 
Effects of e-governance 
The use of electronic instruments changes the relations between the three 
spheres. The relation between the civil society and the political sphere changes 
since citizens can get access to their politicians using other, more approachable 
means, like sending an e-mail. Politicians can also easily communicate their ac-
tual decisions and plans, for example by sending electronic newsletters, or writ-
ing on a blog on a website.  
The relation between administration and society also changes. On the one 
hand, one could expect that the service delivery by the administration is more ef-
ficient and based on more accurate information. Sometimes, it might be even 
possible to approach the administration using electronic routes instead of physi-
cal, like filling out a web form to apply for a license or to enrol in a course at the 
university.  
And finally, the relation between the political sphere and administrative sphere 
also changes. ICT makes it possible to gather information on actual effects of 
policy. Politicians therefore can make better informed decisions.  
In the model in figure 13.1, the arrows indicate relationships in terms of two 
way communications between the spheres (Grönlund 2004: 20). E-governance 
facilitates these relationships. The model indicates a two way communication be-
tween the spheres. This is also one of the major pitfalls of electronic technology. 
For instance, if a member of the civil society sphere sends an email to his repre-
sentative (politicians, like councillors in the political sphere); it is not guaranteed 
that they will receive feedback. That will, in the end, harm the mutual relation-
ship between these two spheres.  
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Figure 13.1  Governance model 
 
Source: Grönlund 2004: 20. 
 
 
E-governance in the long term 
The wide effects of electronic instruments demand a profound consideration of 
all the effects when deciding on a new ICT project. In general, a successful e-
governance project will integrate interests and modes of operation of all three 
spheres (DEMO-net 2005: 6). And even then, one could not easily predict the 
particular development path for a governance system. Recognition of the three 
spheres nevertheless provides a framework for making such predictions.  
Despite this general remark, it seems rather inevitable that e-governance 
would result in, over time, a situation in which the administration would increase 
its influence over society and diminish the room for political weighing up of in-
terests (Zouridis & Thaens 2002). The proposition is then that, e-governance re-
sults in a situation in which political systems gradually become more alike in dif-
ferent countries, as the communities, particularly due to the use of the internet, 
make national borders less relevant. Information is easily spread among citizens, 
making it less easy for governments to mislead their citizens and eventually per-
haps even causing repercussions for: Either communities that use these means to 
gather, or other national governments. The revolutions in 2011 in Egypt and 
Libya give us examples of the relevance of this medium: Especially in the way 
today’s generation identified the internet as an easy instrument for sharing their 
thoughts and for planning their actions to overthrow their governments.  
Formal  
politics 
Administration 
 
Civil society 
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Kinondoni Municipality e-governance project  
Implementation of a pilot project in Kinondoni 
Kinondoni Municipality is the northernmost of the three districts of the Dar es 
Salaam Region. Kinondoni Municipality started an e-governance project in 1999 
as a first pilot project (Menda 2005: 2). This project was started as part of the na-
tionwide public service reform programme which aimed at improving account-
ability, transparency and resource management for service delivery (Tanzania 
2003: 7). Kinondoni was the first municipality among the 133 local government 
authorities to initiate this e-governance project. It was the COSTECH (Commis-
sion for Science and Technology, a government agency in Tanzania that initiated 
the project), while IICD (Institute for International Cooperation and Develop-
ment, a NGO) provided computers for the project. For this project, about 256 
computers were installed with most of them having access to the internet.  
The main objectives of the project were to improve efficiency and effective-
ness of service provision, revenue collection of taxes and to save costs. This case 
description on the implementation of e-governance in Kinondoni shows the 
changes due to e-governance.  
 
Funding from the municipality 
Funding was the most important factor that improved performance of the e-
governance project in Kinondoni Municipality. The national ICT policy (URT 
2003: 10) stated: 
‘Government shall annually allocate funds equivalent to a reasonable proportion of GDP for 
ICT deployment, diffusion and universal access.’  
The aim of this precondition was to reduce dependence on donors’ assistance and 
to enhance project’s sustainability. 
When the e-governance project was established, it received funding support 
and computers from COSTECH (Commission for Science and Technology), and 
IICD (Institute for International Cooperation and Development as stated above).  
In 2000, the project was handed over to the Kinondoni Municipality. Thereaf-
ter, the municipality took over all responsibilities for funding, staffing and man-
aging the project. The project was costly and received an earmarked budget of 
Tsh 170 million in 2006/2007; up to Tsh 180 million in 2007/2008 and even Tsh 
200 million in 2008/2009. And despite the raising budget, the available means 
seemed to be inadequate, due to an even more increasing need for ICT services 
from the staff.  
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Support from top management and staff 
The implementation of the e-governance project fully relied on the support from 
the top management and the staff within the administration. The support came 
from the two former municipal directors, Mr Berege and Mr Katanga. These two 
officials saw the need for the implementation of this project once the ‘go ahead’ 
decision was made and the politicians at the council did approve of the project.  
Mr Katanga was very much interested in ICT and, as a result of his support; 
the implementation of the project was carried out smoothly. There was good co-
operation between the internal stakeholders within the bureaucracy of Kinondoni 
Municipality and the external stakeholders, like COSTECH and IICD. As a re-
sult, these external parties could deliver adequate equipment, like computers, and 
training for the staff members. The results were high-tech infrastructure, includ-
ing running software and the provision of management information systems. The 
hard ware consists of an up and running local area network with internet connec-
tivity. These facilities were available throughout the administrative organisation.  
The departments that could especially use an electronic boost, like the finance 
department (for collecting taxes and accounting) and the land section (land regis-
tration) benefitted from this project. In the earlier days, the finance department 
depended on manual registration. Within the e-governance project, the manual 
activities were computerised, improving the speed and transparency of service 
delivery. In the land section, the e-governance project made it possible to get ac-
cess to relevant documents and files on the rights of land owners. The support 
from the management of Kinondoni Municipality was mainly based on the 
awareness that the old manual registration and processing of decision-making in 
these two departments would result in even more uncertainty and complains. 
This support is one of the major factors that improved the project’s performance 
as it was observed that: ‘highly supportive management at Kinondoni was a fun-
damental success factor for the project’ (Cammi 2006: 14).  
 
Commitment of ICT Staff 
The implementation of the e-governance project caused a re-design of the organ-
isational structure of the Kinondoni Municipality. The organisation needed pub-
lic servants that were able to maintain and build a local area network with work-
ing computers. In case of computer defects, it was their responsibility to fix these 
problems. The success of the implementation of Kinondoni depended highly on 
the skills and dedication of these employees. The dedicated persons hired at Ki-
nondoni Municipality to carry out ICT operations have improved the project’s 
performance (Cammi 2006: 91). The need for training of local staff to work with 
computers is already mentioned in the national policy documents (URT 2003: 
14): 
 E-government and e-governance  
 
 
163
‘policy challenges involve developing remuneration, incentive package for the ICT skilled 
staff with a focus on retention scheme for skilled workers so as to move from brain drain to 
brain gain.’  
 
Customisation of the systems 
The management information systems were customised by an external consultant 
who designed the systems to suit the needs of the users. The systems were de-
signed to show who initiated the payment and who approved it. Before the pro-
ject, these activities were manually processed and were largely ineffective and 
inefficient. There was limited transparency due to limited free flow of informa-
tion. The information was not available to the departments and sections that 
needed it to monitor the investments decisions. This made it difficult to conduct a 
strategic vision. The municipal strategic vision was impaired and the municipal-
ity did lack a long-term perspective on things like good governance and human 
development. These hampered the effective use of resources (Menda 2005: 2). 
 
Results of the e-governance project 
E-governance affects relations between politicians, administration and citizens. 
The results can be shown in the field of revenue collection and service delivery.  
 
Improvement in revenue collection. At Kinondoni, the revenue collection in-
creased almost immediately after the implementation of the e-governance project 
as shown in table 13.1. The revenue collection increased to 41% from 2006 to 
2007. This is after the implementation of three different systems that facilitated 
the collection of Property Tax, City Service Levy and a Billboard Management 
Information System. These three systems which started working in 2006 are 
hosted in one program known as municipal Revenue Collection Manager (MRE-
COM).  
The Billboard system particularly showed effectiveness of the ICT tools. The 
system made it possible to control tax evasion because it stored all the required 
details of each billboard, like the name of the owner, the ID number and the 
month in which tax payment is due. Due to this, taxpayers are paying promptly 
for fear that legal measures may be taken against them for non-payment. The fact 
that the details of the Billboard are known is an important factor for revenue col-
lection.  
Before the computerisation, revenue accountants were only able to collude 
with the Billboard owners. They reported less number of square meters of each 
billboard and therefore collected less revenue. The fact that these accountants had 
an individual relation with the citizens that was not easily controlled, it was pos-
sible for them to take some money for private means. This suspicion can be sub-
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stantiated by the data from 2000 to 2005 in which increase in revenue has been 
very small and in some years negative e.g. in 2005. To control tax evasion, the 
Billboard system has been linked to a map system using the Geographic Informa-
tion System (GIS), which facilitates easy identification of residential areas of 
those who have not paid their tax dues for tracing purposes. 
 
Table 13.1 Annual revenue from 2000-2008 (in millions of Tsh) 
Years 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Revenue 2515 2813 3971 4013 4212 4113 5633 7925 8804 
Increase in %  12 41 1 5 -2.4 37 41 11 
 
 
Improvement in service delivery. At the municipality, the service delivery im-
proved due to the e-governance project, especially in the departments which were 
supplied with computers. These computers and their systems that manage the 
data (Legal Information System, Human Resource Management Information Sys-
tem and a Health Management Information System) have improved service de-
livery due to easy typing, printing and retrieval of information.  
The Health Management Information System improved retrieval of data about 
histories of patients’ diseases, which was cumbersome before the installation of 
the system in which manual system was used. As a result of the system, service 
delivery in the Department of Health has improved. The system enabled doctors 
attending patients in the field to directly feed the data into their computers when 
attending patients. After the exercise is over, the data about all patients attended 
by the doctor, drugs used and diseases treated can easily be printed out and sent 
to the municipality for further action. This facilitates decision-making processes 
and improves service provision. 
Changes due to e-governance 
Change of communication 
The main feature of the e-governance project was the access to information. This 
was enabled because the municipality had networked a greater percent of its de-
partments and sections which enabled permanent (24 hour) network availability 
and a global reach through the Internet (Menda 2005: 3). This has partly been fa-
cilitated by the municipal website (www.kmc.go.tz) which contained answers to 
frequently asked questions (FAQ). This has increased information flow to the 
citizens (Wescott 2001: 22). In addition, availability of information has reduced 
citizens’ physical visits to the municipality.  
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The e-governance project has also improved communication between staff, citi-
zens and their representatives. ICT therefore, yields many benefits, including 
faster responses to request and queries including outside normal working hours 
(Wescott 2001: 2). This was facilitated by another feature of the municipality 
website, that contains the email addresses of the councillors, municipal director, 
heads of departments and wards executive officers. The availability of the mu-
nicipal website has partly increased political control over administrators on the 
one hand, and administrators control over junior staff on the other hand, because 
of relatively easy communication and feedback through electronic means.  
As a result, the opportunity and scope for citizens to influence the decisions of 
politicians and administrators broadened due to reliable 24-hour, 7-days a week 
network availability (Menda 2005: 3). Currently, about 70% of municipal de-
partments and sections have been connected to the internet.  
Before the e-governance project, people used traditional methods of writing 
letters and making physical appointments. After the e-governance project took 
off, the majority of staff and citizens dramatically shifted to using email mes-
sages, computers and internet as a modern channel for communication. This con-
curs with the argument used by Tarman (2006: 1): 
‘in communicating with politicians, whether in government or their local member of parlia-
ment, citizens are using digital channels in greater numbers, and that for younger citizens, if 
they wish to actually communicate with a politician at all, doing so through a print commu-
nication or letter is something they may probably never do in their entire lifetime.’  
 
Change of organisation 
The procurement of more computers has necessitated the municipality to recruit 
additional ICT staff that assist in troubleshooting of computer problems. These 
staff greatly assisted in maintenance of computers, thereby enabling smooth op-
eration of municipal activities. Moreover, the citizens have also become aware of 
the benefits of ICTs. The majority of them are currently aware about the applica-
tion of the ICT tools and as a result, they don’t accept manually processed re-
ceipts which created loopholes for cheating and misuse of public funds. This has 
partly been contributed by the municipal advertisement in the notice boards that 
citizens should not accept manually processed receipts to reduce loss of munici-
pal revenues.  
In addition, electronic preparation of receipts has also increased citizens’ con-
fidence in the accountants because they believe that whenever they pay their tax 
dues, nothing is being embezzled by the accountants. This shows effectiveness of 
ICT tools in managing information and in providing accurate data. The afore-
mentioned benefits of e-governance projects concur with the argument of Menda 
(2005: 2) that 
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‘E-governance facilitates more efficient and effective interaction between the government 
and citizens and between governmental bodies. In so doing, it promotes transparency and ac-
countability as well as efficient and effective leadership across the government, in admini-
stration (the executive), the civil service, the parliament and the judiciary. Thus, e-
governance can be a key to better government leadership, and consequently, a stimulant to 
rapid, successful and sustainable development in political, social and economic realms.’ 
 
Challenges 
Every change has its drawbacks. This section contains some of the disadvantages 
of the changes and the challenges that Kinondoni faced after implementation of 
e-governance.  
 
Low speed of the Internet. One of the most important problems Kinondoni faced 
is the problem with slow internet services. Especially during peak hours, when 
the majority of people are surfing on the internet, it becomes too slow to func-
tion. Due to these problems, the municipal server sometimes stalls. This server is 
located at the Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH), about 6 
kilometers away from the Kinondoni Municipality. The problem of a shared 
bandwidth which Kinondoni Municipality is using is that the Internet Service 
Provider may at times share it with other institutions without the knowledge of 
the using institution.  
 
Lack of electricity and internet in some ward’s offices. A second problem related 
to the infrastructure is the fact that not all ward offices, being the centres of the 
lowest governmental authority, have sustainable electricity provision. The ward 
office of Bunju, for example, is not attached to the electricity network. For effec-
tive implementation of e-governance, it is therefore necessary to invest also in 
basic infrastructure such as electricity.  
 
Lack of computer skills for staff. Other problems are related to the staff. Some of 
them appeared to be lacking the skills in order to work with the computers. Not 
all staff members, but especially the older ones, were not able to work efficiently 
with computers. Also, the younger, newly recruited staff needed extra training to 
use the computers to support their work. For this, the municipality had to set up a 
training programme.  
 
High investments when digitalising. Both the skills and the available resources 
are hampering the implementation of electronic instruments in some depart-
ments. These are the departments that have gathered lots of data on paper. One of 
the examples of these departments is the Administration Department. This de-
partment has not digitized/scanned certificates due to absence of big storage me-
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dia that can accommodate certificates of all 6494 municipal employees. Data in 
the Marketing Section have not been automated because it does not have enough 
computers, while data in the Land Section have not been computerised because 
the Land Information System has not been purchased due to financial constraints. 
This is because the system was expensive for the section to purchase on its own 
budget as it costed more than Tsh 400 million. The fact remains that implement-
ing e-governance asks for high investments; not only in infrastructure but also in 
training and maintenance.  
 
The fear that computers will replace staff. The study on the implementation of e-
governance in Kinondoni also revealed another interesting feature. Both citizens 
and staff members were afraid that the implementation of computers would result 
in a situation that staff would be replaced entirely. The comparison with some 
private sectors, like banks, show that some processes are taken over by com-
puters. Clients are not dealing with a servant that is interested in the individual 
case, but are dealing with a computer or with a servant that is just applying soft-
ware, not able to take into account the specificities of the individual case.  
This fear is often the source of resistance against the implementation of ICT in 
the work process. The implementation of e-governance in Kinondoni shows, 
nevertheless, that no staff members have been retrenched after the implementa-
tion of the project. Of course, this was also due to the fact that the project entails 
huge investments of external donors.  
Questions 
1. Compare and contrast the term e-government and e-governance. 
2. According to the case study provided, what do you think are the main constraints facing Ki-
nondoni e-governance project? 
3. Determine the change in the relations between the three spheres in the Kinondoni case. 
4. By comparing the situation before and after the implementation of the e-governance project, 
to what extent can you say that the discussed e-governance project is a successful project? 
5. In your analysis of the case study, what are the benefits of electronic governance? And what 
are the pitfalls?  
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Public-private partnership 
in social service provision 
Josephat Stephen Itika  
Introduction 
Public-private partnership (PPP) is basically public service delivery through col-
laboration of a public agency with one or more actors from the private sector. As 
such, it is a relatively recent development in public administration that has been 
taking place since the beginning of this century. It is a result of trials and lessons 
learnt from the application of quite a number of administrative models developed 
over the past fifty years – both in developing and in developed countries.  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, governments all over the world 
were confronted with the tasks of reconstructing war torn economies. This im-
plied a far more active role of government and of public agencies in societal and 
economic affairs than was customary before the war. The organisational structure 
that governments were able to utilise for this purpose was still very much the tra-
ditional administrative bureaucracy that had been developing slowly over the 
whole of the previous century. Traditional public bureaucracies were designed 
for administering justice: The just application of the laws of the land. Fairness 
and equity were among its core values. With the growth of the so-called ‘welfare 
state’ (characterised by controlled public service delivery through the expansion 
of public service machinery), it turned out that traditional bureaucracy was not 
entirely fit to meet the new challenges posed by mass delivery of social services. 
Even though fairness and equity remained important public values, other re-
quirements such as efficiency and the effectiveness of operations became ever 
more pressing.  
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In the 1980s, this resulted in the development of ‘managerialism’ in social ser-
vice delivery. The emphasis on bureaucratic culture and on bureaucratic behav-
iour shifted towards effective management in running government affairs. One 
result was the mushrooming of semi-independent government boards and agen-
cies to manage programmes and projects as a way of reducing the administrative 
burden on public service delivery from the traditional civil service. This was a 
common phenomenon, especially in developing countries.  
The 1990s saw an entirely different approach, heavily influenced by the politi-
cal philosophy of neo liberalism, which pushed for heavy macroeconomic policy 
reforms. In this approach, the massive involvement of governments in the econ-
omy, especially in social service delivery, was regarded as distorting economies. 
At the same time, government agencies failed to live up to on the promise of de-
livering high quality social services and hence undermined their legitimacy to 
govern. Privatisation in different forms became fashionable, the most far reach-
ing being the total withdrawal of government from specific economic sectors 
such as mining, telecommunication or energy production and distribution. Public 
interests in those areas might be safeguarded by either government shareholding 
in the private enterprises active in that economic sector, or by some form of pub-
lic regulation of the sector. In case of shareholding, public and private actors 
jointly carry out the management and the activities of the company. Especially in 
developing countries, a number of initiatives have been taken to create a favour-
able environment for privatisation – including national investment promotion 
laws, investment centres and parastatal reform commissions.  
 
Despite all these reforms, aimed at reducing the role of the government in eco-
nomic development, most developing countries have not realised many of the 
expected outcomes of privatisation. One reason for this has to do with the nature 
of the private sector itself, which is generally too weak to be a significant actor in 
the economy. At the same time, governments are often too weak to be able to 
create the necessary enabling environment for the private sector, while safe-
guarding public interests. As a result, from around 2000 onwards the focus has 
shifted to novel ways and structures for public service delivery. The core of these 
innovations is to create effective partnerships between government agencies and 
private sector organisations – both businesses and not-for-profit organisations. 
The intention is to take down walls so that the public and private sector actors 
can join hands and create synergy. 
Figure 14.1 depicts the four phases in public administration for public service 
delivery that lead up to the advance of public-private partnership. Once more, 
great hopes are invested in this new mode of administering public services. When 
the private sector comes in, it is expected that these partnerships will create value 
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for money. It is expected that projects will start earlier and finish earlier because 
of reduced bureaucracy. Another expectation is that there will be more access to 
innovations from the private sector and better access to private capital. Further-
more, improvements in public services and an increase in the transparency and 
the accountability in the expenditure of public money are expected. 
 
Figure 14.1  The evolution of administrative systems for public service delivery 
 
 
The concept of public-private partnership 
Public-private partnership is best seen as a continuum of collaborative arrange-
ments for public service delivery between the public and private sector organisa-
tions, based on the principle of appropriate allocation of resources, rewards and 
risks (Bennet et al. 1999; Brinkerhoff 2002). This continuum provides a range of 
models from which to choose when considering ways and means for the delivery 
of a specific public service. These models are: 
• simple cooperation 
• joint venture 
• direct contract 
• lease 
• concession 
• complete privatisation with regulation 
 
Appropriate allocation of resources and risks is critical in all forms of partner-
ship. For the collaboration to be effective and sustainable for both parties in-
volved; there has to be equality in the relationship, as far as costs and benefits are 
concerned. This principle is to be found in PPP regulatory frameworks positions 
such as the South African PPP legislation and the UK’s stringent PPP regulatory 
framework (USAID 2006).  
The PPP continuum can be used as a tool for decision-making about involving 
the private sector in the improvement of public services; in a municipality, for 
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instance. Thus, Bennet et al. (1999) and Brinkerhoff (2002) argue that in re-
sponse to public service delivery gaps in a local authority, a simple cooperation 
between the government and the private sector should be a starting point. The lo-
cal authority may invite ideas from the business community to improve by-laws 
for regulating certain service delivery mechanisms. In this case, the role of the 
private sector is merely advisory.  
The second level in the PPP continuum is a joint venture in which the munici-
pality may collaborate with a private party, and in which they take joint respon-
sibility for the overall delivery of a specific service package. The parties have to 
balance their roles, interests and risks. Unlike under simple collaboration, strong 
accountability mechanisms, transparency in decision-making, equitable costing 
and the distribution of financial profits and risks are necessary.  
The third level is the direct service contract. In this case, the municipal author-
ity contracts out a specific public service to the private provider at an agreed 
level, within defined specifications, payments, and for a fixed period of time. 
The forth level is lease contract. This is awarded through competitive bidding. 
The highest bidder gets the contract. The government agency retains ownership 
of all assets and is accountable to the public for ultimate performance. Under a 
lease arrangement, the government leases infrastructure and facilities to a private 
firm for a fixed period of time. The private sector party will have exclusive rights 
to operate and it will bear commercial risks for non-payment of fees and charges 
by the service beneficiaries.  
The last option is concession. The local authority, a government department or 
government agency, may transfer full authority and responsibility to the private 
sector for service delivery in a specified area at a specified time. This will in-
clude everything to do with construction, maintenance, collection of revenue and 
management. The concessionaire will be responsible for all capital investment to 
build, upgrade or extend the system. The client will generally retain responsibil-
ity for establishing and monitoring performance standards, regulation of price 
and service volumes. The main difference with lease is the additional responsibil-
ity for capital investment by the private sector. In partnerships where infrastruc-
ture is required, several arrangements may be made, as shown in figure 14.2. 
Figure 14.2 shows five typologies of partnerships in infrastructure develop-
ment and management for service delivery. There could be more typologies, de-
pending on the strengths of both the private and public sector and the opportuni-
ties available for public service improvement. These typologies determine the 
PPP model that might be suitable; for example, between lease and concession.  
What remains outside these partnership models is either full government in-
vestment and public service delivery or full privatisation, where the government 
will remain with creating an enabling environment for the private sector to invest 
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in and operate under the normal market conditions. Despite the possible effec-
tiveness of public-private partnerships, creating such a public-private partnership 
is full of pitfalls. Designing and implementing an adequate contract that fits the 
requirement of appropriate allocation of resources and risks, is often complicated 
and costly. Underestimating the difficulties involved may easily lead to failure of 
the partnership, as illustrated in the case of Dar es Salaam water 
 
Figure 14.2  Partnerships in infrastructure development and management  
 
 
 
 
PPP and the water problem in Dar es Salaam  
Introduction 
Until 1991, the government provided free water services, apart from some high 
income areas. However, the services were not sustainable, due to a number of 
reasons, including disrepair, lack of investment, high levels of wastage and very 
poor levels of service coverage. In an attempt to improve the situation, the gov-
ernment developed a new water policy in 1991 which removed government sub-
sidies for water utilities, called for self financing and called for partnership be-
tween the government, agencies, the community and the private sector. This 
policy led to the formation of the Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority 
(DAWASA) in 1997 with the primary objective of provision of water and sewer-
age services. However, this new institution did not perform better because water 
wastage, disrepair, inability to offer new water connections and collection of tar-
iffs were critical, and little could be done without external support. 
Typologies of partnerships 
in infrastructure develop-
ment and management 
DESIGN AND BUILD (DB) 
- private designs 
- the private(agency) builds infrastructure for  
government  
- risk is transferred to the private sector
OPERATE AND MAINTAIN (OM) 
- The private (agency) operates and maintains 
public facility for specified period of time
DESIGN-BUILD-FINANCE-OPERATE (DBFO) 
- The private (agency) designs, builds, finances 
and operates under long term lease then returns to 
the government
BUILD-OWN-OPERATE (BOO) 
- The private (agency) builds, owns and operates 
- Regulated by public authority
BUY-BUILD-OPERATE (BBO) 
- Transfers public asset for upgrading and operates 
for specified time under contract
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On the other hand, since 1997, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
started to pressurise the government to privatise water utilities in order to im-
prove services and reduce government burden. As part of the pressure, under the 
World Bank Country Assistance Strategy, the country would get USD 300 mil-
lion a year if there was fast track privatisation,;if the government was slow, it 
would get 200m, and if it could not privatise, it would receive only 100m a year 
(ActionAid 2004; Mushi 2007).  
At long last in 2000, the government, donors and creditors agreed privatisation 
as a condition for loan, including debt relief under HIPC. By that time, DA-
WASA was managing water and sewerage services itself, owned the infrastruc-
ture assets, and employed more than 1200 persons. However, water service pro-
vision through DAWASA did not prove satisfactory for numerous reasons, not 
the least of which was the inability to mobilise resources necessary to provide for 
the infrastructure and maintenance needs.  
Due to DAWASA’s inability to provide adequate water and sewerage ser-
vices, the government applied for a development loan from many financial insti-
tutions. Eventually, financial and technical assistance was secured from the 
World Bank, the African Development Bank and the European Investment Bank. 
The funding was for a rehabilitation program requiring substantial long term in-
vestment (approximately USD 163,000,000, of which USD 143,000,000 was to 
be supplied by the international organisations). One of the requirements of this 
loan was that the water and sewerage services would be privatised. The govern-
ment had no choice but to bow to the requirement (ActionAid 2004). It was only 
in 2002, however, that as part of a re-bidding process, tender documents were is-
sued for bids for the lease contract which called for the successful bidder to take 
over, for a period of ten years, the water and sewerage assets of DAWASA, and 
to provide defined water and sewerage services to customers in the greater Dar es 
Salaam Region. 
 
Failed lease contract management  
According to the background information in the court ruling, the 2002 invitation 
to bid initially attracted three bidders. However, the other bidders dropped out, 
leaving City Water Ltd the successful bidder. After substantial negotiations, the 
lease contract and the Supply and Installation of Plant and Equipment (SIPE) and 
Procurement of Goods (POG) were entered into on 19 February 2003 and the 
Sub-Loan Agreement on 18 June 2003 whereby external financing would be 
USD 143 million, City Water would invest USD 8.5 million to cover removable 
and DAWASA would use USD 2.5 million through cash generation. 
City Water was a Tanzania corporation, formed for the purpose of being an 
investment vehicle, and the operator for the water and sewerage project. City 
 Public-private partnership in social service provision  
 
 
177
Water was owned 51% by Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited (‘BGT’), an Eng-
lish corporation, and 49% by Super Doll Trailer Manufacture Co (‘STM’), a 
Tanzanian company. BGT is itself a joint venture which is owned 80% by Bi-
water International, a wholly owned subsidiary of Biwater Plc, a well known 
English corporation active in the water and sewerage sector, and 20% by HP 
Gauff Ingenieurie GmbH, a German engineering and consulting company. DA-
WASA was, and still is, a Tanzanian state-owned corporation created in 1997 as 
a quasi-commercial, parastatal organisation to provide water and sewerage ser-
vice in, amongst others, the City of Dar es Salaam and the adjacent regions of 
Kibaha and Bagamoyo, in Tanzania. 
 
Terms and conditions of the contract 
Associated with the principal contract, three related contracts were provided for 
the bidding procedure:  
1. a contract for Supply and Installation of Plant and Equipment (the ‘SIPE’ con-
tract), calling for capital improvements to the critical elements of the Dar es 
Salaam water and sewage system; 
2. a contract for Procurement of Goods (Water Meters): The ‘POG’ contract; 
3. a Sub-Loan Agreement providing for the government to provide matching 
loan financing to support City Water’s equity contribution pursuant to which 
the Operator (City Water) could draw down one dollar (up to USD 5 million) 
for every dollar of equity contributed by City Water’s shareholders. 
 
According to expert opinion, it would appear, in hindsight, that the terms ac-
cepted by City Water in the Lease presented a substantial challenge for the lessee 
from the outset. City Water accepted the lowest allowed operator tariff proposed 
by the government authority (Tsh 322 per m3) which apparently other bidders felt 
was too low. City Water knew, or should have known, that the information pro-
vided in the bidding documents for the existing parameters for available water for 
distribution, billing projections and customer database was not based on reliable 
foundations and was not guaranteed. City Water also accepted to take over the 
entire staff that DAWASA had employed in rendering the services as a parastatal 
organisation, and thus, renounced the savings opportunities that the takeover of 
public services by a private organisation would ordinarily offer.  
 
Some controversial issues 
Although City Water and DAWASA agreed to the terms and conditions of the 
contract, later on it turned out that a number of historical employee costs, paid by 
DAWASA, had not been correctly revealed to City Water. Due to this lack of in-
formation, City Water was far too optimistic with its projections of revenue and 
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costs. Once City Water calculated these costs in the official financial projections, 
it appeared that there would be a negative net cash flow over the first six years of 
the ten year Lease. By then, it was clear that City Water took a high risk when 
they signed the contract. This also put the pressure on this new way of organising 
public water and sewerage services, knowing that the previous attempts to organ-
ise these services had failed.  
 
The performance of the contract 
During the first 18 months of the Lease (which commenced on 1 August 2003), 
the revenue flowing to City Water was far lower than the projections based on 
the program submitted with City Water’s bid. It was even lower than the revenue 
previously realised by DAWASA, during its previous failed attempts as a 
parastatal organisation to provide the services itself. At the same time, operative 
costs were significantly higher than had been estimated. In July 2005, the World 
Bank published a study on the experiences, the successes and the failures of the 
privatisation efforts in the United Republic of Tanzania. One major conclusion of 
the report was that the reason for accepting City Water’s bid was the pressing 
need to mobilise new funds to invest in the infrastructure. City Water were sup-
posed to improve the infrastructure as well. However, it was not expected that the 
private investor would not be able to improve the services. The primary assump-
tion on the part of almost everyone involved, certainly from the donor side, was 
that it would be very hard, if not impossible, for the private operator to perform 
worse than DAWASA. 
Due to the circumstances, and the high costs that exceeded the initial calcula-
tion, City Water failed to observe some key obligations of the lease contract. It 
failed to make payments to DAWASA, on account of Lessor Tariffs, and it failed 
to meet the required level of equity contribution. In any event, it led City Water 
to take the position that it could no longer meet its obligations under the lease 
contract without revision of its financial terms. 
 
Efforts to revise the contract 
Between April 2004 and September 2004, City Water initiated negotiations with 
DAWASA and the Minister of Water to obtain the revision of financial terms of 
the lease contract. These initial negotiations were not fruitful as DAWASA and 
government representatives focused on the payments owed by City Water for the 
contractually promised equity injections and tariff payments. On the other hand, 
City Water focused on the necessity of radical revision of the financial terms of 
the lease contract to permit City Water to continue fulfilling its role under the 
contract. 
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Initially, it was City Water’s intention to ask the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Tribunal to determine its rights and enti-
tlements for adjustment of the Operator Tariff, payable to City Water, and for re-
lief from making payments, owed under the lease contract. The main ground for 
this would be that DAWASA had provided some misleading bidding information 
to City Water. However, no such claim or evidence was developed by City Wa-
ter. 
Meanwhile City Water started informal negotiations. Since these negotiations 
were not leading to a contractual solution, in September 2004, City Water re-
quested an ‘Interim Review’ of the tariff, as it was entitled to do under Article 
41.4 of the lease contract. This article of the lease contract provided that the les-
see was entitled to upward adjustment of the tariff on interim review, only if it 
could demonstrate that a ‘Material change of circumstances’ had occurred. 
On 2 September 2004, DAWASA named PricewaterhouseCoopers for render-
ing an independent evaluation of whether City Water was entitled to tariff revi-
sion, pursuant to Interim Review, under the terms of the lease contract. On 28 
November, PWC rendered its report, which found, in an Interim Review, that 
there was no contractual justification for upward revision of the tariff. 
Following the failure of the contractual tariff revision process, discussions 
were renewed between the parties during which City Water renewed its requests 
for substantial revision of contract terms on a freely renegotiated basis. Meetings 
were held at Ministerial level in January and February 2995 and in March, the 
parties agreed to enlist the assistance of a mediator, or facilitator, Dr. Tony Bal-
lance of TRC Economic Solutions. Negotiations continued in March and April 
2005. 
Between mid-April and the end of April, the parties negotiated intensively on 
an initial report, prepared by Dr. Balance, and then again on a ‘aide-memoir’, 
also prepared by Dr. Balance at the end of April. In the first week of May 2005, 
Dr. Balance presented a proposed compromise seeking to achieve agreement be-
tween the parties on a revision to the contract. The proposal was not agreed, nor 
was any alternative arrangement agreed upon for the revision of the contract. 
 
Termination of the lease contract 
In the absence of an agreement, the Board of Directors of DAWASA decided to 
terminate the lease contract. On 12 May 2005, DAWASA made a call for the full 
amount of the Performance Guarantee to recover outstanding amounts, owed to it 
under the lease contract. The bank that had provided a bank statement during the 
bidding, then made a payment to DAWASA for the full amount of the guarantee, 
which amounted to Tsh 5,535 million (the Performance Guarantee was in the 
amount of USD 3 million and Tsh 2,853 million). 
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On 14 May 2005, a meeting was held between representatives of the parties at 
which DAWASA requested City Water to accept a shortening of the termination 
notice period provided in the lease contract 30 days so that a successor could take 
over providing essential water and sewerage services, without interruption of 
service to the public. However, City Water refused. 
On 16 May 2005, City Water served a Notice of Arbitration under the UN-
CITRAL Rules, as provided under Article 66 of the lease contract, commencing 
the present arbitration. 
On 17 May 2005, DAWASA served a cure under Article 50.1 of the lease con-
tract, requiring City Water to replace in full, within seven days, the Performance 
Guarantee which had been called for and paid to DAWASA (which would have 
required City Water to provide to the guaranteeing bank USD 5.5 million of new 
security. On 20 May 2005, the parties met to discuss the naming of transition 
teams to facilitate the taking over of the project by DAWASA as was required 
pursuant to Article 55 of the lease contract. City Water did not, however, name a 
transition team and did not cooperate further in the takeover process. 
On 23 May 2005, City Water obtained an ex parte injunction from the High 
Court in London prohibiting DAWASA from taking further steps towards the 
termination of the lease contract. An inter partes hearing on the injunction was 
scheduled for 8 June 2005 but on the eve of the hearing, City Water withdrew its 
application and hence the injunction lapsed. 
On 25 May 2005 DAWASA served a notice of termination based on the expi-
ration of the seven day cure period for City Water to replace the performance 
guarantee. The thirty-day notice period for termination would have expired on 24 
June 2005. 
Between the 26 and 30 May 2005, communication between the two parties 
took place with crossed purpose. DAWASA was seeking agreed early termina-
tion and a commitment to transition cooperation by City Water due to DA-
WASA’s fear that City Water was, in fact, financially unable to continue services 
and that interruption of services would soon occur. However, City Water still 
took the position that the notice of termination was ineffective, that it was still in 
place as lessee and that its status could only be terminated by agreement between 
the parties or by the terms of an arbitration award. 
A decision was made by DAWASA and the government to effectively termi-
nate the contract prior to expiration of the notice period. City Water continued to 
contest DAWASA’s right to terminate and insisted on its right to remain in pos-
session and to act as operator.  
A decision was then taken by the Minister of Water to physically take over the 
premises so as to enable DAWASA to commence performance of services and 
continue services to the public. The expatriate management of City Water was 
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asked by the police on 1 June 2005 to vacate the premises. The three senior man-
agers, Messrs Stone, Livermore and Harrington, were deported from Tanzania 
later in the evening as ‘prohibited immigrants’. 
Acting on instructions from the Minister of Water, the DAWASA managing 
director went to the premises on the afternoon of 1st June, accompanied by the 
managing director of a newly established Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage 
Corporation (DAWASCO), and announced to the personnel that the operation 
was being taken over by DAWASCO, who would become their employer. 
Questions 
1. Public-private partnership requires sharing of resources, rewards and risks. To what extent 
do you think these concepts apply to the lease contract? 
2. It is learned from the case study that the lease contract had failed before it started. However, 
it continued until when it was frustrated by force. Why did this happen? 
3. The government took a development loan to improve water service delivery through Public-
private partnership. However, that objective was not realised. What are the key lessons in 
public administration? 
4. Do you think the government act of forcefully ending the contract was an act of good gov-
ernance? Justify your arguments. 
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Rent-seeking behaviour and 
the organisation of utilities 
Emmanuel Matiku, Andrew Mbwambo & Joseph Kimeme 
Introduction  
Public choice, traced to the work of Gordon Tullock & James Buchanan (1962), 
is the study of political phenomena with the tools and models of modern eco-
nomic scholarship. Topics that traditionally belong to political science and public 
administration have been tackled with often innovative results. Fundamental to 
the public choice approach is the assumption that politicians and public officials 
behave as primarily self-interested actors. A question then is, under which set of 
constitutional rules such behaviour may be aligned with public interests or with 
the preferences of citizens. Modelling of behaviour is done in a number of differ-
ent ways, such as utility maximisation and game theory.  
Even though public choice primarily attempts to explain actual public behav-
iour, one often finds a normative or prescriptive twist in the analyses that are 
concerned with problem solving, especially by changing constitutional rules. One 
strand of public choice scholarship (Niskanen 1971; Stiglitz 2000) is less inter-
ested in constitutional rules, but insists that government itself is the problem, 
when it comes to the efficient allocation of scarce resources in society. Downsiz-
ing government to the necessary minimum would liberate markets to produce an 
efficient allocation of resources.  
In general, it is important to stress that public choice theory is all about model-
ling on the basis of strong but simple assumptions about political behaviour. It 
does not claim that these assumptions reflect all real behaviour in the political 
reality. The founding fathers of public choice Tullock & Buchanon (1962: 29) 
came up with the following caveat:  
‘even if the model (with its rational self-interest assumptions) proves to be useful in explain-
ing an important element of politics, it does not imply that all individuals act in accordance 
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with the behavioural assumption made or that any one individual acts in this way at all times 
(…) the theory of collective choice can explain only some undetermined fraction of collec-
tive action. However, so long as some part of all individual behaviour (…) is, in fact, moti-
vated by utility maximisation, and so long as the identification of the individual with the 
group does not extend to the point of making all individual utility functions identical, an 
economic-individualist model of political activity should be of some positive worth.’  
An important idea, brought forth by public choice theorists, is the concept of 
rent-seeking. 
Rent-seeking and privatisation 
The concept of rent-seeking 
The concept of rent-seeking, in its most general meaning, refers to the behaviour 
of an individual, company, or government attempting to make a profit without 
making a product, producing wealth, or otherwise contributing to society. The 
concept goes back to a distinction (made by the classic economist Adam Smith) 
of different forms of income: Profit, wage and rent. Profits and wages are income 
based on a consensual agreement between parties engaging in mutually beneficial 
transactions. Rent, on the other hand, is income obtained when parties are ex-
cluded from otherwise accessible transactions. The classic example of Adam 
Smith was the guild system: A group of craftsmen effectively forming a cartel, 
excluding other non-member craftsmen from offering services. The rent, thus ex-
tracted, is the higher price the craftsmen can ask of their clients by lack of com-
petition. 
In modern economic life, there are many forms of rent-seeking behaviour. 
Very common in advanced economies is (economic) lobbying with a govern-
ment. Whenever a government holds monopoly powers in a sector of the econ-
omy, firms, or the whole sector, are induced to influence the government agency 
responsible to obtain regulation in their favour. Such regulation may exclude 
competitors, it may increase government determined tariffs and prices, etc. One 
example is the market for telecommunication. Regulation of that market is 
deemed necessary for instance to ensure uninterrupted interconnection between 
different providers. Because of the requirement of interconnectivity, different 
providers can easily enter into collusion to form a price-cartel. The higher price 
customers have to pay due to lack of competition is a form of rent-seeking. gov-
ernment regulation in such a market typically aims at determining feasible tariffs: 
A price that a fully competitive market would produce. Of course, the firms in 
the market will strive for a tariff that is higher than one that is economically fea-
sible. Whenever they succeed in convincing the government agency to decide ac-
cordingly, they have created a situation for rent-seeking. 
On the other end of the spectrum of rent-seeking behaviour, one finds bribery 
and corruption. Generally, corruption means that an actor abuses an authority, 
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with which he is entrusted, for personal gain. That actor can be a procurement 
officer in a private firm taking money from a provider in exchange for awarding 
a contract. The actor can also be a government official, for instance allowing an 
illegal tax break or an illegal permit to a firm in exchange for a reward from that 
firm.  
 
Rent-seeking public officials 
Public choice theorists have applied the concept of rent-seeking to explain rela-
tionships between politicians and public officials, on the one hand, and private 
firms on the other hand. In modelling this relationship, public officials in that re-
lation are conceived to be pursuing self-interest, and thus show a tendency to 
make decisions or choose policies that create opportunity for rent-seeking in or-
der to ‘maximise their level of compensation’ (Krueger 1974; Mbaku 2000; Har-
ris 2003). Krueger (1974), for example, discusses a type of rent-seeking in which 
public officials make decisions that increase government involvement in the 
economy – not to further the public good, but because the larger the role of gov-
ernment in the economy, the more the interaction between public officials and 
clientele, and the more opportunities for extracting illicit fees from their clientele.  
Generally, rent-seeking by public officials is wasteful and counterproductive, 
leading to inefficient allocation and use of resources. Renger & Wolff (2000: 6) 
summarise the welfare costs of rent seeking thus: 
‘The social and economic effects of rent seeking take many forms. In the long term the result 
is total distortion of the structure of social and economic incentives and misallocation of re-
sources, leading to heavy welfare losses and social costs. Rent seeking hinders economic 
growth and social development (...) [it] is one of the main causes of underdevelopment and 
poverty in numerous developing countries.’ 
Again, just as in other strands of public choice literature, different authors draw 
different conclusions when applying the concept of rent-seeking on the behaviour 
of public officials. For some, the opportunities and incentives for rent-seeking in 
public bureaucracies are so large and widespread, that they advocate minimising 
government involvement in societal and especially in economic affairs. Because 
of the supposedly extensive rent-seeking in the public sector, the market is con-
sidered a better system for resource allocation. Others search for institutional 
safeguards that would minimise rent-seeking in public organisations.  
These differences notwithstanding, hardly any scholar would claim that all 
public officials are rent-seeking all the time. In reality, there is a broad spectrum 
of types of behaviour of public officials, as depicted in figure 15.1. In this figure, 
the spectrum is simplified to three categories of behaviour: Serving the public 
interest, rent-seeking and corruption. At one end of the spectrum, there may be 
no rent seeking as public officials observe governance ethics in making deci-
sions, serve the public, promote the public interest and behave legally, according 
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to standard procedures. At the next (middle) point of the spectrum, there is rent-
seeking whereby public officials make decisions and commit themselves in ways 
that promote self-interest and self-gain. At the extreme end (i.e. centre) of the 
spectrum, the rent-seeking behaviour of public officials turns into grand corrup-
tion. 
 
Figure 15.1 Public governance behavioural continuum 
 
 
 
Rent-seeking and corruption 
Renger & Wolff (2000) point out that there is extensive linkage between rent 
seeking and corruption, which is at the extreme end of the spectrum. Rent seek-
ing becomes corruption either where politicians and bureaucrats specifically ex-
ploit their official opportunities and manipulate the existing institutional frame-
work to serve their own private gains or where illegal financial benefits (e.g. 
bribes) are used in rent seeking. Public officials then utilise public authority, en-
trusted to them for the safeguarding of public interests, solely for personal advan-
tage and/or for the advantage of groups (entrepreneurs or others) that pay them. 
Fredricksson & Svensson (2003: 1385) show that a government may choose a 
particular policy after its officials have been bribed or promised a bribe by ‘an 
interested group of lobbyists’. In an attempt to clandestinely redistribute state 
wealth to themselves, public officials may issue statements that confuse the pub-
lic and conceal the truth about an existing situation (see Harsch 1993: 33; Mbaku 
1996: 100).  
Szeftel (2000) reveals that in most African countries, privatisation has wid-
ened the opportunity for corruption as public officials orchestrate the public 
benefits of privatisation to conceal their hidden motive of pursuing self-
enrichment.  
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Privatisation and development  
In the course of the 1980s, donor nations developed a set of policies for the sup-
port of developing countries; policies that were highly influenced by neo-liberal 
thinking. This set of policies came to be known as ‘The Washington Consensus’, 
a phrase coined in 1989 by American economist, John Williamson. The Wash-
ington Consensus reflected the lending practices of the World Bank, (the multi-
national organisation for economic development and financial support), the IMF 
and other public lending institutions. 
The Washington Consensus condensed those lending conditions in a ten-point 
programme:  
1. keeping competitive exchange rates within the country;  
2. liberalising foreign investment opportunities;  
3. privatising enterprises run by the state;  
4. giving strong legal guarantees for property rights;  
5. letting interest rates be handled by the market and remaining positive and 
moderate;  
6. moving spending away from subsidies and towards direct investment in in-
frastructure, health care, and education;  
7. reforming the tax system to a broader tax base; having a policy of strong fis-
cal responsibility;  
8. liberalising trade by removing or lessening restrictions on imports and tar-
iffs;  
9. cutting into regulation that lessens competition, except in the cases of con-
sumer safety, environmental health, and financial institutional stability. 
10. legal security for property rights. 
 
By 2010, the Washington Consensus became dead, and the reviews made in 
hindsight, are mixed at best. Yet in the previous 25 years, the World Bank’s deci-
sions concerning loans to developing countries were firmly based on that policy. 
Some critics claim that the Washington Consensus was ethno-centric and did not 
take into account the special circumstances and factors that influenced or ham-
pered economic development in third-world countries. Put in a different way, the 
Washington Consensus was a derivate of economic theories that were designed 
to deal with full-fledged Western economies. The applicability of such theories 
under totally different circumstances in developing countries was disputable at 
the very least. A short review of the economic debates, especially within the pub-
lic choice framework, will show these theoretical roots. 
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Privatisation and other market-type provisions 
Although public choice theory is mainly concerned with designing better public 
institutions, some scholars have emphasised that ‘small government is better 
government’ (Niskanen 1971). They regard the market as generally a better sys-
tem for producing goods and services than a government bureaucracy, because it  
• empowers the consumers by giving them a wider choice of services;  
• stimulates competition;  
• reduces the power of bureaucrats acting as ‘gatekeepers’ to control ‘the allo-
cation of services in a paternalistic or authoritarian manner’ (Self 1993: 129); 
and  
• reduces monopoly and promotes efficiency resulting from the desire by or-
ganisations to compete for and win clients (Drache & Sullivan 1999). 
 
Scholars that promote the market as the more efficient system for production and 
distribution, often fail to consider the steps to be taken to ensure that the transi-
tion from public provision to market provision does indeed attains its objectives. 
Also, there is often little concern about the environment in which a new market 
structure has to function. The assumption seems to be that once the bureaucrats 
have been put out of the way, the market will not only produce strategies that 
will maximise economic efficiency, but will also render a conducive environment 
for implementation of those strategies. 
The defendants of systems of state involvement argue that the public interest 
of public officials is attested by the level of achievement attained by the public 
sector in many parts of the world today. Self (2000), for example, contends that 
there is no clear-cut evidence to prove that private firms are necessarily efficient 
in a technical sense. Stiglitz (2000) pursues this point further, stating that gov-
ernments which are transferring public entities to the private sector on grounds of 
efficiency should look at the steel mills established and run by the Korean and 
Taiwanese governments to realise that some of the most efficient and profitable 
enterprises in the world are in the public sector.  
There also exists scepticism on the question of efficiency, competition and 
utility maximisation that are supposedly offered by the economic market (Drache 
& Sullivan 1999; Self 1993, 2000; Lee 2006). Self (2000), for example, argues 
that, technically speaking, there is no clear-cut evidence to prove that the eco-
nomic market is necessarily efficient in resource allocation. The author is also 
critical of the view that market forces promote competition (Self 1993: 104). In 
the author’s opinion, market competition is often reversed when conglomerates 
assume monopoly in the economy. Stiglitz (2000) argues that, given a properly 
organised and managed environment, collective institutions are capable of pro-
moting the efficient use of resources.  
 Rent-seeking behaviour and the organisation of utilities  
 
 
189
Tanzania electric supply company’s divesture decision  
Introduction 
The crucial role played by electricity in the social and economic development of 
society is well documented in various literatures (see Myllyntaus 1991; Nathan 
1998; Wilkinson & Hill 2000; Steiner 2001; Pineau 2002). Electricity is de-
scribed as ‘the lifeblood’ and one of the ‘building blocks’ of modern society in 
the sense that apart from being a vital service to the economy, at the root of all 
productivity improvement, it is ‘an important final good consumed by house-
holds’ (Steiner 2001: 43). In this regard, it is one of the sectors in which reform, 
if need be, has to be carefully considered.  
Although Tanzania’s electricity (power) sector has been liberalised to allow 
independent power producers (IPPs); the public power utility, Tanzania Electric 
Supply Company (TANESCO) is still the monopoly supplier of electricity in the 
country. However, in 2002 the firm was placed under a management contractor 
as ‘a run-up to the power utility’s divesture and privatisation. Basu (1994) argues 
that placing a public enterprise on a management contract, prior to divesture, is a 
form of privatisation. The following sections present the implementation of the 
decision. 
 
Tanzania’s power sector liberalisation 
Liberalisation of the power sector in Tanzania traces its history to 1985 when the 
IMF included restructuring the energy sector as one of the conditions to be met 
by the government of Tanzania for accessing the Fund’s loans. The IMF de-
manded restructuring the power sector because TANESCO was, in the Fund’s 
view, ‘inefficient’ and had become a ‘burden’ to the government. The IMF’s de-
cision to include electricity in its lending conditions was followed by the World 
Bank when the latter declared it would no longer ‘finance power projects where 
poorly performing and highly polluting utilities and their governments were un-
willing to carry out fundamental structural reforms’ (World Bank 1993: 72). Co-
incidentally, the Bank’s declaration was made shortly after receiving a USD 300 
million loan application from the Tanzanian government to finance the imple-
mentation of the Lower Kihansi Hydropower Project (LKHP).  
In 1993, Tanzania issued a new electricity industry policy and restructured 
framework (revised in October 1999). The policy spelled out the sector’s main 
objectives as: Promoting competition in the power sector; increasing sector effi-
ciency to meet electricity demand; accelerating electrification to ensure access by 
the broadest cross-section of the population; ensuring the long-term economic 
viability and sustainability of the electricity industry; and reducing public expen-
diture by transferring to the private capital the commercial risks inherent in elec-
tricity investment. To realise these objectives, the policy outlined a number of 
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strategies to be adopted – including restructuring and unbundling the present, 
vertically integrated monopoly utility into functional units of generation, trans-
mission and distribution; introducing competition in the sector while safeguard-
ing stakeholders and customer interests through regulation; establishing an inde-
pendent regulatory agency; and improving efficiency in the distribution system.  
This policy change was followed by two important occurrences in the coun-
try’s power sector. Firstly, the Kihansi hydropower project financiers, led by the 
World Bank, released USD 275 million for the Kihansi project and implementa-
tion of the 180MW project started in July 1994. Secondly, two independent 
power producers, Songas Limited (Songas) and Independent Power Tanzania 
Limited (IPTL), were licensed by the Ministry of energy and Minerals (MEM) to 
generate power for sale to the existing public power utility, TANESCO. Songas 
was created in October 1995 by two Canadian companies in partnership with the 
government of Tanzania, TANESCO and Tanzania Petroleum Development 
Corporation (TPDC). The aim of the USD 350 million project was to implement 
the Songo Songo Gas to Electricity Project, in Kilwa District of southern Tanza-
nia, by constructing the gas processing facilities on Songo Songo island and the 
232 km long pipeline network to transport natural gas to Dar es Salaam, where it 
would be burnt to generate up to 115MW of electricity for the National Grid. The 
project was scheduled for completion in 2004.  
 
The IPTL emerged in 1995, in the wake of a visit to Malaysia by the then ruling 
party’s Secretary General and Minister for Planning in July 1994, during which 
Tanzania’s power supply problems were discussed between him and the Malay-
sian government, as well as potential Malaysian investors. Following this visit, a 
seven-man delegation from Mechmar of Malaysia visited Tanzania in August 
1994 and held discussions with government leaders and TANESCO manage-
ment. Around this time, a Tanzanian company, VIP Engineering, was registered 
and entered into a joint-partnership with Mechmar to form IPTL. The new com-
pany began negotiating a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with the Ministry of 
Energy and Minerals (MEM), culminating in the signing of the Memorandum of 
Understanding in June 1995. The terms of the agreement included that IPTL 
would:  
1. construct a USD 150 million power plant at Tegeta, in the outskirts of the city 
of Dar es Salaam; 
2. generate and add to the National Grid 100MW of electricity, using low speed 
engine turbines;  
3. have the project ready for commissioning by 1998; and  
4. be paid by TANESCO USD 4.8 million monthly for generating 100MW of 
electricity over a 20-year period upon becoming operational.  
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However, it was later revealed that VIP Engineering, Tanzania’s IPTL equity 
holder, ‘is (in fact) owned by a group of senior government and party officials’ 
(East African, 5 March 2001). 
The signing of the IPTL project was greeted by opposition from the World 
Bank, arguing that the IPTL’s USD 150 million project was too costly and would 
have a direct bearing on the price of power per unit when operational. The World 
Bank also contended that the cost of the project had been inflated because the es-
timated cost of installing 1MW of power was USD 1 million, and, therefore, the 
true cost of the project would have been USD 100 million against the USD 150 
million , claimed by IPTL management. The IPTL investors argued that their ac-
tual cost of installing 1MW was USD 1.5 million and had, therefore, spent USD 
150 million to install 10 generators by March 1998. In view of this argument, the 
World Bank blamed the government of Tanzania for agreeing to be part of such a 
project, and henceforth threatened to suspend its USD 28 million pledge for the 
Mnazi Bay gas project, as well as its support for the USD 300 million Lower Ki-
hansi Hydropower Project.  
Following the World Bank’s displeasure in the IPTL project, the government, 
through TANESCO, issued IPTL with a notice of default on 9th April 1998, stat-
ing that without informing TANESCO, IPTL unilaterally decided to substitute 
medium-speed diesel engines for the slow-speed engines, as stipulated in the 
agreement. In view of the substitution, TANESCO wanted the project cost to be 
re-negotiated and put its own estimates at USD 90 million instead of USD 150 
million. A statement from the State House voiced government support to suspend 
the agreement, arguing that the government could not allow Tanzania’s electric-
ity consumers and the economy to be burdened with extraordinarily high electric-
ity tariffs. However, IPTL refused to either recognise the suspension or renegoti-
ate the project, arguing that the government was aware of the substitution and 
that the decision to suspend the project was being influenced by the World Bank. 
Accusing the Bank’s interference in the agreement, the Tanzanian counterpart in 
the IPTL project stated: 
‘When IPTL signed a project agreement with the government, the first place we went to look 
for funds was the World Bank, but the institution denied us funds. And that was not the end. 
The Bank made sure that we did not get money wherever we went to, and this is because of 
the Bank’s child-project, Songas Limited.’ 
The wrangle between TANESCO and IPTL ended in the High Court of Tanzania 
when, in September 1998, IPTL filed a law suit, seeking a monthly damages 
payment of USD 3.623 million from TANESCO, beginning September 1998 un-
til the matter was resolved. The firm alleged that it had incurred a loss of USD 
18.115 million due to delays in operationalising the project that was ready for 
commissioning. The High Court granted IPTL’s petition, prompting TANESCO 
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to seek an appeal with the Tanzania Court of Appeal. However, before the appeal 
was lodged, the government ordered TANESCO to refer the matter to the Lon-
don-based International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (IC-
SID) for arbitration. IPTL objected to having ICSID as its arbitrator, preferring 
the International Chamber of Commerce instead. IPTL argued that apart from the 
ICSID operating on the basis of outdated rules; it was an affiliate of the World 
Bank that had some interest in the dispute.  
TANESCO prevailed in November 1999 in its dispute with IPTL, arbitrated 
by the ICSID, and it paid an arbitration fee of Tsh 5 billion. However, while the 
dispute was still undecided by the ICSID, a US-based investigation agency called 
Decision Strategies Fairfax International (DSFX) released a report revealing, that 
between 1994 and 1995, the Malaysian company Mechmar’s representatives had 
paid between USD 20,000 and USD 200,000 to the power utility’s senior manag-
ers and government officials as inducement for the approval of the IPTL project. 
In its conclusion, the DSFI report stated: 
‘Based on testimonial evidence and supporting data…there currently exists circumstantial 
evidence stoutly suggesting that the IPTL project was planned, approved and implemented 
pursuant to a pattern of corrupt behaviour at the highest level in government.’ 
The ICSID ruling, issued on 12 July 2001, declared that TANESCO should pay 
IPTL USD 123 million instead of USD 150 million for the project and a monthly 
tariff payment of USD 3 million, instead of USD 4.8 million, for 20 years, 
whether or not the plant was generating electricity. 
 
Towards the privatisation of TANESCO 
government efforts to restructure TANESCO became increasingly harnessed af-
ter a European Community team visited Tanzania on 30 June 2000. Addressing 
Tanzania’s Parliamentary Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Com-
mittee, the head of the European Community delegation commented on the elec-
tricity sector, citing mismanagement as the main reason TANESCO was per-
forming so poorly and went on to recommend privatisation as the only strategy 
for solving the existing problems, including high tariffs. In its defence, however, 
TANESCO management issued a statement on 5 July 2000, citing the factors for 
the public utility’s poor performance as the high cost of investments in the ex-
pansion of generation, transmission and distribution; worn out equipment; high 
fuel prices for thermal plants; currency exchange rate fluctuations; reduction of 
output in power stations, due to depletion of water reserves, resulting from un-
controlled irrigation and deforestation along the banks of rivers feeding into hy-
dropower dams; declining water levels in dams due to siltation, resulting from 
uncontrolled farming around dams; and long outstanding bills mainly owed by 
government and its parastatals. TANESCO argued that given the nature of some 
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of the problems, no management, however efficient, could achieve results with-
out support from the government. Having been accused of inefficiency, 
TANESCO issued a three day ultimatum for its debtors, including the govern-
ment which owed Tsh 51.5 billion in unsettled power bills, to settle their out-
standing bills or face a ‘black out’. The government responded by saying that it 
was, in fact, owed by TANESCO a total of Tsh 250 billion, given to the firm for 
implementation of projects. 
Following the departure of the European Union delegation, the government 
commissioned an external consultant, the London-based Delloitte, Touche & 
Tohmatsu (hereinafter referred to as Delloitte), in early 2000 to conduct a finan-
cial and management review of TANESCO’s operations. In July 2000, Delloitte 
produced a report detailing operational and managerial weaknesses of 
TANESCO and recommended the hiring of an external firm to manage the public 
power utility during the transition phase to privatisation. According to Delloitte, 
a foreign management firm would enable TANESCO to increase its income by 
15% to Tsh 22 billion per year. 
In the wake of Delloite’s recommendation, the Parastatal Sector Reform 
Commission (PSRC) issued an invitation to tender for Management and Support 
Services for TANESCO. Eleven firms expressed interest in managing the public 
utility, including Arnelt Consulting (USA); Birks Energy (Sweden); ESB Inter-
national (Ireland); Eskom Enterprise Pty Ltd (South Africa); IberAfrica (Spain); 
Eltel Network International (Finland); NRECA International (USA); Vattenfall 
(Sweden); Net Group Solutions (South Africa); and Revenue Loss Management 
(South Africa). Following technical evaluation against ‘an agreed set of criteria’, 
six firms were selected for pre-qualification. These were ESB International; 
Eskom International (Pty Ltd); IberAfrica; NRECA International; Vattenfall and 
Net Group Solutions. However, before the six short-listed firms could bid, PSRC 
arranged a ‘pre-bid conference’ on 8 November 2001 to which the bidders were 
invited to attend. The main objectives of a pre-bid conference included: Describ-
ing the project and its expectations to bidders; generating interest to promote 
maximum competition among bidders; clarifying items in the bid documents; and 
generating feedback and advice from bidders. Four firms, Eskom Enterprise 
(South Africa); Net Group Solutions (South Africa); ESB International (Ireland) 
and Vattenfall (Sweden) attended this meeting. 
Bidders were given until 30 November 2001 to submit their bids to PSRC. 
Meanwhile, the government commissioned the USA-based Stone and Webster 
Consultants for USD 3 million to give advice on TANESCO’s restructuring, in-
cluding unbundling the power utility; developing the electricity trading arrange-
ments and the regulatory environment; developing the approach to improve ac-
cess to rural electrification; giving advice on the privatisation of the companies 
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that would result from the ‘unbundling’ process; identifying and developing 
changes to the required legislation for the restructuring of the electricity sector; 
and implementation of the approved structure for the sector.  
Upon the expiration of the bid period, three bidders – Eskom Enterprise 
(South Africa), Net Group Solutions (South Africa) and ESB International (Ire-
land) – had submitted a bid. A tug of war erupted between the technocrats in the 
PSRC and politicians in the MEM regarding which firm, Escom Enterprises or 
Net Group Solutions (both of South Africa), should be awarded TANESCO’s 
management contract. PSRC’s choice of Escom Enterprises was rejected by the 
Minister of Energy and Minerals, arguing that the choice lacked transparency. 
The TANESCO Board of Directors also voiced reservations on the manner in 
which bidder evaluations were carried out. In the view of the TANESCO Board, 
ESB International of Ireland seemed a more competent bidder compared to the 
South African firms. 
The tug of war culminated in Net Group Solutions (hereinafter referred to as 
NGS) from South Africa being declared, on 11 December 2001, to have won the 
contract to run TANESCO. A Management Support Services Contract (MSSC) 
between the government and NGS was signed on 21 December 2001. Under the 
terms of the MSSC, NGS was required to manage all aspects of the operations, 
maintenance and expansion of TANESCO; improve TANESCO’s financial, 
commercial and technical performance by applying commercial electric utility 
management principles; implementing a capital investment programme focusing 
on network rehabilitation, accelerating electrification and interconnections for 
cross border trading; participating in the pre-privatisation transition activities of 
TANESCO; and implementing the corporate restructuring by ring-fencing the 
main business units (generation, transmission and distribution). Justifying the 
hire of NGS, Tanzania’s Third Phase President stated that TANESCO’s man-
agement had failed to deliver and the government could not continue using tax 
payers’ money to sustain it. The President acknowledged that the government 
and its various institutions owed TANESCO over USD 50 million unsettled bills. 
In early 2002, the East African revealed that NGS was, in fact, a small engi-
neering firm in South Africa and was not capable of running a big organisation 
like TANESCO. According to the Newspaper report, Net Group Solutions’ local 
partner in Tanzania was the President’s brother-in-law, and members of the board 
of directors in the local partner included names of primary school children. Fol-
lowing this revelation by the East African, the Parliamentary Finance and Eco-
nomic Committee demanded to see TANESCO’s management contract, a de-
mand that was not honoured by government.  
 These developments prompted the Tanzania Union of Industrial and Commer-
cial Workers (TUICO) to convene a meeting in Dar es Salaam on 20 March 2002 
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to discuss TANESCO’s privatisation. After the meeting, TUICO issued a state-
ment rejecting government accusation that TANESCO’s management was ineffi-
cient, arguing that the government was solely responsible for the problems ex-
perienced by the firm. The Union charged that, apart from the government not 
paying power bills, its officials had used TANESCO funds for their personal gain 
and cited Energy and Minerals Minister as having used Tsh 1,320,000 from 
TANESCO to install an air conditioning system in his private house. In TUICO’s 
view, TANESCO’s performance was only being used as scapegoat to justify pri-
vatisation because:  
‘TANESCO has been given the burden of electrifying rural areas to please politicians who 
used electricity supply to rural areas as a measure of political success when appealing for re-
election. Besides, government institutions on the mainland and in Zanzibar have, for years, 
been supplied with electricity without paying their bills. In return to all these, TANESCO is 
unjustly accused of being unable to generate profit and, on that basis, the government is giv-
ing it to foreigners.’ 
TUICO also raised a number of issues, which provided ‘circumstantial evidence’ 
indicating that the award of tender to NGS was corrupt. Firstly, the Union 
pointed out that Tanzanian law requires tenders to be floated for ninety days to 
enable a large number of bidders to submit their bids. According to the Union, 
the TANESCO tender was floated for only 27 days. Besides, big companies with 
technical know-how and extensive experience in power supply were ‘sidelined’ 
in favour of the South Africans. Secondly, after the award of tender to NGS, sen-
ior government and PSRC officials had travelled to South Africa where they had 
received financial ‘kickbacks’ for facilitating the award of tender to the South 
African firm. 
TUICO demanded ‘a golden handshake’ of Tsh 80 billion and terminal bene-
fits amounting to Tsh 2 billion to be paid to TANESCO workers, before the firm 
was handed over to NGS. The Union argued that if the government was able to 
pay Tsh 60 billion to 320 Members of Parliament after every five-year term, pay-
ing Tsh 80 billion to 4,000 workers, some of whom had served the firm for over 
30 years, was not a big deal. The government rejected TUICO’s demands, argu-
ing that as the ‘owner’ of the power utility, it had the right to make investment 
decisions that were beneficial to the firm and the nation. Besides, the government 
argued that the workers were demanding the power utility to pay them an amount 
which it could not realise through its operations. 
While the workers were haggling with the government, TANESCO announced 
a 10% power tariff rise on 1 April 2002. The increase was interpreted as having 
resulted from pressure from higher authorities because normally, TANESCO 
would issue a press release to announce and justify its intention to raise power 
tariffs. In this case, however, customers only learnt about it when they went to 
the company’s pay outlets to pay their bills. The next day, newspaper headlines 
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were filled with customers’ ‘woes’ demanding for the privatisation of 
TANESCO’s. On the same day, the power tariff rise was publicly criticised, the 
Cabinet approved and sanctioned NGS to take over the running of TANESCO 
for a period of two years, and on the same day NGS managers arrived in the 
country from South Africa. 
On 5 April 2002, the Minister for E&M was summoned to appear before the 
Parliamentary Financial and Economic Committee (FEC), which was unhappy 
with issues emanating from TANESCO, especially its rushed privatisation. At 
this meeting, the Minister explained that privatisation of the public power utility 
was the implementation of the power sector restructuring programme initiated by 
the government in 1992. As for the ‘new’ management that was to run 
TANESCO, the Minister defended the government’s decision, arguing that the 
current management had totally failed to enable TANESCO to meet public ex-
pectations. According to the Minister, corruption among the public utility’s man-
agers was one of the main factors that had damaged the performance of the firm, 
citing the Tsh 5.6 billion that had been spent on equipment ordered outside 
TANESCO’s established tender system. However, the FEC members wondered 
why the government was now so desperate in rushing TANESCO into privatisa-
tion if the restructuring programme was initiated ten years earlier, with 
TANESCO’s problems existing all along. They argued that the public power util-
ity could not be privatised in the absence of a proper inventory of the company’s 
assets, an inventory that was yet to be carried out. The Parliamentary Committee 
also wondered why the government should accuse only TANESCO’s manage-
ment of ‘unprocedural tendering’ when a report by the Controller and Auditor 
General (CAG) had shown that, in the year ending 30 June 2001, a total sum of 
Tsh 70,727,295,859 was either unaccounted for or had been spent on government 
ministries contrary to standard procedures. 
TANESCO’s new management was supposed to start work on 11 April 2002. 
However, on 10 April 2002, the firm’s workers issued a statement insisting that 
they would not allow the new managers to take over TANESCO until the fate of 
their demands, based on the ‘Voluntary Agreement’ submitted to the govern-
ment, was known. They also stated that TANESCO, a sensitive institution that 
bears the ‘souls’ of the citizens and the country’s economy, could not be man-
aged by a small firm like NGS, capable only of managing an engineering work-
shop. Moreover, the selection of NGS had not involved TANESCO’s Board of 
Directors. The stance of the TANESCO workers was supported by the Trade Un-
ion of Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA), in a statement issued on 11 April 2002 
and signed by all the Union’s eleven members.  
 As if to support TANESCO’s workers, a group of 46 MPs presented a submis-
sion to the National Assembly Speaker on 11 April 2002, petitioning the gov-
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ernment to submit, in Parliament, a copy of its agreement with the South African 
management firm. The MPs wanted the government to explain the procedure it 
used to nominate NGS; the sudden hike in tariffs for small users; and steps taken 
to account for monies which the Minister for E&M said had been ‘misappropri-
ated’. In their submission, the MPs stated that petitioning the government for an 
explanation was within the framework of good governance because the issue 
concerning TANESCO’s management contract had ‘raised more questions than 
answers among the public’. The House Speaker, in a letter dated on 11 April 
2002, informed the MPs that their petition could not be entertained because it 
was ‘unprocedural’ and was against a Parliamentary Standing Order which re-
quires that only one MP signs such a submission.  
Following the Speaker’s refusal to allow the petition from MPs, a Member of 
Parliament for Mbozi West, moved a private member’s motion on 13 April 2002, 
calling for the formation of a Parliamentary Probe Committee (PPC) to examine 
the functioning of the PSRC in relation to privatisation of public enterprises. In 
his petition, the MP cited the contractual problems of the National Bank of 
Commerce (NBC), Tanzania Telecommunications Company Limited (TTCL) 
and TANESCO privatisations as cases that called for an immediate investigation 
into the PSRC’s modus operandi. He contended that the entire privatisation pro-
gramme was ‘politically motivated’ and its effects would have far reaching im-
plications socially, economically and politically.  
Three days after the petition to undergo a probe committee on the PSRC was 
received by the Speaker, the Minister for Finance made two announcements in 
the House. Firstly, he announced that the government had decided to restore the 
subsidy it had removed in 1999 on power consumption for domestic users and 
would subsidise up to 100 units of the power consumed by each individual con-
sumer. Explaining the basis of the government decision to restore the subsidy, 
the Minister stated:  
‘TANESCO is like a sick person who requires all kinds of measures to restore his health. 
While government subsidy on its products is one such measures, there is need to bring the 
sick person to a ‘good doctor’ for a better intended future. This, therefore, provides good 
reasons for management change.’ 
Secondly, the Minister informed the Parliament that the government had decided 
to hand the probe on PSRC over to the Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB), 
with instruction to look into how the agreement with NGS was reached. He 
stated further that PCB would also investigate how the agreement between 
TANESCO and IPTL was consummated. According to the Minister, the decision 
to involve PCB in probing these issues was based on two factors including the 
cost aspect, if a parliamentary probe committee was to be involved; and PCB’s 
competence in undertaking such assignments. 
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One day following the Finance Minister’s announcements, there was a mini 
Cabinet reshuffle whereby the Minister for E&M (hereinafter referred to as Mr 
X) was replaced by someone new (hereinafter referred to as Mr Y). The removal 
of Mr X from the MEM was explained as resulting from his ‘failure to convinc-
ingly explain to MPs about tariff hikes and the signing of the contract agreement 
between the government and the South Africans’ government efforts in privatis-
ing TANESCO were bolstered by a statement issued by the Swedish Ambassador 
to Tanzania in April 2002, urging the government to ‘immediately’ divest the en-
ergy sector because ‘given the opportunity, the private sector would by far prove 
to be more cost-effective in achieving the country’s energy goals compared to the 
public sector’. This statement prompted the then President to address the nation 
soon after, explaining the government’s intention to privatise TANESCO and at-
tacking the firm’s management for failing to serve the country’s people. Reiterat-
ing the government’s decision to sign an agreement with NGS, the President said 
that TANESCO’s major and only problem was poor management and  
‘[T]herefore, in order to save consumers from paying high electricity tariffs and other woes 
resulting from an inefficient management, the government has signed a contract with Net 
Group Solutions to manage TANESCO. Contracting a foreign firm to run TANESCO is not 
only inevitable but also long overdue, and should be understood in the context of state inter-
est to improve TANESCO’s efficiency.’ 
The President went on to explain that although the government owes TANESCO 
over Tsh 52 billion in unsettled power bills, ‘it is not true that outstanding bills 
are the source of TANESCO’s problems’. According to the President, 
TANESCO had incurred heavy losses consecutively, since 1995, including Tsh 
26.4 billion (1995); Tsh 3.7 billion (1996); Tsh 3.1 billion (1997); Tsh 14.2 bil-
lion (1998); Tsh 25 billion (1999); and Tsh 61.7 billion (2000). In his view, set-
tlement of bills would, therefore, not solve the problems besetting the firm. 
On 1 May 2002, a group of five NGS managers arrived at the TANESCO 
Headquarters in Dar es Salaam, ready to begin work on the public utility. The 
government had arranged for NGS to access TANESCO offices, while workers 
were on May Day celebrations. However, the South Africans were confronted by 
a group of 300 angry TANESCO workers. The workers carried placards and 
chanted slogans to ridicule NGS as well as the government decision that had 
awarded the tender to NGS. Some of the words in the placards included: 
‘TANESCO is a public property, it is not the property of a few greedy govern-
ment leaders’; ‘Boers, go back home, you are only competent to manage a small 
workshop – not TANESCO’; and ‘We have the right to query problematic con-
tracts’ 
 The government issued an ultimatum on 15 May 2002, demanding that the 
workers who had besieged TANESCO head offices should vacate the premises or 
‘force would be applied’ to remove them. After this call had gone unheeded, a 
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contingent of heavily armed members of the paramilitary Field Force Unit (FFU) 
arrived at the TANESCO head offices on 17 May 2002. FFU is the country’s riot 
police unit, which is deployed to quell riots and ‘illegal’ demonstrations against 
government. On arrival, it dispersed the workers, throwing tear gas canisters and 
unleashing police dogs on them. After the workers were dispersed, the main gate 
was opened and the new managers moved in to take their offices. On the same 
day, the TANESCO’S local Managing Director (MD), and four of his senior 
managers from Corporate Services, Technical Services, Operations and Supplies 
directorates were sent on compulsory leave to pave the way for NGS managers. 
Armed members of the FFU remained at TANESCO head office for several 
weeks to ensure the new managers were not distracted from managing the firm. 
 
Performance of TANESCO under privatisation 
Upon starting work at TANESCO, the company’s new Managing Director (MD) 
from South Africa gave all TANESCO customers 21 days to settle their power 
bills or face power disconnection. Announcing this decision, the new MD argued 
that TANESCO would be empowered to supply electricity to the 90% of the rural 
population, if the 10% who have access to electricity settle their bills totalling to 
Tsh 111,858,164,727. He stated that the government owes Tsh 70 billion (i.e. 
63%) of the total amount owed. After the 21 days had passed, TANESCO began 
implementing power disconnections, starting with what are regarded in the coun-
try as ‘sensitive ministries and institutions’ including the Ministry of Defence 
and National Service (owing Tsh 6 billion), Ministry of Home Affairs (Tsh 5 bil-
lion), and the Dar es Salaam Water, Sanitation and Sewerage Authority (DA-
WASA) (Tsh 5 billion). It would be almost a treasonable offence if the previous 
management were to disconnect power in any ministry. Hardly a day following 
power disconnection, these institutions rushed to TANESCO to settle part of 
their long-standing power bills including Defence (Tsh 1.2 billion); Home Af-
fairs (Tsh 300 million); DAWASA (Tsh 900 million); and Zanzibar (Tsh 174 
million).  
TANESCO MD’s disconnection order began to indicate signs of sabotage 
when technicians disconnected power to customers who had paid their bills regu-
larly, creating a countrywide furore. One such customer was Tanzania Posts Cor-
poration, which filed a suit in Court, claiming Tsh 500 million compensation. 
Another new problem also arose whereby a person’s popularly, known among 
the local people as vishoka (i.e. illegal electricians), moved from one premise to 
another, assisting those whose power had been disconnected to illegally ‘tap’ 
electricity. 
Despite measures taken by the new management, a wave of accusations 
greeted the new managers on account of continued power interruptions and hikes 
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in tariffs. Besides, TANESCO reported a revenue loss of 40% and had been able 
to collect only Tsh 9 billion or 10.6% of the total outstanding debt. In what ap-
peared to be a response to being accused of ‘lack of managerial skills’ in running 
TANESCO, the NGS managers signed a Tsh 70 million deal with the South Af-
rican-based University of Stellenbosch Business School to conduct business 
training for them in Tanzania. The cost of this training was borne by TANESCO. 
The government’s frustration on TANESCO’s performance was revealed on 
28 March 2003, when the Minister for E&M summoned the TANESCO board 
chairman and gave him a two-week ultimatum to provide explanations on several 
issues; including why power interruptions in the country continued unabated; 
why power tariffs had not been reduced; and what contingency plans were in 
place to end the power crisis facing the country. TANESCO’s response to the 
ministerial ultimatum was contained in a letter to the Commissioner of Energy on 
10 April 2003. In its defence, the new management blamed the situation facing 
TANESCO on the agreement signed between the government and IPTL. The let-
ter stated in part:  
‘the financial models (in the agreement) show that the combined effects of the power  
purchase agreement (PPA) on the current and future structure of TANESCO, as well as the 
resultant electricity market after restructuring would be severe, if not completely unimple-
mentable.’ 
By November 2003, an assessment of about two years of TANESCO perform-
ance under the new management from South Africa revealed that the company’s 
performance ‘had declined drastically, both financially and technically’. How-
ever, the government announced that it would grant the firm a monthly subven-
tion of Tsh 7 billion to meet running costs for its two gas turbines at the Ubungo 
power station. This was a far cry from government’s intention to take TANESCO 
off the government budget through the signing of the latter’s Management Ser-
vice Contract. The government also applied for Tsh 70 billion from the World 
Bank to finance further restructuring of TANESCO, improve power reliability 
and expanding the power supply system. 
At about the same time, the government was challenging TANESCO over 
poor performance. Newspaper Reports revealed that two top government leaders 
teamed up to form a private company known as TANPOWER Resources, ‘with 
their wives, children and in-laws listed as shareholders’. TANPOWER Resources 
bought shares in the then state-owned Kiwira Coal Mine and re-named it Kiwira 
Coal and Power Limited (KCPL). Shortly afterwards, KCPL entered into a USD 
271 million (about Tsh 340 billion) with TANESCO for the supply of coal-fired 
electricity to the National Grid. 
NGS’ two-year contract to manage TANESCO ended on 30 April 2004. How-
ever, instead of terminating the contract on the basis of the unsatisfactory per-
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formance, the government renewed the contract with the firm for 30 months for 
USD 5,688,182. The government could have terminated the contract because 
NGS had failed to deliver desired results and TANESCO experienced a number 
of operational and managerial inefficiencies including high production costs, 
poor billing, poor fund collection system, and rampant corruption resulting in op-
erational losses and cash flow difficulties. In its letter to the IMF dated 22 July 
2004, the government acknowledged TANESCO’s problems and stated that the 
government was transferring Tsh 125 billion, or 1% of GDP to TANESCO ‘to 
cover the deterioration of its finances resulting from drought, oil prices and the 
financial impact of past investment decisions taken by government’. The gov-
ernment’s statement acknowledged the assertion, by the former management, that 
TANESCO’s problems were multifaceted and that no management, however ef-
ficient, could solve them without government support. It also acknowledged the 
fact that some of the power utility’s problems were the consequence of govern-
ment intervention in the firm’s investment decisions. 
The biggest test for NGS in TANESCO came in 2006 following a prolonged 
drought that threatened a countrywide black-out due to load-shedding. Respond-
ing to the problem, TANESCO’s MD expressed TANESCO’s urgent need for 
thermal generators to save the country from a looming blackout. To get the gen-
erators, TANESCO contracted three foreign firms to deliver gas turbines: Rich-
mond Development Corporation (RDC) of USA (100MW); Wartsila of Finland 
(100 MW); and Aggreco of the United Arab Emirates (40 MW)]. According to 
the TANESCO management, the three firms had been selected on the basis of 
‘thorough scrutiny of their documents by experts’. RDC pledged to deliver the 
power equipment within 150 days. Based on this assurance, the Forth Phase gov-
ernment’s newly elected President gave a televised statement assuring Tanzani-
ans that RDC would deliver the USD 172 million worth of new power equipment 
before 15 October 2006. However, it was revealed that RDC was not a registered 
company in the USA, as it had claimed. 
These events in the power sector resulted in the removal of, by the new Presi-
dent, the Minister for E&M and his deputy. Meanwhile NGS had submitted an 
application to renew its management contract with TANESCO for a third term in 
November 2006. This application was turned down by the new Minister for 
E&M. Explaining TANESCO’s predicament under NGS, the Minister said that 
the power utility had registered a Tsh 70 billion overdraft and was in a pathetic 
situation that would require four years to rectify. After failing to renew its con-
tract with the government, NGS’ South Africa-based Chairman summed up their 
experience in TANESCO, saying that no manager could possibly succeed to run 
TANESCO under the prevailing conditions.  
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In 2008, a Parliamentary Probe Committee was constituted to investigate how the 
tender to supply thermal generators to TANESCO was awarded to the so-called 
Richmond Development Corporation, a non-existing firm. In its Report, the 
Committee observed that the award of the tender to RDC was corruptly con-
summated, and implicated some highly placed government officials. This 
prompted the resignation of the country’s Prime Minister (PM) and two other 
senior Ministers. Following the PM’s resignation, the President dissolved the 
government, dismissing the entire Cabinet. 
Questions 
1. Public officials are rent-seekers who tend to ‘maximise their level of compensation’. Explain 
what you understand by this statement. Under which conditions might this statement be true? 
2. Generally speaking, what are the arguments against the assumptions against the proponents 
of privatisation and marketing production? 
3. Explain what you understand by public officials’ behavioural continuum. What is the contin-
uum depicting? How can it be applied in analysis? 
4. Identify rent-seeking behaviour by public officials and by private entrepreneurs in the case 
study. What are the conditions that make this rent-seeking possible? 
5. Can you identify corrupt behaviour by public officials and by private entrepreneurs in the 
case study? In what way do you distinguish this behaviour from rent-seeking? What are the 
conditions that make corrupt behaviour in the case study possible? 
6. From your analysis of the case study, was the decision to privatise the Tanzania Electric 
Supply Company in accordance with the Washington Consensus? Explain your answer. 
7. After viewing this case study, what would you generally say about privatisation as a policy 
choice in emerging economies? 
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